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Introduction 
At the onset of the recent financial crisis, economists’ attention towards the impact of international 
policies on financial conditions increased considerably. This is especially true with respect to many 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, which since 1996 were already undergoing major changes in their 
portfolio composition due to the debt relief initiative (HIPCs/MDRI). As a matter of fact, the mutual 
occurrence of the two events led to significant changes in developing countries’ borrowing behavior 
and in their debt portfolio, whose underlying patterns are still to be thoroughly analyzed. 
 
On the one hand, low interest rates in Advances Economies (AEs) since 2009 have fueled capital 
flows towards high yield emerging countries, urging them to deal with capital inflows problem. On 
the other hand, the global financial turmoil limited the availability of external resources to poor 
countries and pushed them to tap their almost unexplored local markets. Also the HIPCs/MDRI 
Initiative - which reduced the external debt of many Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – might have 
favored this switch in portfolio composition.  
  
This thesis is a collection of four essays on the impact of international policies on debt and borrowing 
behavior of developing countries. It focuses first on Low Income Countries (LICs) and then it 
enlarges the analysis to Emerging Markets (EMs). 
 
The first two chapters are mainly concerned with the determinants of domestic public debt in LICs. 
The third chapter deepens into their borrowing behavior and studies the impact of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) regulation on public and private flows. Finally, the fourth paper enlarges the 
analysis to richer countries and studies the impact of US monetary policy on capital flows and 
domestic credit in Emerging Markets. 
 
In the first chapter I introduce a new dataset on the stock and structure of domestic public debt in 
Low-Income Countries and I describe its evolution over time. I show that since 1996 the level of 
internal financing in poor countries has increased. I also bring evidence that despite domestic debt is 
costlier than external financing, over time poor countries have been able to increase the share of long-
term domestic debt and decrease borrowing costs. Another result is that the concentration of the 
investor base, mainly dominated by commercial banks and by the Central Bank, may crowd out 
lending to the private sector.  The dataset represents a complete novelty as compared to the existing 
datasets, because it puts together information on domestic debt in a way that ensures comparability 
across countries (definition of domestic debt, level of public sector, liabilities included) and it 
recollects up-to-date information on domestic debt composition (instruments, maturity structure and 
investor base).  
 
Although the first paper identifies potential costs and  benefits of internal financing in LICs, the 
analysis does not  suffice to identify the determinants of its evolution. In the second chapter I use the 
new dataset to understand  the reasons behind domestic debt increase  despite its higher cost vis-à-vis 
external financing. I focus my attention on the dichotomy between demand and supply factors in 
order to distinguish whether borrowing behavior is mainly driven by international or by domestic 
determinants. The analysis shows clearly that domestic debt development in LICs is at an early stage 
and  financial needs are still probably satisfied mainly through external financing. We also find that 
domestic debt is negatively correlated with moderate inflation and trade openness suggesting that in 
presence of monetary stability countries tend to switch toward domestic debt  while countries more 
outward oriented issue more debt externally. Interestingly we  find that internal financing is positively 
correlated with liquidity in circulation and hyperinflation, providing a warning signal of the tendency 
of governments to inflate the debt away.  
 
 2 
 
In the third chapter I deepen the analysis on borrowing behavior of poor countries focusing on the 
impact of international prescriptions on the flows of private and public borrowing in LICs. The aim is 
to investigate whether restrictions on non-concessional borrowing imposed by the IMF have reduced 
the opportunity for LICs to borrow externally, forcing them to change their financing strategy.  To 
assess this behavior, I use the statistical technic known as Propensity Score Matching and then study 
the impact of the IMF policy on the size and composition of debt flows to LICs.  The results highlight 
interesting aspects of international policy prescriptions and their impact on developing countries. In 
particular they show that LICs do not accumulate loans at market rates (non-concessional) more 
rapidly when not subject to the limits imposes by the IMF, suggesting that poor countries may not be 
able to attract them in the first place. The analysis also suggests that countries turn to higher levels of 
non-concessional borrowing as their economies grow richer, not because of the absence of constraints 
imposed on their borrowing behavior. On the contrary, the results show that the presence of IMF 
programs can play a catalytic role in attracting resources at favorable terms (concessional).  
 
Finally, the aim of the fourth chapter is to understand how US monetary policy affects borrowing 
behavior and credit in developing economies. Given that LICs have still limited access to 
international market and, capital flows may not react to market sentiments, I shift the focus of the 
analysis from Low Income Countries to Emerging Markets. Using Vector Autoregressions (VAR) I 
look, first, at the impact of the Federal Fund Rate (FFR) on total gross capital inflows; second, I look 
at  whether shocks in U.S. monetary policy have a different impact on different type of flows (foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investments, other inflows); and finally I study the  impact on US long 
interest rate on the breakdown of gross capital flows and credit to the private sector. The results bring 
evidence that restrictive monetary policy increases market risk aversion and decreases gross capital 
flows and credit. Also the analysis on gross flows breakdown suggests that the results are mainly 
driven by portfolio investments, suggesting that debt and equity flows may act as transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy in EMs. Last, we show that shocks in the long term interest rate – 
that we interpret as shocks to the term premium  - do not impact gross capital flows.  
 
I hope that this work will add to the literature on debt sustainability in developing countries and to 
studies advocating the benefits and costs of a composition tilted towards long-term local currency 
debt. Despite Emerging Markets have proved resilient to the global financial crisis and poor countries 
have improved their debt external position in the wake of the debt relief initiative, governments 
should ensure they take active steps to manage capital inflows boom and they do not drift to an 
unsustainable path of debt accumulation falling in the well know “this time is different” attitude.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Domestic public debt in low-income countries: trends and 
structure1 
 
Giovanna Bua Juan Pradelli Andrea F. Presbitero 
The World Bank         
Università Statale di Milano 
The World Bank Università Politecnica  
delle  Marche & MoFiR 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces a new dataset on the stock and structure of domestic debt in 36 Low-Income 
Countries over the period 1971-2011. We characterize the recent trends regarding LICs domestic 
public debt and explore the relevance of different arguments put forward on the benefits and costs of 
government borrowing in local public debt markets. The main stylized fact emerging from the data is 
the increase in domestic government debt since 1996. We also observe that poor countries have been 
able to increase the share of long-term instruments over time and that the maturity lengthening went 
together with a decrease in borrowing costs. However, the concentration of the investor base, mainly 
dominated by commercial banks and the Central Bank, may crowd out lending to the private sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: E62; H63; O23 
Keywords: Domestic debt; Debt structure; Low-income countries, HIPCs 
 
  
                                                     
 
1 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not 
necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated 
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. We gratefully 
acknowledge the financial support of the World Bank’s Research Support Budget. We also thank Reza Baqir and Alessandro 
Missale for comments on an earlier draft.  
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1. Introduction 
Analyses on government borrowing and debt management in Low Income Countries (LICs) have 
traditionally focused on external debt. This scarcity of studies is partly due to the lack of a 
comprehensive database on domestic public debt and the historical prominence of external borrowing 
compared to domestic borrowing. Until recently, in fact, foreign liabilities have been the largest 
component of the public debt in LICs, the target of debt relief initiatives such as Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and the main concern of the 
joint Fund/Bank Debt Sustainability Framework for LICs (LIC DSF). In recent years, however, LICs 
made substantial efforts to develop their local public debt markets and relied heavily on domestic 
sources to finance budget deficits during the global crisis, sparking the attention of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the academic community. 
 
Because of the constraints indicated above, the existing literature on government borrowing in LICs is 
relative scant and inconclusive with regard to the benefits and cost of domestic liabilities relative to 
foreign liabilities. Only few studies assess empirically the rationale (if any) for LIC governments to 
gradually shift their financing strategies towards domestic sources and away from external sources. 
 
At any rate, domestic financing is plenty of advantages. The literature on public debt management in 
Emerging Markets (EMs) has shown that, in general, market depth has increased, maturities have 
lengthened and the investor base has broadened (Mehrotra, Miyajima and Villar, 2012). As a result, 
domestic debt may bring some prominent benefits: the lower exposure of the public debt portfolio to 
currency risk if and when the domestic debt is denominated in local currency (Hausmann, Panizza 
and Rigobon, 2006; Bacchiocchi and Missale 2012); a lower vulnerability to capital flow reversals 
(Calvo, 2005); the possibility to undertake countercyclical monetary policy to mitigate the effect of 
external shocks (Mehrotra, Miyajima and Villar, 2012); and the improved institutional infrastructure 
underlying the organization and functioning of local financial markets (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). 
In general, long-term domestic currency-denominated debt reduces maturity and currency 
mismatches and hence tends to be safer.  
 
However, the literature also stresses that domestic borrowing brings benefits only in the presence of a 
sound institutional and macroeconomic framework, and only if the debt structure features certain 
characteristics (Abbas and Christensen, 2010, Arnone and Presbitero, 2010, Hausmann, Panizza and 
Rigobon, 2006, Panizza, 2008, Presbitero, 2012b). Many developing countries are, in fact, unable to 
issue long-term government securities at a reasonable cost, so they are more vulnerable to rollover 
and interest rate risks. Moreover, domestic currency-denominated debt could substitute inflation risk 
for currency mismatch. The nature of the credit base may also raise vulnerabilities. Previous studies 
underlie the importance of a diverse investor base for lowering the cost of government debt and the 
volatility of market yield, and stress that a lenders’ profile strongly biased toward commercial banks 
might worsen crowding out effects and reduce the efficiency of the banking system. Yet another 
aspect of the debt structure that influences vulnerability is the type of instruments issued. According 
to Abbas and Christensen (2010), many of the benefits of domestic debt market – saving assets, 
collateral function, benchmark yield curve for private lending – apply to securitized domestic debt 
and not to liabilities issued in captive markets or accumulated due to poor public financial 
management (such as arrears). 
 
The cost-benefit analysis of financial instruments available to the government, as described above, is 
largely discussed with regards to EMs, while the lack of data on domestic public debt in LICs – 
especially the financial terms applied to domestic liabilities – has prevented extending the analysis to 
poorer countries along similar lines. In particular, it hindered the possibility of discussing the 
rationale for LICs government to increase domestic borrowing relative to external indebtedness.  
 
Against this backdrop, the main objective of this paper is to fill the void in the literature by 
constructing a brand new database on domestic public debt in LICs. While the existing datasets 
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mainly provide information on the stock of domestic debt and interest payments, at best, our dataset 
also includes detailed information on maturity, currency composition, creditor base, and type of 
instruments. The up-to-date information on domestic debt stock and structure is comparable across 
LICs.  
 
Based on our dataset, this paper characterizes the recent trends regarding LIC domestic public debt 
and explores the relevance of different arguments put forward on the benefits and costs of 
government borrowing in local public debt markets. The main stylized fact that emerges from the data 
is the increase in domestic government debt during the period 1996-2011 and its larger burden with 
respect to external public debt, at least since the mid-2000s. Short-term financing is mainly 
instrumented through marketable and non-marketable securities held by the banking system. Central 
Bank advances to the Treasury, which are typically rolled over, constitute a relevant source of long-
term financing. The breakdown into HIPCs and non-HIPCs highlights significant differences in the 
evolution and structure of domestic debt between the two groups, with HIPCs relying more on 
Central Bank advances and non-HIPCs making progress in issuing securities and lengthening 
maturities. 
 
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 revises the existing literature and databases on domestic 
public debt in LICs. Section 3 describes our dataset and Section 4 presents some stylized facts on the 
evolution and structure of domestic public debt. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Domestic Public Debt Management 
2.1. Fiscal deficit financing 
Fisher and Easterly (1990) identify four different means of fiscal deficit financing and associate each 
of them with the risk of building certain macroeconomic imbalances: 1) printing money might fuel 
inflation, 2) running down foreign exchange reserves might trigger an exchange crisis, 3) borrowing 
abroad might end up in an external debt crisis, and 4) borrowing domestically might increase interest 
rates and lead also to a debt crisis. 
 
In theory, the seignorage revenue the government can expect to obtain from printing money is non-
linear in the inflation rate, similarly to a conventional Laffer curve. The link between money creation 
and inflation is well-known. In practice, however, seignorage is often a small source of resources both 
for developing and developed countries. Empirical evidence shows that in normal times, the 
maximum amount of seignorage revenue collected over an extended period of time is less than 5 
percent of GDP (Easterly and Schmidt Hebbel, 1991). During fiscal crisis episodes, the seignorage 
can become an important (albeit temporary) means of deficit financing (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
By running down international reserves, instead of printing money, the government can hope to put 
off the inflationary effects of a fiscal deficit. This policy is also temporary because it can last just until 
reserves are depleted, or probably collapse even earlier as pointed out by the theoretical and empirical 
literature on currency crisis.  
 
Foreign borrowing allows to finance the fiscal deficit without creating money supply-driven 
inflationary pressures or crowding out domestic lending to the private sector. However, external 
credit flows tend to be volatile, procyclical, and subject to sudden stops (Calvo, 2005). By providing 
not only financing but also foreign exchange, foreign borrowing may induce a real exchange rate 
appreciation, thus hampering competitiveness and possibly lowering investment and economic 
growth (Rodrik, 2008). External debt is typically denominated in foreign currency and this creates 
additional constraints on monetary policy and exchange rate management. For instance, according to 
Hausmann (2003), foreign currency-denominated debt lowers the evaluation of solvency because it 
heightens the dependence of debt service on the evolution of the exchange rate, which is often volatile 
and subject to shocks and crises. Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) underline that, when there are 
currency mismatches in the balance sheets of local agents, currency devaluations are contractionary 
since they induce negative net wealth effects. Under these circumstances, Hausmann and Rigobon 
(2003) maintain that central banks are reluctant to let the exchange rate float and tend to intervene 
aggressively in the foreign exchange market and hold more international reserves.  
 
Domestic borrowing, typically denominated in local currency, does not bring about some 
complications associated with external credit flows. The most prominent concern, instead, is the 
crowding out effect: issuing domestic debt the governments taps private savings that would otherwise 
be available to finance private investment. If market-determined interest rates increase, this may 
reduce investment demand. And if interest rates are controlled or lenders are reluctant to raise them to 
avoid adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the domestic government borrowing can lead to 
credit rationing and a reduced supply of funds for private investment. 
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2.2. Domestic Financing In LICs 
The theoretical literature on government borrowing and public debt management in LICs is relatively 
scant – at least compared to advanced economies and emerging markets – and still inconclusive with 
regard to the benefits and costs of domestic liabilities relative to foreign liabilities. Empirical work, in 
particular, has been constrained by the lack of a comprehensive domestic public debt database and by 
the traditional emphasis placed on external borrowing as the main means of fiscal deficit financing in 
poor countries. The few available studies on LIC government debt reviewed in Table A1 in the 
Appendix gathered data from multiple sources that were deemed adequate for specific analytical 
purposes.
2
 Available data on domestic public debt are therefore quite heterogeneous in terms of the 
criteria to distinguish domestic and external debt, the definition of public sector, the type of 
government liabilities covered, and the treatment of certain financial arrangements (e.g., on-lending 
operations, IMF lending to central banks under a sovereign guarantee, liabilities issued in regional 
capital markets). Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no dataset provides information on the 
structure of domestic public debt.  
 
Domestic public debt started increasing in LICs from the mid-1990s, in coincidence with an upsurge 
in financial liberalization (Presbitero, 2012b). Subsequently, in the wake of the debt relief initiatives 
and the recent global financial crisis, the level and composition of public debt in LICs have changed, 
sparking the attention of IFIs and the academic community.
3
  
 
In policy-oriented discussions on government borrowing and public debt management in LICs, a 
common presumption is that domestic financing is more expensive and riskier than external 
financing, thus making foreign debt preferable to domestic debt. Supporting this view, Christensen 
(2005) analyses the structure of public debt in 27 Sub-Saharan African countries and finds that 
domestic debt represents a significant burden to the budget in terms of interest payments, 
notwithstanding having a relatively small size. In addition, the author shows that the short-term 
maturity of domestic government debt is a source of rollover risk and macroeconomic instability, and 
documents the existence of crowding out effects on private-sector borrowing.  
 
LICs benefiting from debt relief initiatives have attracted special attention of policy makers and 
researchers because of the expectations that these initiatives would help poor countries to stabilize the 
economy, strengthen public finances, free budget resources to finance the provision of social services 
and infrastructure, and implement structural reforms. In their study on debt relief and HIPCs, Arnone 
and Presbitero (2010) analyze the evolution and costs of domestic government debt using a World 
Bank dataset covering 79 developing countries in 1970-2003. They provide evidence that both the 
stock of domestic public debt and the associated interest payments rose in HIPCs after receiving 
relief. Presbitero (2012b) shows that, in fact, the reliance on internal financing has partially offset the 
reduction in external debt granted by multilateral and bilateral debt relief initiatives. Arnone and 
Presbitero (2010) argue that such trends might put forward risks to sustainable economic 
development and thus jeopardize the objective of spurting growth that motivated granting debt relief 
in the first place. Furthermore, they suggest that the objectives of creating a stable macroeconomic 
environment and developing local financial markets have not been reached yet. This should be a 
concern because the experience of EMs since the early 2000s suggests that macroeconomic stability 
and financial deepening are necessary for domestic public debt not to represent yet another factor of 
vulnerability (Borensztein, Levy-Yeyati, and Panizza, 2006). In this regard, Presbitero (2012b) shows 
that only countries with sound policies and institutions exhibit a pattern of rising domestic public debt 
and upbeat macroeconomic performance in terms of greater capital accumulation, stronger output 
                                                     
 
2 These sources include the IMF’s Monetary Survey, Staff Reports, and Article IV Reports; the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database; and, if available, the websites of LICs’ central banks 
and ministries of finance. 
3 In February 2012, the IMF’s and IDA’s Board drew attention to the fiscal vulnerabilities stemming from an increasing 
public debt in LICs, and recommended the development of benchmarks (thresholds) for total public debt in order to 
strengthen the LIC DSF and inform policy dialogue with country authorities (IMF-IDA, 2012). 
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growth, and faster financial development. Such a salutary correlation is not observed in countries with 
a weak institutional environment. 
 
The increasing domestic borrowing in LICs, especially in those that benefited from debt relief, begs 
for an explanation. One strand of the literature challenges upfront the common presumption that 
domestic financing is costlier than external financing in LICs. Abbas (2005) argues that the lack of 
recurrent domestic sovereign defaults in poor countries might be an insight that servicing domestic 
debt is actually easier than repaying foreign debt, and, in a similar vein, Panizza (2008) maintains that 
switching the sources of fiscal deficit financing towards domestic debt might reduce the risk of 
sovereign defaults. Another strand moves away from purely cost-risk considerations and emphasizes 
supply-side constraints: facing decreasing foreign aid (including both lending and grants) relative to 
development financing needs, LIC governments must seek for additional domestic funding sources. 
Some authors argue that external credit constraints imposed by private lenders, or policy 
conditionality restricting non-concessional foreign borrowing imposed by IFIs, have reduced the 
opportunities for external financing and forced LIC governments to tap local public debt markets 
(Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
4
 Structural benchmarks in recent IMF programs seek to foster the 
development of local markets for government securities, thus ultimately favoring domestic financing 
(IMF and World Bank, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004; Borensztein, Levy-Yeyati, and Panizza, 2006; 
Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). Finally, other studies depart from the hypothesis that LIC governments 
use domestic public debt mainly for fiscal deficit financing, and argue that internal borrowing help 
sterilizing foreign exchange inflows from foreign aid or natural resource-based exports, particularly in 
LICs pursuing an active exchange rate management but unable or unwilling to use monetary policy 
for sterilization purposes (Christensen, 2005; Aiyar, Berg, and Hussain, 2005). 
 
An alternative rationale for the rising domestic borrowing in LICs is suggested by the literature on 
public debt management in EMs, which also increased reliance on local financial markets since the 
early 2000s. Focusing on demand-side factors, a number of studies investigate an EM government’s 
preferred debt portfolio composition and the cost-risk profile of financial instruments available, 
identifying important pros and cons of shifting from external to domestic borrowing. To the extent 
that internal financing is denominated in local currency, domestic debt reduces the exposure of the 
public debt portfolio to unanticipated movements in the exchange rate (Hausmann, Panizza, and 
Rigobon, 2006; Bacchiocchi and Missale, 2012) and ensures a higher degree of freedom to use the 
exchange rate as a stabilization mechanism against external shocks, i.e. lower fiscal dominance on the 
exchange rate policy (IMF and World Bank, 2001; Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). Also, to the extent 
that domestic debt is owed to resident creditors, it reduces exposure to capital flow reversals (Calvo, 
2005). Domestic borrowing can improve the efficiency of the allocation of national savings if 
mobilized resources are used to fund public investment and not capital flight or inefficient self-
investment by savers (Abbas and Christensen, 2010). Building the institutional infrastructure for the 
issuance of domestic public debt often supports the organization and functioning of local financial 
markets (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, the literature on EMs explores the disadvantages of domestic borrowing. Given 
that many developing countries are unable to issue long-term government securities at a reasonable 
interest rate, the resulting maturity mismatch can be worse than the currency mismatch associated 
with foreign debt (Panizza, 2008). Macroeconomic distortions and instability can be induced by an 
excessive domestic borrowing, including crowding out effects (Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 2008; Abbas 
and Christensen, 2010; and Arnone and Presbitero, 2010) and the association of large domestic debts 
with hyper-inflation episodes and external debt crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Distortions in the 
                                                     
 
4 IMF-supported programs in LICs typically include limits on non-concessional external debt, under the Debt Limits Policy 
(DLP), which seek to prevent the build-up of unsustainable debt while allowing for adequate external financing (IMF, 2009). 
Along the same line, the World Bank lending to LICs follows the Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP), an incentive 
mechanism aimed at discouraging high-risk countries that receive grants from contracting non-concessional external debt 
(IDA, 2006). Neither the DLP nor the NCBP apply to domestic public debt. 
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financial system can be also important, particularly the potentially perverse incentives facing financial 
institutions that invest in government debt. For instance, banks investing in public debt are more 
profitable but less efficient, and they are more likely to prefer short term portfolio allocation and thus 
build additional vulnerabilities; domestic banks and institutional investors may be induced by moral 
suasion to absorb excessive public debt (Hauner, 2006; Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 2008; and Arnone 
and Presbitero, 2010). 
 
Some studies focus on the role of macroeconomic, political, and institutional factors in determining 
the composition of total public debt in terms of domestic and external liabilities. Earlier contributions 
in the original sin literature attempt to explain why external liabilities are denominated in a few 
currencies and why domestic liabilities are short term (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; Jeanne, 2003; and Mehl 
and Reynaud, 2005). Guscina (2008) finds that in EMs, low and stable inflation and deep financial 
markets are associated with a higher share of domestic liabilities in the public debt portfolio of the 
central government. Along the same line, Diouf and Doufrense (2012) study the security market in 
the WAEMU and identify demand- and supply-side factors that might hamper the issuance of long-
term domestic debt instruments.  
 
While these arguments are largely discussed with regard to EMs, the lack of data on domestic public 
debt, especially with regard to financing terms applied to domestic liabilities, has prevented extending 
the analysis to LICs along similar lines. 
 
At a macroeconomic level, the balance of costs and benefits of domestic borrowing in LICs could be 
reflected in the effect of domestic public debt on economic growth. To the best of our knowledge, 
Abbas and Christensen (2010) is the only paper that explicitly addresses this issue in a sample of 
developing countries that includes a sufficiently large number of LICs. The authors find that domestic 
public debt has a positive impact on output growth provided that it does not exceed 35 per cent of 
bank deposits; above this threshold, debt undermines economic activity through crowding out effects 
and inflationary pressures. The financing terms applied to government liabilities also matter: the 
growth effect of domestic public debt is higher for marketable instruments that bear positive real 
interest rates and are held by non-bank investors.
5
 
     
                                                     
 
5 Presbitero (2012a) investigates the impact of total (external and domestic) public debt on output growth in a sample of 92 
developing countries and finds that debt has a negative impact on growth up to a threshold of 90 percent of GDP, beyond 
which the effect becomes irrelevant. This non-linear effect is consistent with debt hindering growth only in countries with 
sound macroeconomic policies and stable institutions. By contrast, in countries where macroeconomic policies are weak, 
these are likely to be the first-order constrain on growth. 
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3. Domestic Public Debt in LICs: A New Dataset 
The Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) prepared by the IMF (IMF, 2001) defines debt 
as “all liabilities that require payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a 
date or dates in the future. Thus, all liabilities in the GFS system are debt except for shares and other 
equity and financial derivatives”. The definition of domestic debt, as opposed to external debt, is not 
unique and three criteria are common in practice. On a creditor residency basis, debt is domestic if 
owed to residents.
1
 This criterion is widely used in the compilation of statistical information on 
government debt by official agencies following the GFSM (IMF, 2001), and is relevant to study 
international risk sharing and resource transfers between residents and non-residents. On a currency 
basis, debt is domestic if denominated in local currency. This definition enables the analysis of 
currency mismatch and vulnerabilities associated with the currency composition of the public debt 
portfolio. Finally, on a jurisdiction basis, debt is domestic if issued in local financial markets and 
subjected to the jurisdiction of a local court. This definition helps recognizing the implications of debt 
restructuring procedures.
2
 Defining unambiguously domestic versus external debt is crucial, since the 
debt definition affects the identification of vulnerabilities and the conclusions drawn from empirical 
studies (Panizza, 2008). 
 
Other dimensions are also relevant to characterize the public-sector domestic debt, most notably the 
definition of public sector (i.e., Central Government, General Government, or Public Sector)
3
 and the 
type of financial liabilities included in the debt statistics (i.e., market versus non-marketable 
instruments). In LICs, the Central Government debt is typically better recorded and thus most studies 
focus on it.
4
 Similarly, marketable debt instruments are usually better reported than other government 
liabilities. Information on domestic debts instrumented through loans, securities5, and other accounts 
payable (e.g., Central Bank advances) is relatively more accessible and transparent than on insurance 
technical reserves and financial derivatives.
6
 
Our domestic public debt dataset comprises 40 low and lower-middle-income countries over the 
period 1971-2011 (see Table A2 in Appendix).
7
 Following the GFSM (IMF, 2001), we adopt the 
residency basis to define domestic debt in 35 countries, whereas the currency basis is used in 5 
                                                     
 
1 The concept of residence in the GFSM (IMF, 2001) is not based on nationality or legal criteria, but on economic interest: an 
institutional unit is said to be a resident unit of a certain country when it has a center of economic interest in the territory of 
that country. A similar concept of residence is used in the 1993 United Nations System of National Account, the Fifth 
Edition of the IMF Balance of Payment Manual, and in the IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics. 
2 According to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), sovereign bonds come with an array of contractual features, e.g., 
covenants, commitments to undertake (or not) certain actions over lifetime of the bond, remedies in the event that contractual 
obligations are breached, and procedures for modifying the contract. Contractual clauses often differ according to the law 
under which the sovereign bonds fall and hence they have different implications for the scope and term of debt 
restructurings.  
3 In the GFSM (IMF, 2001), the General Government consists of all the governments units as well as the non-market non-
for-profit institutions controlled and financed by government units. The General Government can be classified in: (i) Central 
Government, whose authority extends over the entire territory of the country; (ii) State Government, whose authority extends 
over the largest geographic area into which a country may be divided for political or administrative purposes; and (iii) Local 
Government, whose authority is restricted to the smallest geographic areas distinguished for political or administrative 
purposes. The Public Sector includes the General Government, the Public Corporations controlled by government units that 
engage in financial and non-financial activities, and the Central Bank. 
4 However, this implies that for countries that are highly decentralized with subnational governments that do borrow, or for 
countries that have large state-owned enterprises that issue debt, the central government debt is likely to underestimate the 
public-sector liabilities. 
5 According to the Handbook of Securities Statistics (BIS, European Central Bank, IMF, 2009), a security is a negotiable 
financial instrument whose legal ownership is transferable from one owner to another by delivery or endorsement. A security 
is designed to be traded on an organized exchange, although actual trading in secondary markets may not happen. 
6 The treatment of government (financial, liquid) assets that leads to the definition of gross versus net debt is becoming an 
important issue in EMs. However, just a few LICs provide data on net debt and stocks of financial liquid assets that could 
potentially be used to repay maturing debt. 
7 Lower-middle-income countries included in our database slightly exceed the per-capita GNI threshold separating their 
income category from the low-income countries. 
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countries because of their debt recording practices and data constraints. We include all domestic 
financial liabilities defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), with the exception of arrears, and focus on the 
Central Government debt as most other studies in the literature.
8
 As a novelty, our dataset contains 
information on the level and structure of domestic public debt: along with the stock of domestic 
public debt, we gather data on on-budget interest payments, type of instruments, maturity, and 
investor base.
9
  
 
Amongst the 40 countries, 33 are classified as LICs and 7 as lower-middle income countries. There 
are 38 countries benefiting from IDA lending (denoted IDA-only countries) and 2 receiving a mix of 
IDA and IBRD lending (denoted blend countries). HIPCs are two-thirds of the sampled countries. In 
terms of geographic location, 29 countries are in Sub-Sahara Africa, 5 in East Asia and Pacific, 2 in 
Europe and Central Asia, 2 in South Asia, one in Latin America and the Caribbean, and one in 
Middle East and North Africa.  
 
As expected when dealing with LICs, the data availability is quite heterogeneous across countries and 
over time. In our dataset, accurate information on debt stock exists for 40 countries whereas data on 
debt structure is reported for 36 countries. In addition, the time span of variables included in the 
dataset largely differs across countries. We are therefore constrained to selectively choose panels of 
data to conduct meaningful descriptive analyses and comparisons in Section 4. Thus, we construct 
two balanced panels covering the period 1996-2011: the Debt Stock Sample contains the domestic 
debt stock series for 21 countries, and the Debt Structure Sample includes data on debt stock and 
structure for 15 countries. We also construct a balanced panel covering the period 2007-2011 for the 
whole sample of 36 countries, the Debt Structure Short Sample. 
 
In the next section, we illustrate the evolution of domestic public debt in LICs using the Debt Stock 
Sample and we analyze the debt structure and financing terms - including on-budget interest 
payments, type of instruments, maturity, and investor base – using the Debt Structure Sample and the 
Debt Structure Short Sample. Reported time series are primarily weighted country averages, with the 
GDP in dollars at constant 2005 prices as weight. We complement the average figures with box-plot 
analysis to assess the data variability across countries in both datasets. 
  
                                                     
 
8 Reporting of arrears varies largely across countries, e.g., the timing of recording could be as soon as payments are delayed, 
or when arrears are audited, or when they are settled or securitized. Information on debt owed by subnational governments 
and state-owned enterprises is available for only 7 countries in a few recent years, thus preventing us from constructing a 
Public Sector debt dataset. 
9 Our data sources concerning domestic public debt include IMF Staff Reports, websites of countries’ Ministry of Finance 
and Central Bank, and consultations with World Bank country economists, IMF country desks, and debt managers members 
of a network established by the World Bank’s Economic Policy, Debt, and Trade Department. Data on external public debt 
are drawn from the World Bank’s Debt Reporting System (DRS). 
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4. Characteristic of Domestic Public Debt in LICs  
4.1. Evolution of domestic debt 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Central Government debt for the Debt Stock Sample in 1996-2011. 
On average, LIC external debt is much lower than in the past, decreasing from 72 percent of GDP in 
1996 to 23 percent in 2011, whereas LIC domestic debt is on the rise, increasing from 12.3 percent of 
GDP to 16.2 percent. Both HIPCs and non-HIPCs managed to reduce the burden of foreign liabilities, 
particularly the HIPCs benefiting from debt relief initiatives that largely wrote off their financial 
obligations to official creditors. Trends concerning the domestic public debt, on the other hand, differ 
between HIPCs and non-HIPCs since the early 2000: HIPCs have reduced domestic debt since the 
peak of 20 percent of GDP in 2002, while non-HIPCs have increased it from 12 percent of GDP to 18 
percent in the period 2000-2011. Overall, LICs now hold a public debt portfolio with a fairly 
balanced composition in terms of domestic and external liabilities compared to the past. In both 
HIPCs and non-HIPCs, the public domestic debt represented 40 percent of the total public debt in 
2011, almost three times the share observed in 1996.
10
 
 
LICs are quite heterogeneous with regard to reliance on domestic debt, as the box-plot in Figure 1 and 
the Table A3 in Appendix suggest. For instance, Cambodia has virtually no domestic liabilities and 
Eritrea has an amount almost equal to its GDP. Most LICs have increased the stock of domestic debt 
(relative to GDP) since the mid-1990s, but there are exceptions such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Solomon 
Islands, and Tanzania, whose level of domestic debt decreased. We do not find evidence of LICs 
uniformly substituting domestic debt for external debt (or viceversa): the pairwise correlations 
between the ratios of domestic and external debt to GDP in 1996-2011 for each individual LIC, have 
a positive sign in some countries and a negative sign in others. Country-specific circumstances may 
then play a role in the pattern of substitution (if any) between local and foreign financing in LICs 
  
                                                     
 
10 Arnone and Presbitero (2010) argue that the share of domestic debt drastically increased in HIPCs soon after receiving 
external debt relief. But the share slightly decreased since 2006, possibly because HIPCs re-engage in securing foreign 
financing to take advantage of the new borrowing space created by the debt relief and the lower global interest rates. A 
scaling-up of public investment projects has been observed in some HIPCs (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). 
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Figure 1: Domestic and External Debt  
  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
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4.2. Financial cost and burden  
A main concern about domestic debt relates to its financial cost and burden relative to external debt. 
For the Debt Structure Sample in 1996-2011, Figure 2 displays implicit interest rates as proxies of 
borrowing cost. The nominal implicit interest rate is calculated as the interest payments in the current 
year divided by the average debt stock in the current and preceding year.
11
 For the domestic debt, we 
calculate the real implicit interest rate by subtracting the GDP deflator inflation from the nominal 
rate. For the external debt, we add the average depreciation rate of the local currency against the US 
dollar and SDR in order to capture losses (or gains) resulting from exchange rate fluctuations in the 
presence of foreign currency-denominated external debt. On average, the cost of external borrowing 
never exceeded 4 percent per annum and has been always much cheaper than the nominal cost of 
domestic borrowing, even including the currency depreciation losses. The domestic nominal implicit 
interest rate, however, declined significantly from 18 percent per annum in 1996 to 8 percent in 2011. 
On average, the real cost of domestic borrowing is also lower than in the past and quite often the real 
implicit interest rates are negative and thus encourage borrowing from local sources. Both HIPCs and 
non-HIPCs achieved lower nominal borrowing costs in recent years. The domestic implicit interest 
rate is slightly lower in HIPCs as they rely more on advances from the Central Bank, which are 
relatively inexpensive vis-à-vis other sources of domestic financing. 
 
Figure 2 also shows simple measures of the financial burden of public debt in LICs: the interest 
payments on domestic debt, and the interest payments on external debt plus the valuation effect 
induced by exchange rate fluctuations. By construction, the financial burden of a given type of debt 
mechanically combines its implicit interest rate (i.e., borrowing cost), its share in the total public debt 
(weight), and the size of the public debt (volume). As a consequence of the large reduction in foreign 
liabilities relative to GDP and the stability of external borrowing cost, the burden of external debt in 
LICs fell from nearly 2.2 percent of GDP in the late 1990s to 0.3 percent in recent years. LICs also 
experienced a mild drop in the burden of domestic debt from 1.7 percent of GDP to 1.3 percent, 
driven instead by a cheaper domestic borrowing cost.  
 
On average, therefore, LICs currently face a heavier burden stemming to domestic liabilities 
compared to foreign liabilities. But the cross-country heterogeneity observed earlier with regard to 
reliance on domestic borrowing leads also to variations in the associated financial burden. For 
instance, in 2011 Malawi and Kenya afforded domestic interest payment around 3 percent of GDP, 
whereas Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, and Togo paid less than 0.5 percent. More generally, we found a 
different pattern between HIPCs and non-HIPCs, with the former benefiting, since 2005, from a 
much larger reduction in the domestic interest bill than non-HIPCs. Given that the stock of domestic 
debt was not extremely different in the two groups (Figure 1), the lower cost of domestic debt in 
HIPCs may be a side effect of debt relief programs, which could have fostered local financial 
development and brought down borrowing costs. In addition, the HIPCs took advantage of external 
debt relief and, after 2000, the share of interest payments on external debt quickly converged to the 
low values of non-HIPCs 
  
                                                     
 
11 Our choice of using the average debt stock as denominator is justified by the large share of short-term liabilities in the 
domestic debt that accrue interests the same year in which they are issued. Other studies use the current debt stock as 
denominator (Christensen, 2005) or the previous debt stock (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).  
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Figure 2: Cost of Domestic and External Borrowing  
  
  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
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4.3. Instruments 
The structure of domestic public debt in terms of type of instruments matters. According to Abbas 
and Christensen (2010), the development of local government debt markets helps supply a benchmark 
yield curve for private lending contracts as well as financial instruments that serve as saving assets 
and collateral vehicles. But these benefits are to be expected from government debt instrumented 
through securities, not from government debt issued in captive markets or liabilities associated with 
arrears and overdrafts.  
 
For the Debt Structure Sample in 1996-2011, Figure 3 shows the composition of the domestic public 
debt portfolio in terms of major instruments defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), namely loans, 
securities, other accounts payable (e.g., Central Bank advances), insurance technical reserves, and 
currency and deposits (e.g., judiciary deposits). Securities and Central Bank advances to the Treasury 
are the main sources of domestic financing in LICs. On average, since the early 2000s securities 
constitute three-quarters of domestic debt whereas Central Bank advances are nearly one-fifth. The 
breakdown in HIPCs and non-HIPCs reveals a remarkable difference in the structure of government 
debt: the share of securities is much higher in non-HIPCs and, conversely, the share of Central Bank 
advances is larger in HIPCs (possibly because their markets are relatively less developed and the 
pressures of fiscal dominance and debt monetization are more acute). Interestingly, we find out an 
upsurge of Central Bank advances in response to the financial crisis in both groups.  
 
The box-plot in Figure 3 and the Table A3 in Appendix show differences across individual countries. 
On average, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania issue securities exclusively, in contrast to Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Guinea, and Burundi, in which securities are a small share of the domestic public debt.  
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Figure 3: Domestic Debt by Type of Instrument  
  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
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4.4. Maturity 
A common presumption about the choice between domestic and external debt is that a government 
faces a tradeoff concerning maturity and currency mismatch: domestic debt is often denominated in 
local currency but of shorter maturity relative to external debt. In fact, many developing countries are 
unable (or unwilling) to issue long-term government securities in local financial markets at a 
reasonable interest rate (Panizza, 2008; Hausmann and Panizza, 2003; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005).  
 
The relative share of long- and short-term domestic debt instruments could be explained by either 
demand or supply factors. The government may hesitate to issue long-term debt if the yields curve is 
sufficiently upward-sloped, so that borrowing costs increase with tenors. However, even if the 
government recognizes the benefit of extending the maturity profile, supply-driven factors may limit 
its ability to do so. In a volatile macroeconomic environment, the market might be not ready or 
willing to absorb long-term government debt in view of significant inflation and default risks 
(Christensen, 2005). Moreover, the banking system, which often dominates the government debt 
market in LICs, generally has a strong incentive for buying T-bills, given that these instruments 
provide a regular flow of earnings and have a privileged treatment (e.g., a zero credit risk) in the 
calculation of risk-based capital adequacy requirements (Diouf and Dufrense, 2012). An investor base 
lacking mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, all institutions that typically have 
long-term investment horizons, hampers the possibility of extending the maturity of public debt. In 
this regard, it is a well-established principle that the maturity profile’s length can be viewed as a 
measure of the degree of market development. 
 
For the Debt Structure Sample in 1996-2011, Figure 4 displays the composition of the domestic 
public debt portfolio in terms of maturity. Long-term (short-term) debt has original maturity of more 
(less) than one year at the date of issuance. In the first panel, we treat Central Bank advances as long-
term liabilities because in practice they are not callable and can be safely assumed to be rolled over 
on a continuous basis (even advances that are technically short-term instruments). In the second 
panel, we exclude Central Bank advances altogether from the series of domestic debt and re-calculate 
the maturity composition. On average, LICs have managed to lengthen their domestic public debt 
portfolio, with the share of long-term liabilities in the total domestic debt increasing from 52 percent 
to 67 percent in 1996-2011. The maturity lengthening persists even if Central Bank advances are 
excluded. Differentiating between HIPCs and non-HIPCs suggests that the overall increase in the 
share of long-term has been driven solely by the later. HIPCs, by contrast, had a relatively larger 
share but it has remained quite stable since the mid-1990s. Table A3 in Appendix shows similar 
figures for individual countries. 
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Figure 4: Domestic Debt by Maturity  
  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
 
 
4.5. Investor base 
Investors in LIC government debt are few in nature and often also in number. Domestic public debt 
instruments are held primarily by commercial banks, the Central Bank, financial institutions in the 
non-banking system (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies), and non-financial 
institutions (e.g., non-financial corporations and individual investors). The investor base in local 
financial markets is typically narrow and highly concentrated (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).   
 
Previous studies underlie the benefits of a diverse investor base in terms of lowering borrowing costs 
as well as reducing market yield volatility. Broadening the investor base attenuates the monopoly 
power of a particular group of financial institutions, bringing down interest rates and rollover risks 
(Christensen, 2005). Larger crowding out effects are to be expected when the investor base is strongly 
biased towards commercial banks. As indicated above, the banking system generally has a strong 
incentive for buying government debt and seeking profitability in lending to the public sector. This 
may lead to relatively weaker incentives to extend credit to riskier private borrowers and even lower 
efficiency in banking operations and financial intermediation (Hauner, 2006). Crowding out effects 
are especially harmful in LICs because small- and medium-sized private companies heavily rely on 
bank financing, with negligible (if any) opportunities in corporate bond and stock markets.  
 
Other potential distortions in the incentives facing financial institutions that invest in government 
debt. First, banks are more likely to prefer a short-term portfolio allocation, thus raising rollover risk 
for the government. Second, domestic banks and institutional investors may be induced by moral 
suasion to absorb excessive public debt, which may amplify the deleterious effect of a debt crisis in 
case the government is following unsustainable policies (Panizza, 2008). Third, a large bank exposure 
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to government securities could undermine the solvency of financial institutions in times of economic 
distress, potentially leading to a systematic banking crisis (Diouf and Dufrense, 2012). Distortions 
also arise when it is the Central Bank that finances the government’s short-term cash imbalances 
through overdraft facilities for managing daily transactions and cover unexpected shortfalls in 
revenue (Johnson, 2001). A higher independence of the Central Bank helps lowering the leverage of 
the government in borrowing though these facilities.  
 
For the Debt Structure Sample in 1996-2011, Figure 5 shows the participation of investors holding 
the domestic public debt. On average, the banking system comprising commercial banks and the 
Central Bank holds nearly three-quarters of the domestic liabilities, with a quite stable participation. 
Within the banking system, the share of commercial banks has increased since the early 2000s. The 
breakdown into HIPCs and non-HIPCs reveals that the former rely much more on Central Bank 
lending (e.g., advances) whereas the later tap commercial banks and other market investors. 
. 
Figure 5: Domestic Debt by Holder  
 
 
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
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4.6. Relationships between cost of domestic debt, maturity, and investor base 
Using the Debt Structure Short Sample, which can be seen as a constellation of domestic public debt 
portfolios for 36 countries in recent years, the casual inspection of simple correlations provides 
preliminary evidence on the relationships between cost of domestic debt, maturity, and investor base.  
 
Figure 6 (left panel) shows observed pairs of cost of domestic public debt (proxied with the implicit 
interest rate) and the share of long-term instruments. The simple correlation between the two 
variables is -0.31 and statistically significant, suggesting that debt portfolios of longer maturity face 
lower cost than debt portfolios of shorter maturity. This finding is at odds with the common 
perception that LICs are unable to issue long-term liabilities at a reasonable interest rate in domestic 
financial markets. Admittedly, the observations include countries (mostly HIPCs) where a large share 
of public domestic debt is held by the Central Bank, who often lends long and cheap. Excluding the 
observations where the Central Bank share exceeds 50 percent in the Figure 6 (right panel), the 
correlation goes to -0.15 (albeit not statistically significant) but it does not become positive, as that 
perception would imply.  
 
The negative correlation between the cost and the maturity of domestic debt would imply that only 
countries where the average cost of debt is low can afford to issue long-term (costlier) debt. Given 
that a low nominal implicit interest rate may reflect a more efficient market or a lower inflation rate, 
the inverse relationship between cost and maturity is consistent with countries with more developed 
domestic financial markets and better macroeconomic policies being able to issue longer term 
instruments at a lower cost. This suggests that some LICs are reaping the benefits of developing 
domestic financial markets and improving macroeconomic management. In fact, measuring the 
degree of financial development by the savings-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of credit to the private 
sector over GDP, we find that the correlation between the implicit interest rate and the share of long-
term domestic debt is negative and significant for countries where the development of financial 
markets is above the median, and not significantly different from zero in countries with a low level of 
financial development.
12
 
  
                                                     
 
12 Specifically, when using the savings-to-GDP ratio, the correlation between the implicit interest rate and the share of long-
term debt is equal to -0.40 for countries in which the savings-to-GDP ratio is above the sample median and to -0.14 (non 
statistically significant) in countries where the ratio is below the media. The corresponding values when using the ratio of 
credit to the private sector over GDP are -0.36 (statistically significant) and 0.10 (non statistically significant). 
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Figure 6: Implicit interest rate and maturity 
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
Note: Correlation is -0.31 in left panel (144 obs.) and -0.15 in right panel (85 obs.). 
 
 
Figure 7: Implicit interest rate, maturity, and investor base  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
Note: Correlation is 0.25 in left panel (132 obs.) and -0.33 in right panel (133 obs.). 
 
Figure 7 presents the relationship between the share of domestic public debt held by investors other 
than the Central Bank, the cost of domestic public debt (left panel) and the share of long-term 
instruments (right panel). A positive, statistically significant correlation (0.25) between the non-
Central Bank holdings and the cost of debt is consistent with the view that LIC governments with 
larger reliance on commercial banks and other financial institutions as sources of local funding face 
higher financial costs on their domestic liabilities. On the other hand, a negative, statistically 
significant correlation (-0.33) between non-Central Bank holdings and the share of long-term 
instruments supports the view that those LIC governments also bear domestic liabilities of shorter 
maturity. This finding is consistent with a preference for short-term instruments by commercial 
banks, which in turn might lead to reflect supply-side limits to the issuance of long-term debt 
instruments (Diouf and Dufrense, 2012). Panizza (2008) highlights the associated rollover risk and 
macroeconomic vulnerability of such a short-term maturity profile. 
 
Correlations identified in Figure 7 have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Yet LICs 
face quite heterogeneous financing terms even when they have similar shares of domestic public debt 
held by non-Central Bank investors. Figure 8 reports the distribution of proxy variables of financial 
cost and maturity of debt portfolios, distinguishing between three groups of portfolios: the groups 1, 
2, and 3 correspond, respectively, to debt portfolios whose share held by non-Central Bank investors 
is up to one-third, between one- and two-thirds, and more than two-thirds. Mean values of financial 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Im
p
lic
it
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
ra
te
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Long term debt (as % of Domestic Debt)
Interest rate and maturity structure
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Im
p
lic
it
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
ra
te
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Long term debt (as % of Domestic Debt)
Excluding Central Bank > 0.5
Interest rate and maturity structure
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Im
p
lic
it
 i
n
te
re
s
t 
ra
te
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Investors other the Central Bank (as % of Domestic Debt)
Interest rate and investor base
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
L
o
n
g
 t
e
rm
 d
e
b
t 
(a
s
 %
 o
f 
D
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 D
e
b
t)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Investors other the Central Bank (as % of Domestic Debt)
Maturity structure and investor base
 23 
 
cost and maturity variables do vary across groups, but the overall distributions of these variables are 
quite disperse and tend to overlap between groups 2 and 3. 
 
As a response to the global crisis in 2009, LICs were recommended to use their available fiscal space 
to implement countercyclical policy responses and support aggregate demand (IMF, 2010). Most 
LICs did not curtail spending despite of falling revenues, and those with much stronger pre-crisis 
macroeconomic policy buffers even accelerated the growth rate of real primary expenditures, 
including public investment. Budget deficits widened and LICs resorted to domestic and external 
financing to fill the gap. According to IMF (2010), more than half of the additional deficit was 
financed by domestic sources, including borrowing in local government debt markets, central bank 
financing, or drawing down government deposits. Figure 9 (upper panels) indicates that most LICs in 
our sample indeed increased their public debt relative to GDP between 2007 and 2011, and benefited 
from an implicit cost of domestic borrowing broadly unchanged. LICs whose share of domestic 
public debt held by non-Central Bank investors was up to one-half in 2007 tended to borrow more 
from them and so exhibit a higher share in 2011 (Figure 9, lower panels). In a sense, the anti-crisis 
response induced these LICs to rely more on previously untapped domestic sources of financing. On 
the other hand, LICs with the Central Bank holding relatively more government debt in 2007 did not 
have an homogeneous reaction, as some tended to borrow more from the monetary authority and 
others increased reliance on market investors.     
 
 
Figure 8: Implicit interest rate, maturity, and investor base  
  
Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
Note: Groups 1, 2, and 3 correspond, respectively, to debt portfolios whose share held by non-Central 
Bank investors is up to one-third, between one- and two-thirds, and more than two-thirds.   
 
 
Figure 9: Domestic Debt Level and Structure in 2007 and 2011. 
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Source: our elaboration on the LIC domestic public debt dataset. 
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5. Conclusions 
Several low-income countries are now taking advantage of lower debt burdens, thanks to the debt 
relief programs of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Since then, they started relying on a growing basis 
on internal financing. The change in the composition of financing sources, related also to decreasing 
foreign aid and increasing foreign direct investment and remittances, could have several implications 
for debt sustainability and for the scaling-up of public investment and poverty-reduction 
expenditures. In theory, domestic debt could bring several benefits to LICs, but it could also crowd 
out private investment and thus hinder the growth process. However, the existing empirical evidence 
on the balance of costs and benefits of domestic borrowing in LICs is quite scant. 
 
One of the main limitations that institutions and researchers face when dealing with the 
macroeconomic effects of government financing in LICs is poor data quality. In particular, data on 
domestic debt in LICs have been so far quite heterogeneous in terms of definitions and coverage. This 
paper introduces a new dataset on the stock and structure of domestic debt in 40 LICs over the period 
1971-2011. With respect to the existing datasets, this one puts together information on domestic debt 
in a way that ensures comparability across countries (definition of domestic debt, level of public 
sector, liabilities included) and it recollects up-to-date information on domestic debt composition 
(instruments, maturity structure and investor base). In particular, we have been able to build two 
balanced panels covering the period 1996-2011: one with data on domestic debt stock series for 21 
countries, and the other including data also on domestic debt structure for 15 countries. In this way, 
we have been able to analyze the evolution of internal financing in poor countries in the last fifteen 
years with a certain granularity, as not has been done so far. 
 
The descriptive analysis of the stock and structure of domestic public debt in LICs highlights some 
interesting patterns and identifies marked differences in the evolution and composition of government 
liabilities across countries, especially between HIPCs and non-HIPCs. First, domestic debt increased 
from 12.3 percent of GDP in 1996 to 16.2 percent of GDP in 2011, almost reaching the size of 
external debt. However, we do not find evidence that LICs uniformly substituted domestic debt for 
external debt. Second, the debt burden on domestic debt is higher that on external debt but it has 
decreased over time, consistently with lower borrowing costs due to financial deepening. Third, we 
find that LICs have been able to increase the share of long-term instruments over time. Maturity 
lengthening went together with a reduction in borrowing costs. This correlation is at odds with the 
common perception that LICs are unable to issue long-term liabilities at a reasonable interest rate, and 
it suggests that some LICs are reaping the benefits of developing domestic financial markets. Fourth, 
there is evidence of an increase in the share of securities in government debt, especially for non-
HIPCs. However, Central Bank advances, still important for many HIPCs, increased in response to 
the global financial crisis. Finally, a source of concern is the concentrated investor base, mainly 
dominated by commercial banks and the Central Bank, which may crowd out lending to the private 
sector and undermine financial stability.  
 
Our preliminary descriptive analysis provides some useful insights on the macroeconomic effects of 
domestic borrowing in LICs. However, we believe that further research is required and our data set 
could provide a useful source to better inspect the tradeoffs that governments in poor countries have 
to face when choosing how to finance public spending. One natural way to exploit this data set is to 
see how the size of domestic debt is correlated with the characteristic of the economy (e.g., financial 
development, institutional framework, access to international capital markets) and how the increase in 
domestic debt affects public debt sustainability in LICs. Ongoing research work at the World Bank 
addresses these issues. Second, we think that a relevant issue to explore is the extent to which 
increasing domestic debt affects bank lending to the private sector and possible crowds out 
investment. At the aggregate level, better data could help to identify the correlations between capital 
flows to developing countries, pointing out possible sources of vulnerability. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Databases on LIC public debt. 
 
 
Christensen (2005) 27 non CFA Sub-
Saharan African 
countries (of which 
15 LICs) over 1980-
2000.
Not defined. Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as gross securitized government 
debt composed of treasury bills, development stocks, and 
bonds. It excludes arrears, advances from the central bank, 
and commercial bank loans.
The dataset has limited country 
coverage. It contains information on 
domestic debt structure for 15 LICs 
up to 2000.
Arnone and 
Presbitero (2010)
79 developing 
countries (of which 
17 LICs) over 1994-
2003.
Domestic debt is 
defined as debt owed 
to creditor resident in 
the same country. 
Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as gross securitized government 
debt, including treasury bills, bonds, notes, and government 
stocks. It excludes arrears, advances from the central bank, 
commercial banks loans, debentures, and government 
guaranteed debt.
The dataset contains information on 
domestic debt structure for 17 LICs 
up to 2003.
Abbas and 
Christensen (2010)
93 LICs and 
emerging markets 
over 1970-2007.
Domestic debt is 
defined as domestic 
currency debt owed 
to domestic citizens.
Central Government. Domestic debt is defined as commercial bank’s gross claims 
on the Central Government plus central bank liquidity paper.
The dataset excludes government 
debt held by retail investors and 
non-banking institutions.
Abbas et al. (2010) 174 countries in 
1791-2009. For LICS 
the data coverage 
starts in 1970. 
Different definitions. General Government  (or 
Central Government if  no 
data on General Government 
are available). 
It provides data on total public debt (external plus domestic). 
Public debt data are collected from different sources and 
liabilities included in the definition might differ across 
countries.
Definitions of public debt differ 
across countries. The paper does 
not disaggregate public debt into 
external and domestic.
Panizza (2008) 130 countries over 
1990-2007.
Domestic debt is 
defined as debt 
issued under the 
jurisdiction of a local 
court.
Central Government (or 
General Government if no 
data on Central Government 
are available).
It provides data on total public debt (external and domestic). 
Public debt data are collected from different sources and 
liabilities included in the definition might differ across 
countries.
Public sector definition and 
liabilities differ across countries.
Presbitero (2012b) 44 LICs over 1970-
2010 (data are 
available for 41 
LICs).
Different definitions. Central Government (or 
General Government if no 
data on Central Government 
are available).
It provides data on domestic public debt, collected from 
different sources and liabilities included in the definition 
might differ across countries.
This is an extension and an update 
of the Panizza (2008) data set. 
Domestic debt 
definition
Database Country 
coverage
Public-sector definition Liabilities included Observations
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Table A2. LIC Domestic Public Debt Dataset 
 
 
 
 
Country name
Income 
Group
Region 
(i)
Lending 
category
Debt 
Relief
Domestic 
debt stock 
(ii) (iii) 
(iv)
Instrumen
ts
Maturity
Investor 
base
Main data 
source
Debt 
Stock 
Sample
Debt 
Structure 
Sample
Debt 
Structure 
Short 
Sample
Burundi LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1971-2011 1975-2011 1975-2012 1975-2013 Website x x x
Benin LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2000-2012 2000-2012 2007-2012 n/a IMF x
Burkina Faso LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2003-2011 2003-2011 2003-2011 2003-2011 PRMED x
Bangladesh LIC SA IDA 1998-2011 1998-2011 1998-2011 1998-2011 IMF x
CAR LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 IFS (v) x
Comoros LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1982-2011 n/a n/a n/a IFS (vi) x x
Eritrea LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995-2008 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 IFS (vii) x x
Ethiopia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1988-2010 1988-2010 1988-2010 1988-2010 PRMED x x x
Ghana LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 1981-2011 1982-2011 1981-2011 1996-2011 Website x x x
Guinea LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995-2011 1995-2011 1995-2011 1995-2011 IMF x x x
The Gambia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 2005-2010 Website x
Guinea Bissau LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1995-2011 1995-2011 1995-2011 1995-2011 IMF x x x
Haiti LIC LAC IDA HIPC 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 PRMED x x x
Kenya LIC AFR IDA 1977-2011 1977-2010 1982-2010 1977-2010 Website x x x
Kyrgyz LIC ECA IDA 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 IMF x x x
Cambodia LIC EAP IDA 1993-2011 n/a n/a 1993-2011 IFS x x
Lao PDR LMIC EAP IDA 2006-2011 n/a n/a n/a IMF
Liberia LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2003-2011 2006-2011 2006-2011 2006-2011 PRMED
Madagascar LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1998-2011 1998-2011 1998-2011 1998-2011 IMF x
Mali LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2008-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 IMF x
Myanmar LIC EAP IDA 1989-2011 n/a n/a 1989-2011 IFS x x
Mozambique LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2011 PRMED x
Mauritania LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005-2011 2005-2011 2005-2011 2005-2011 PRMED x
Malawi LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1980-2011 1980-2011 1980-2011 2002-2011 PRMED x x x
Niger LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1998-2010 n/a 1998-2010 n/a PRMED x
Nepal LIC SA IDA 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 Website x x x
Rwanda LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1981-2011 1981-2011 1981-2011 1981-2011 Website x x x
Senegal LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 IMF x
Solomon Islands LMIC EAP IDA 1980-2011 1988-2011 1988-2011 1988-2011 Website x x x
Sierra Leone LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1978-2011 1978-2011 1978-2011 1978-2011 Website x x x
Chad LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2005-2011 2005-2011 2005-2011 2005-2011 IMF x
Togo LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1975-2011 n/a n/a 1975-2011 IFS x x
Tajikistan LIC ECA IDA 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 IMF x
Tanzania LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1979-2011 1981-2011 1979-2011 2000-2011 PRMED x x x
Uganda LIC AFR IDA HIPC 1978-2011 2002-2011 1978-2011 1978-2010 IMF x x
Vietnam LMIC EAP Blend 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 IMF x
Yemen LMIC MNA IDA 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 IMF x x x
Congo, Dem. LIC AFR IDA HIPC 2006-2011 n/a n/a n/a IMF
Zambia LMIC AFR IDA HIPC 1999-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 PRMED      x
Zimbabwe LIC AFR Blend 1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-2004 n/a Web-IMF
(vii)  Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
(i) Africa Region (AFR), East Asia & Pacific Region (EAP), Europe & Central Africa Region (ECA), Latin America & Caribbean (LAC),  Middle 
East and North Africa Region (MNA), South Asia (SA).
(ii) Domestic debt corresponds to Central Government, with the exception of Lao PDR (General Government), Niger (Public Sector), and Congo 
DCR (General Government).
(iii) Domestic debt  includes all financial liabilities defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), with the exception of Benin, Kenya, Kyrgyz, and 
Mauritania, whose definition includes only securities. For Benin and Mauritania, there are no data available for other liabilities. For Kenya and 
Kyrgyz, other liabilities are negligible and not reported.
(iv) Domestic debt is defined on a residency basis, with exception of  Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, and Yemen, where the currency 
basis is used because of their debt recording practices and data constrains.
(v) Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
(vi) There is no domestic market. Central Bank is the only holder of domestic debt.
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Table A3. LIC Domestic Public Debt Dataset – Debt Stock Sample and Debt Structure Sample 
 
 
Country name
Debt 
Relief
Public 
Debt in 
2011 (%  
of GDP)
Domestic 
Public 
Debt in 
2011 (%  
of GDP)
External 
Public 
Debt in 
2011 (%  
of GDP)
Variation 
in Public 
Debt/GDP 
in 1996-
2011 (p.p.)
Variation 
in 
Domestic 
Public 
Debt/GDP 
in 1996-
2011 (p.p.)
Variation 
in External 
Public 
Debt/GDP 
in 1996-
2011 (p.p.)
Pairwise 
correlatio
n between 
External 
Debt/GDP 
and 
Domestic 
Debt/GDP 
in 1996-
2011
Securities 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Loans (%  
of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Other 
accounts 
payable 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Other 
liabilities 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Long-term 
debt (%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Short-
term debt 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Non-
classified 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt) (i)
Long-term 
debt (%  of 
Domestic 
Debt 
excluding 
Central 
Bank 
advances) 
(i)
Short-
term debt 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt 
excluding 
Central 
Bank 
advances) 
(i)
Non-
classified 
(%  of 
Domestic 
Debt 
excluding 
Central 
Bank 
advances) 
(i)
Burundi HIPC 46.7 19.7 27.0 -91.1 9.3 -100.3 -0.3972 26 0 61 13 67 20 13 8 57 35
Comoros HIPC 51.2 6.2 44.9 -46.2 1.7 -47.9 -0.5552*
Eritrea HIPC 135.3 95.6 39.7 87.7 54.3 33.4  0.7503*
Ethiopia HIPC 32.2 14.2 18.1 -103.3 -10.0 -93.3 0.1783 51 0 49 0 82 18 0 62 38 0
Ghana HIPC 45.5 24.2 21.4 -36.7 8.9 -45.6 0.0523 99 0 1 0 59 41 0 59 41 0
Guinea HIPC 66.8 10.8 56.0 -15.0 7.9 -22.9 -0.4974* 23 0 77 0 77 23 0 0 100 0
Guinea Bissau HIPC 44.1 18.3 25.7 -276.2 12.2 -288.3 -0.7893* 0 96 4 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
Haiti HIPC 24.5 14.3 10.2 -14.0 1.3 -15.3 0.0761 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 50.2 25.9 24.4 -6.9 12.1 -19.1 -0.5018* 100 0 0 0 54 46 0 54 46 0
Kyrgyz 53.6 4.1 49.5 16.6 -0.9 17.5 0.2531 100 0 0 0 73 27 0 73 27 0
Cambodia 31.2 0.5 30.6 -35.2 -1.8 -33.4  0.9728*
Myanmar 25.0 24.9 0.0 0.8 1.9 -1.1 0.2583
Malawi HIPC 43.3 22.9 20.4 -61.7 13.2 -74.8 -0.3846 89 3 8 0 21 76 3 14 83 3
Nepal 35.5 14.6 20.9 -31.8 -0.2 -31.5 0.4884 95 5 0 0 41 59 0 41 59 0
Rwanda HIPC 24.9 7.6 17.3 -64.6 -8.8 -55.8 0.6800* 58 0 2 40 69 22 9 69 22 9
Solomon Islands 23.7 5.5 18.2 -11.4 -11.8 0.4 0.5497* 52 19 0 29 78 19 3 78 19 3
Sierra Leone HIPC 61.4 15.0 46.5 -60.5 10.2 -70.7 0.0945 90 0 9 1 36 64 0 30 70 0
Togo HIPC 27.5 10.0 17.5 -72.7 3.3 -76.0 -0.8138*
Tanzania HIPC 39.5 9.9 29.6 -71.7 -8.7 -63.1 0.6393* 99 1 0 0 77 23 0 77 23 0
Uganda HIPC 28.9 9.8 19.1 -32.7 8.2 -41.0 0.7211*
Yemen 43.7 25.0 18.6 -30.2 23.5 -53.7 -0.5160* 88 0 12 0 18 82 0 10 90 0
(i) Average share in 1996-2011.
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Chapter 2  
 
 
Domestic public debt in Low-Income Countries: an empirical 
analysis.  
 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the rationale for the increase in domestic debt using a newly developed 
database covering 21 Low Income Countries (LICs) over the period 1996-2011. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the determinants of public debt composition in LICs and 
the size of domestic debt in the economy. The  results suggest that domestic debt development in 
LICs is at an early stage and financial needs are still probably satisfied mainly through external 
financing. The fiscal space granted by debt relief seems to have naturally favored the substitution of 
public debt portfolio toward domestic debt but it probably did not suffice on its own to foster 
domestic debt development. We also find that internal financing is positively correlated with the 
share of liquidity in the economy and with hyperinflation episodes and it is negatively correlated with 
trade openness and moderate inflation. Contrary to expectations we do not find evidence that 
financial development and quality of policy and institutions  are positively correlated with domestic 
debt. The fragility of some results highlights that reasons for the increase of domestic debt in LICs are 
not as clear as in Emerging Markets (EMs). 
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1.Introduction 
Notwithstanding the higher cost of domestic debt in Low-income countries (LICs), the literature does 
not provide an unambiguous prescription on its benefits and costs and yet on the rationale for its 
increase. Until recently most of the studies focused mainly on external borrowing, leaving domestic 
debt unexplored. This scarcity was partially due to the lack of centralized data and the long reliance 
of LICs on foreign assistance to meet their financial needs. In this paper we intend to investigate the 
rationale for the increase of internal financing in LICs using a newly developed dataset.  
 
Attention on the determinants of domestic debt in LICs has surged only in the recent years and has 
been motivated mainly by the potential opportunities generated by debt relief in many Heavy 
Indebted Poor Countries  (HIPCs)
1
 and by the limited availability of external borrowing from 
Advanced Economies (AEs) after the financial crisis. Most analyses have focused on demand-side 
factors, suggesting that financial constrains in traditional lending economies or policy conditionality 
restricting non-concessional foreign borrowing imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
have reduced the opportunities for external financing and forced LICs governments to tap local public 
debt markets (IMF and World Bank, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004; Borensztein, Levy-Yeyati, and Panizza, 
2006; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). A notable exception is the recent study by Mu et al. (2013), 
which  focuses on supply-side factors and stresses the importance of the quality of institutions and 
capital openness for the capitalization of African government security market. Finally, an alternative 
rationale for increasing domestic borrowing in LICs has been suggested by the literature on public 
debt management in Emerging Markets (EMs). Several authors have investigated the determinants of 
public debt composition and have identified important pros and cons of shifting from external to 
domestic borrowing
2
. These studies may suggest that the increase in internal financing in LICs could 
have also resulted from the analysis of advantages and disadvantages, where the former outweigh the 
latter.   
 
The major challenges in estimating the determinants of domestic debt in LICs are the lack of data on 
public domestic debt in LICs,  the endogeneity of most of the covariates and,  the high persistence of 
the dependent variable. As for the first point, data on LICs government debt are scant and they are 
quite heterogeneous in terms of the criteria to distinguish domestic and external debt, the definition of 
public sector and  the type of government liabilities covered.  (Bua et al., 2014). This has prevented 
scholars to extend the analysis carried out for EMs also to LICs. Dataset that focus only on specific 
type of government liabilities, for example, may limit the analysis to a sub-set of domestic debt that  
bears specific characteristics, conducting to misleading results
3
. As for the second and third point, 
different econometric methodologies suffer from different limitations and none of them allows to 
address the two problems entirely.   
 
To overcome these limitations, in this paper we analyze the determinants of domestic debt using a 
newly developed database  and presenting the results for  two different estimators: country fixed 
effect (FE) and General Method of Moment (GMM). The dataset, which has been recently developed 
by the author (Bua et al., 2014) and covers 21 LICs over the period 1996-2011,  helps address the 
problem of the lack of data and their heterogeneity. The definition of  domestic debt in the dataset is, 
in fact,  homogenous across countries and it refers to all financial liabilities (i.e. marketable and non-
marketable) included in the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) owed by the Central 
                                                     
 
1 The HIPC Initiative is a  coordinated action by multilateral organizations and governments to reduce to sustainable levels 
the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries. In 2005, the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) which provides full debt relief to free up additional resources to help these 
countries reach the Millennium Development Goals (IMF, 2013a). 
2 Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), IMF and World Bank (2001), Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003), Hausmann 
and Panizza (2003), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Kumhof and Tanner (2005), Calvo (2005),  Jeanne (2003), 
Mehl and Reynaud (2005), Burger and Warnock (2006), Claessens et al.  (2007), Guscina (2008),  Bae (2012).  
3 As shown by Abbas and Christensen (2010) securitized debt usually has positive interest rate and it tends to be growth 
friendly, while non-securitized debt does not present these characteristics.  
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Government to domestic creditors. The use of this dataset guarantees comparability across countries 
and allows  to analyze the entire spectrum of internal financing. The choice to present the results 
using two different estimators is motivated by the literature in EMs, in which  scholars have 
attempted to show results of different estimators emphasizing  those consistent across techniques
4
. 
Fixed effect estimator overcomes the problem of omitted time-invariant country characteristics in a 
panel data. Generalized Method of Moment addresses the inconsistency introduced by the fixed effect 
in a dynamic model. As compared with other possible candidates which have been proposed to fixed 
the endogeneity problem, such as Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and  Arellano and Bond (1991), GMM 
should perform better in relative short sample and in the presence of highly persistent dependent 
variable.   
 
Our dependent variables are the share of domestic debt in total public debt and domestic debt as a 
share of GDP. The two variables enable us to capture two different dimensions of internal borrowing.  
The first one allows to investigate the composition of public debt, while the second one captures the 
depth of the domestic market.  
 
The key results of the paper suggest that domestic debt development in LICs is at an early stage and  
financial needs are still probably satisfied mainly through external financing. The fiscal space granted 
by debt relief seems to have naturally favored the substitution of public debt portfolios toward 
domestic debt but it probably did not suffice on its own to foster domestic debt development. Also we 
find that internal financing is negatively correlated with trade openness and moderate inflation  and it 
is positively correlated with the share of liquidity in the economy and with hyperinflation episodes. 
Contrary to expectation, we do not find evidence that financial development and quality of policy and 
institutions  are correlated with domestic debt.  
 
These results confirm previous finding which suggest that in presence of monetary stability countries 
tend to switch toward domestic debt  (Hausman and Panizza, 2003; Burger and Warnock, 2003; 
Claessens et al, 2007; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005; Guscina, 2008), while countries more outward 
oriented issue more debt externally (Adelegan et al. 2009; Mu et al. , 2013). We interpret the 
significant correlation between domestic debt, liquidity in circulation and hyperinflation  as a warning 
signal of  the tendency of governments to inflate the debt away. As recently suggested by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2011) in fact,  domestic debt and the gain of the government from inflating down its real 
value may explain why governments seem to print money above the seignorage-maximizing rate.  
The lack of significance of financial development is in line with the results of Mu et al. (2013) and 
Abbas and Christensen (2010) who find either a negative or a lack of correlation between the two 
variables. One possible interpretation of these results is that domestic debt in LICs is still mainly 
dominated by central banks - which hold primarily  non-marketable instruments-  and by commercial 
banks - which may be induced by moral suasion to absorb excessive public debt -Panizza (2008).  
Being this true, financial development  would not play an important role in spurring domestic debt. 
Finally, the absence of a positive relation between domestic debt and the quality of policies and 
institutions confirms the results of Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Mehl and Reynaud (2005) who 
both downplay the role of institutional factors in determining domestic debt in EMs.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 
presents some descriptive statistics on the evolution and structure of domestic debt in LICs. Section 4 
describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 shows the estimation results. Section 6 
discusses the robustness checks and alternative specifications. Section 7 concludes.   
                                                     
 
4 In their studies on original sin determinants Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Mehl and Reynaud (2005) use a censored 
Tobit model. Guscina (2008) uses country fixed effect, difference-in-difference, OLS and censored Tobit model. Focusing 
on the size of government bond in the economy, Claessens et al. (2007) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) 
estimate the regressions using panel Generalized Least Squares. More recently, Mu et al. (2013) extend the baseline 
econometric model of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai to two-phase estimation under fixed effects and introduce a 
generalized method of moments to account for possible endogeneity. They also present the results for pooled ordinary least 
squares (POLS), random effects (RE), and fixed effects (FE) models.  
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2. Literature review 
The existing literature on domestic debt in LICs is scant. Most of the studies on debt management 
focused mainly on external borrowing, leaving domestic debt unexplored. This scarcity is partially 
due to the lack of data and the long reliance of LICs on external concessional borrowing.   
 
Despite the recent financial crisis and the debt relief initiative have brought LICs financial 
development to the fore of the current debate ,  most of the research has so far focused on the banking 
sector and the stock market and only little attention has been dedicated to public and private bond 
markets (Detragiache et al., 2005; McDonald and Schumacher, 2007; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; 
Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009; Anayiotos and Toroyan, 2009; Kablan, 2010; and Beck et al., 2011).  
Even less attention has been devoted to public domestic debt as a whole, due to the lack of data 
including marketable and non-makeable liabilities
5
.  
 
In retrospective, one can distinguish two branches of studies on the determinants of domestic public 
debt: one focussing on supply side  factors and the other one on demand-side constrains. 
 
The first branch of the literature investigates government’s preferred debt portfolio composition and 
the cost-risk profile of financial instruments available; it identifies important pros and cons of shifting 
from external to domestic borrowing. To the extent that internal financing is denominated in local 
currency, domestic debt reduces the exposure of the debt portfolio to unanticipated movements in the 
exchange rate (Hausmann, Panizza, and Rigobon, 2006; Bacchiocchi and Missale, 2012) and ensures 
a higher degree of freedom to use the exchange rate as a stabilization mechanism against external 
shocks, i.e. it lowers fiscal dominance on the exchange rate policy (IMF and World Bank, 2001; 
Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). Also, to the extent that domestic debt is owed to resident creditors, it 
reduces exposure to capital flow reversals (Calvo, 2005). Domestic borrowing can improve the 
efficiency of the allocation of national savings if mobilized resources are used to fund public 
investment instead of capital flights or inefficient self-investment by savers (Abbas and Christensen, 
2010). The development of the institutional infrastructure for the issuance of domestic public debt 
often supports the organization and functioning of local financial markets (Arnone and Presbitero, 
2010). Other than the advantages of domestic borrowing, the literature explores its disadvantages. 
Given that many developing countries are unable to issue long-term government securities at a 
reasonable interest rate, the resulting maturity mismatch can be worse than the currency mismatch 
associated with foreign debt (Panizza, 2008). Macroeconomic distortions and instability can be 
induced by an excessive domestic borrowing, including crowding out effects (Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 
2008; Abbas and Christensen, 2010; and Arnone and Presbitero, 2010; Mbate, 2013), hyper-inflation 
episodes and external debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Distortions in the financial system can 
also be important, particularly the potentially perverse incentives facing financial institutions that 
invest in government debt. For instance, banks investing in public debt are more profitable but less 
efficient, and they are more likely to prefer a short term portfolio allocation and, thus, to build 
additional vulnerabilities; domestic banks and institutional investors may be induced by moral 
suasion to absorb excessive public debt (Hauner, 2006; Hanson, 2007; Panizza, 2008; and Arnone 
and Presbitero, 2010). Narrow investor base and lack of instruments may undermine the ability of 
domestic debt to supply sufficient long term financing for growth-enhancing investment projects. 
Domestic debt levels exceeding a certain threshold may pose the risk of triggering domestic debt 
distress and undermining a country’s fiscal and debt sustainability position (Mbate, 2013).  
 
A notable exception in the literature on supply- side factors is the recent study by Mu et al. (2013). 
They depart from public debt composition and cost-benefit considerations and focus on the 
determinants of government security market. They look at 36 African countries and show that 
                                                     
 
5 The few available studies on LIC government debt (Christensen, 2005;  Arnone and Presbitero, 2010;  Abbas and 
Christensen, 2010;  Abbas et al., 2010;  Panizza, 2008;  and Presbitero, 2012) gathered data from multiple sources and  are 
therefore quite heterogeneous in terms of the criteria to distinguish domestic and external debt, the definition of public sector, 
the type of government liabilities covered, and the treatment of certain financial arrangements (Bua et al., 2014).  
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government security market capitalization is related to better institutions, interest rate volatility, 
current and capital account openness. 
 
The second branch of the literature – focusing on demand side factors-  has surged in the recent years 
and has been motivated by the reduced opportunity for LICs to access external borrowing. They 
maintain that financial constrains in traditional lending economies or policy conditionality restricting 
non-concessional foreign borrowing imposed by IFIs, have reduced the opportunities for external 
financing and forced LIC governments to tap local public debt markets (IMF and World Bank, 2001; 
UNCTAD, 2004; Borensztein, Levy-Yeyati, and Panizza, 2006; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). 
Finally, other studies depart from the hypothesis that LIC governments use domestic public debt 
solely for fiscal deficit financing and argue that internal borrowing helps sterilize foreign exchange 
inflows from foreign aid or natural resource-based exports (Christensen, 2005; Aiyar, Berg, and 
Hussain, 2005). 
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3. Evolution of Domestic Public Debt 
In this section we present some stylized facts about the evolution and structure of domestic debt in 
LICs. The analysis is based on a dataset recently developed by the author covering 21 LICs over the 
period 1996-2011
6
.  
 
In the dataset, domestic debt is defined on the residency basis
7
 and it includes all domestic financial 
liabilities listed in the General Financial Statistics Manual (IMF, 2001) - with the exception of arrears 
-owed to the Central Government. The dataset contains also information on the structure of domestic 
public debt allowing for a better understanding of  possible risks stemming from it.   
 
As shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix, during the period 1996-2011 the share of domestic debt in 
public debt portfolio almost tripled, reaching 40 percent of the total public debt. The share of internal 
debt in the economy increased from 12.3 percent of GDP to 16.2 percent and external debt lowered 
from 72 percent of GDP to 23 percent, rebalancing public debt portfolio toward domestic debt. 
Countries that benefitted from HIPCs debt relief Initiative (in the graph, HIPCs ) and those that did 
not (non-HIPCs) both managed to reduce the burden of foreign liabilities; however since the early 
2000, HIPCs have started increasing external debt again, while non-HIPCs kept increasing internal 
financing vis-à-vis external financing. 
 
Despite the smaller share of domestic debt in public debt composition, LICs face a heavier burden 
stemming from domestic liabilities compared to foreign liabilities. As shown in Figure 2,  over the 
period 1996-2011 the cost of external debt -even including the capital loss due to exchange rate 
depreciation- has never exceed 4 percent per year,  while the nominal cost of domestic borrowing 
swung from 18 percent per year in 1996 to 8 percent in 2011. As a consequence of the lower 
borrowing cost of external debt and the reduction of foreign liabilities relative to GDP, the financial 
burden of external debt dropped below the interest payments on domestic debt. As noted in Bua et al. 
(2014) even if the  nominal cost of internal financing is higher than the one on external debt, since 
2003  its real cost  is negative, probably encouraging borrowing from local sources.   
 
As for the structure of internal financing, data show that the structure of domestic debt is mainly 
characterized by short-term financing, securities and dominance of the banking system. The 
breakdown into HIPCs and non-HIPCs highlights significant differences between the two groups, 
with HIPCs relying more on Central Bank advances and non-HIPCs making progress in issuing 
securities and lengthening maturities. 
 
Figure 3 shows, that the main sources of domestic financing in LICs are securities and advances from 
the Central Bank. On average, since the early 2000s, securities constitute three-quarters of domestic 
debt whereas Central Bank advances are nearly one-fifth. The breakdown in HIPCs and non-HIPCs 
reveals that the share of securities is much higher in non-HIPCs and, conversely, the share of Central 
Bank advances is larger in HIPCs.   
 
As for the maturity structure, Figure 4 highlights that LICs have lengthened their domestic public 
debt portfolio, with the share of long-term liabilities in the total domestic debt increasing from 52 
percent to 67 percent in 1996-2011.  Differentiating between HIPCs and non-HIPCs suggests that the 
overall increase in the share of long-term debt has been driven solely by the latter. 
 
Finally, as shown in Figure 4, the investor base is dominated by the banking system, which holds 
nearly three-quarters of the domestic liabilities. Within the banking system, the share of commercial 
banks has increased since the early 2000s.  The breakdown into HIPCs and non-HIPCs reveals that 
                                                     
 
6 This section is largely draw from Bua, et al. (2014). 
7  The currency basis is used in 5 countries because of their debt recording practices and data constraints. 
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the formers rely much more on Central Bank lending (e.g., advances) whereas the latter tap 
commercial banks and other market investors. 
 
Trajectories presented in this section provide a first insight of the evolution of internal financing. The 
increase of domestic debt showed in Figure 2 and its higher cost vis-à-vis external debt (Figure 3) 
support our call for better understanding the rationale of its evolution. The  breakdown into HIPCs 
and non-HIPCs also provides some suggestions on its potential determinants.   As proposed by 
Presbitero (2012), the different pattern between HIPCs and non-HIPCs may points toward the role for 
the institutional and political framework.  Non-HIPCs are probably better equipped in term of 
monetary policies and political stability and yet better able to develop an efficient domestic market at 
a less volatile pace. On the other hand, HIPCs – probably characterized by shallower financial 
markets and pressures of fiscal dominance and debt monetization- have increased their domestic debt 
on the onset of debt relief.  In the next section we assess, amongst others, some of these hypothesis.  
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4. Analytical Framework 
Our analysis employs panel data techniques to assess the role of supply and demand factors in 
determining the volume of domestic debt in LICs. The analysis covers the period 1996-2011 and it 
includes 21 LICs
8
.  
 
(a) Data 
 
Our dependent variables are the share of domestic debt in total public debt and domestic debt as a 
share of GDP. The two variables enable us to capture two different dimensions of internal borrowing.  
The first one helps investigate the composition of public debt, while the second one captures the 
depth of the domestic market.  
 
Domestic debt is defined as debt owed by the Central Government to domestic residents and it covers 
all financial liabilities (i.e. marketable and non-marketable) described in the GFSM (IMF, 2011) with 
the exception of arrears. We include both the banking system -comprising commercial banks and the 
Central Bank- and the non-banking system. It is worth noting, that the inclusion of Central Bank may 
blur the definition of domestic market given that, in our sample, Central Banks hold mainly  non-
marketable instruments.  To address this shortcoming, in section 6 we run a number of robustness 
checks and we exclude the Central Bank.  
 
The explanatory variables are drawn from a list of potential candidates proposed by the literature on 
public debt in Emerging Markets and by the more recent literature on domestic debt in LICs (Aiyar et 
al., 2005; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010; Diouf and Dufrense, 2012; Mu et al., 2013). For the sake of 
clarity, we describe the covariates following the dichotomy among demand and supply factors.  
Summary statistics and description of the variables are provided in Table 2 in Appendix. 
 
Starting from demand side factors, we look at the flow of external resources , proxy by the  “Net 
transfer on external debt”9 (ex_nettr) taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI). 
The impact of this variable is ambiguous at priori. One strand of the literature suggests a negative 
sign and claims that the recent increase in domestic debt in LICs may be driven by financial 
constrains in traditional lending economies (IMF and World Bank, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004; 
Borensztein, Levy-Yeyati, and Panizza, 2006; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).  Other studies, on the 
contrary, suggest a positive relation and maintain that the builds up of domestic debt is motivated by 
the upsurge of aid inflow and the need to sterilize it (Aiyar et al., 2005). We also test the hypothesis 
that LICs have tapped the domestic market due to limits imposed by the IFIs  on non-concessional 
borrowing
10
. To this end, we build a dummy variable (debt_limit) that takes value 1 if a country is 
subject to Debt Limit Policy either under IMF programs (DLP) or IDA Non-Concessional Borrowing 
                                                     
 
8 See Table 1 in the Appendix. We include almost all countries listed in column “Debt Stock Sample”.  However due to the 
lack of data for other covariates included in the regression we drop Rwanda and Myanmar reducing the sample to 19 
countries.  
9 Net transfers are net flows (disbursement - principal repayment) minus interest payments during the year; negative transfers 
show net transfers made by the borrower to the creditor during the year (WDI). 
10 IMF-supported programs in LICs typically include limits on non-concessional external debt. These limits seek to prevent 
the build-up of unsustainable debt, while allowing for adequate external financing. The main component of these limits is 
concessionality requirements applying to debt contracted or guaranteed by the official sector (IMF, 2013b). Along the same 
line, IDA implemented in 2006 an incentive mechanism to avoid countries that benefit from debt relief and grants to higher 
their risk of debt distress by borrowing non-concessional. According to this mechanism –Non Concessional Borrowing 
Policy- concessionality requirements apply only to external public and publicly guaranteed debt (PPG). Domestic debt –even 
if non-concessional in nature- is excluded from the policy limits given its importance as instrument to develop domestic 
capital market (World Bank, 2006).  
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Policy (NCBP) and 0 otherwise
11
. It is worth reminding that due to the endogeneity of this variable, 
nothing can be said about its causality
12.
.  
 
Turning to supply side factors, we start by looking at the stock of debt. Different studies suggest that 
high levels of indebtedness may give the government an incentive to default on their debt either 
through inflation, unexpected change in interest rate, explicit taxation, or outright default (Missale 
and Blanchard, 1994, Leong, 1999, Mehl and Reynaud, 2005). Indeed, we expect lenders to reduce 
their share of domestic liabilities in presence of a high level of debt.  On the other hands, the literature 
on debt relief suggests a negative relation between the two variables. Different authors point out that 
high levels of debt may hamper the ability of countries to attract new lenders, suggesting that higher 
levels of debt may induce governments to raise funding domestically  (Bulow, 2002; Arslanalp and 
Henry, 2004). Recently, Presbitero (2012) finds that in LICs the level of the burden -as approximated 
by external debt- is negatively correlated with domestic debt, confirming the first hypothesis. We 
capture the level of the burden with the total debt to GDP ratio (tot_gdp)
13
.  
 
Then, we want to test the relation between the depth of the financial sector and internal borrowing. 
The literature on EMs is unanimous on the positive impact of financial development on domestic 
debt. On the contrary studies on LICs are less conclusive and they identify different results upon 
different specifications. On the one hand, Guscina (2008) finds that governments in countries with 
higher levels of M2 over GDP are better able to raise financing needs domestically.  Along the same 
line, Claessens et al. (2007) show that countries with deeper domestic financial system –
approximated by bank deposits and stock market capitalization- have larger domestic bond market. 
Mehl and Reynaud (2005) sharpen this result, and show that financial development underpinned by 
growing private savings increases potential demand for, and eases issuance of, longer term, local 
currency instruments. On the other hand,  studies on LICs (or which include LICs in their sample) 
find inconclusive results. Abbas and Christensen (2010) identify a positive relation between private 
saving and domestic debt, but the relation turns to be not significant when they proxy financial 
development with a financial depth index
14
. Also supportive of this weak  relation,   Mu et al. (2013) 
find that the size of the banking sector is either not correlated or negatively correlated with 
government securities suggesting that private market development crowds out government securities. 
We proxy the development of the financial system with the ratio of M2 over GDP (broadmoney_gdp) 
taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). 
 
Then, we control for trade openness. Its sign is ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, open economies 
may encourage securities market development because international competition will limit the ability 
of entrenched interests to protect their advantaged position (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). On the other 
hand, a more open economy might decrease its share of domestic debt due to a more outward 
orientation which translates in issuing more debt externally (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). 
Supporting the first view, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) find a positive relation 
between the two variables. Consistently with the second view, Mu et al. (2013) find a negative 
                                                     
 
11 Data on IMF programs are recollected from the IMF’s MONA Database 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona/index.aspx). Data on NCBP are obtained from World Bank’s website and staff 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida/non-concessional-borrowing.htmland).  
12 A challenge in identifying the impact of IFIs programs  on domestic debt is the potential for endogeneity of  countries’ 
program participation. IMF and WB programs are usually concluded in times of economic crises or specific needs, therefore 
the conditions of countries that enter and remain under a program are not the same as for those that abstain. If those 
conditions differ, difference in the development of domestic debt might depend not only on the program itself but also on the 
initial conditions. Failure to control for these initial conditions would result in a selection bias problem (Allain et al. 2014).  
13 Total debt is calculated as the sum of Central Government Domestic Debt (author’s database) and Central Government 
External Debt including IMF credits (DRS).  
14 The index was first developed by Huang and Temple (2005) and it summarizes liquid liability of the financial system, 
private sector credit provided by commercial and other banks and,  commercial bank assets as a ratio of total banking system 
assets.  
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relation.  Finally, Guscina (2008) shows different results upon use of different estimators.  We proxy 
trade openness with the ratio of trade over GDP (trade).  
 
Following the literature, we include in our analysis the inflation rate to capture monetary credibility 
and we test the hypothesis that lower inflation is conducive to deeper domestic debt markets.  As 
shown by Jeanne (2003) when monetary credibility is low, interest rate on domestic currency debt 
will be higher and countries will borrow more externally. Moreover, if the monetary and fiscal 
authorities are inflation prone, investors will be averse in lending in local currency. To this regards, 
the empirical literature is unanimous on the sign of the relation and shows that lower inflation rates 
are associated with larger domestic markets (Hausman and Panizza, 2003; Burger and Warnock, 
2003; Claessens et al, 2007; Mehl and Reynaud, 2005; Guscina, 2008). A notable exception is 
Presbitero (2012) who, focusing on LICs, highlights a lack of correlation between inflation and the 
depth of the domestic debt.  We proxy monetary credibility with  a 5-year moving average of the 
annual percentage change in the GDP deflator (inf_ma), taken for the WDI.  We first run the model 
using the variable at time t, then we control for its possible endogeneity by adding its lagged value 
(l.inf_ma). In order to avoid the results being driven by hyperinflation events, we also approximate 
monetary credibility with  GDP deflator (gdpdef) plus a dummy variable that capture inflation 
episodes (hyperinf_d).  Additionally    we  test the hypothesis that inflation volatility impacts 
domestic debt through interest rate differentials (Jeanne, 2003). To this end, we substitute our proxy 
of monetary stability with the spread between the interest rate on domestic and external debt 
(diff_int). Finally we interact monetary  stability with capital control (kaopen) and we test the 
hypothesis that either smaller capital inflows make it easier for governments to control inflation  and 
yet to guarantee monetary stability or that in countries more financially open bad monetary policies 
will have an higher impact on domestic debt than in countries with capital control. The rationale 
being that in countries more open, government will easily turn to external lenders to satisfy their 
financial needs (the coefficient of the interaction term will be bigger in countries more financially 
open). 
 
Finally, we test the argument in the public finance literature that the institutional environment may 
have an important effect on the size of government debt. In this regards, the empirical literature is 
unanimous in supporting the idea that countries with better policy and institutions are better able to 
develop domestic market (Burger and Warnock, 2003; Claessens et al, 2007; Guscina, 2008; Mu et 
al., 2013). Two notable exceptions are Hausmann and Panizza (2003) who downplay the importance 
of institutional factors in determining domestic currency bond and maintain that only country size 
matters and Mehl and Reynaud (2005) which do not find any significant relation. Presbitero (2012) 
brings evidence that amongst LICs, those with weak policies and institutions have increased domestic 
debt substantially on the onset of debt relief initiatives and have reduced it thereafter; while countries 
with better policy and institutional environment have increased it at a constant and less volatile pace. 
Following   Presbitero (2012) we proxy policy and institutional environment with the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index calculated by the World Bank and used by World Bank-
IMF debt sustainability framework (DSF) to assess public debt sustainability.  
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(b)Empirical specification 
 
The empirical model we want to estimate can be described by the following equation: 
 
yit = βXit + uit      i = 1…..T, t= 1……T    (1) 
 
yit  is the measure of domestic debt, Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables, β is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated and uit are the residuals. The panel analysis has to face up two conceptual 
problems. The first one is caused by omitted time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects) that 
might be correlated with the explanatory variables and, the second one is caused by the persistence of 
the dependent variables. This calls for explicit modeling of dynamic effects. To this end, equation (1) 
can be reorganized as: 
 
yit = δyit−1 +  βXit +  αi + γt   + uit    (2) 
 
yit−1  is the lagged dependent variable,  αi are country dummies that capture time invariant country 
characteristics,   γt  are year dummy variables that capture shocks common across countries in a 
given year and  uit is a residual that is clustered at the country level.  To overcome the inconsistency 
of pooled OLS, Fixed Effect, and First Difference
15
 introduced by the presence of fixed unit effects in 
a dynamic model, we could rely on consistent Instrumental Variables (IV) and Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimators.  
 
Given the characteristics of our sample (T=16, N=19, δ large) and the dimension of panel data for 
which IV and GMM are built for (T small, N large) the choice amongst estimators is not trivial. 
Without pretending to be exhaustive, here we briefly summarize benefits and shortcomings of three 
possible candidates to estimate our model : Anderson and Hsiao (1982) (AH), Arellano and Bond 
(1991) (AB), and Blundell-Bond (1998) (BB). AH suggests two IV estimators that upon transforming 
the model in first differences to eliminate the unobserved individual heterogeneity, use the lags of the 
dependent variable, either in difference or in level, as an instrument for the differenced one-time 
lagged dependent variable. AH suffers from the trade-off between lag length and sample size. Using 
longer lags in 2SLS increases efficiency but reduces sample size.  Arellano and Bond propose a 
GMM estimator for the first differenced model, which relies on a greater number of instruments, and 
is more efficient that Anderson and Hsiao. Blundell and Bond observe that for highly persistent data 
AH and AB might suffer a severe sample bias due to weak instruments
16
. As a solution they propose 
a GMM which augments differenced GMM by estimating simultaneously in difference and levels, 
the two equations being distinctly instrumented. However attractive are their asymptotic properties, 
all these estimators are biased in panel data with a small number of cross-sectional units. In particular 
AB and BB exacerbate the problem of instruments proliferation as T grows.  To this regards, 
Roodman (2007) stresses that GMM estimators –as compared to IV17– need to calculate an optimal 
weighting matrix whose number of elements to be estimated is quadratic in the number of 
instruments; therefore they might underperform compared to IV estimators. This is confirmed by the 
work of Judson and Owen (1997) who, after running a Monte Carlo analysis comparing AB and AH, 
conclude that with small N the latter outperforms the first.  
 
Given the high persistence of our variable and the relative short period of time taken into 
consideration we believe that the Blundell and Bond estimator is the most appropriate for our sample. 
                                                     
 
15 It is worth  remanding that , differently from OLS and FD that are biased regardless T,   the asymptotic bias of the FE 
estimators goes to 0 as T goes to infinity. Therefore when T is large, dynamic panel bias become insignificant and fixed 
effect estimator works.  
16 AH and AB perform poorly when 𝛿 is large because past levels convey little information about future changes and yet, 
untransformed lags are weak instruments for transformed variables 
17 Which faces the classical problem of overfitting of endogenous variables. 
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Following the literature on the determinants of domestic debt, we decide to present the results of 
more than one estimators and to highlight those that are consistent across methodologies. In this 
regards, we estimate the model first with the Fixed Effect estimator and then with the GMM.  
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5. Results 
Table 3 and 4 show the main results using as dependent variables the share of domestic in total public 
debt (Table 3) and the domestic debt relative to GDP (Table 4). Each table reports the estimates with 
FE and GMM. The first column of each table presents the results of the baseline specification; 
different controls are added in the subsequent columns.  Tables 5 to 11 test the robustness of the 
results to different specifications.   
 
We check in turn whether the various theories discussed above play a role in explaining public debt 
composition and the dimension of domestic debt in the economy. 
 
We start by looking at the impact of the net transfer on external debt (ex_nettr) on public debt 
composition using the FE estimator. As shown in Table 3 (column 2), we find a negative relation 
between the two variables, suggesting that changes in the flow of external resources significantly 
impact the share of domestic debt in total public debt. This result should be interpret with caution, as 
the decrease in net transfer may simply reflect a decrease in total debt and yet a change in the 
domestic debt ratio in the opposite direction.  In order to qualify this result, in column (3) and (4) we 
control for total debt and debt forgiveness, both expressed as a percentage of GDP. The variables 
have the expected sign. Total debt is significantly and negatively correlated with domestic debt, 
showing that the reduction of the level of the burden fosters the substitution between external and 
domestic debt. Debt forgiveness has the same sign. In particular, when we add debt forgiveness to the 
regression, total debt becomes not significant. These results suggest that the reduction of total debt 
guaranteed by debt relief modifies portfolios composition, fostering the substitution between 
domestic and external debt. Finally, in column (5), we control for the limits imposed by the IFIs to 
countries under IMF programs or IDA Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy and we find that the 
dummy variable is not significant. This suggests that countries under Debt Limit Policy of the IMF or 
NCBP of IDA do not show higher level of domestic debt.  Given the potential endogeneity of this 
dummy nothing can be said about its causality. The results are robust to the use of BB estimator.  
Then we turn to the impact of these variables on the depth of the domestic debt market. The results 
are reported in Table 4. Surprisingly we find that the flow of external resources is positively and 
significantly correlated with the size  of domestic debt in the economy and that the coefficient of total 
debt as percent of GDP is positive and significant, even though the coefficient is very small.  Debt 
forgiveness and debt limits are not significant. These results coupled with those in the previous 
paragraph show that an increase in net transfers –and hence in financial needs– determines and 
increase in domestic debt to GDP but a decrease in its ratio over total debt, suggesting that  financial 
needs in LICs are still satisfied mainly through external financing. Once again there is not robust 
evidence that debt limit policy imposed by IFIs affects domestic debt.  Not significant coefficients are 
found with the BB estimator.  
 
Regarding the development of the financial system we find that the ratio of M2 to GDP 
(broadmoney_gdp) does not impact public debt composition (Table 3 column 1 to 5), but it affects 
positively and significantly the size of domestic debt in the economy (Table 4, column 1 to 5). This 
result may point toward a positive relation between  financial deepening and  demand for domestic 
instruments (Mehl and Reynaud, 2005; Claessens et al. , 2007; Guscina, 2008), but it may also simply 
capture  an increase of liquidity following the purchase of government instruments by the Central 
Bank
18
. To disentangle this result, we use alternative specifications and different definitions of the 
variable. As shown in Table 5 – 8 , when we replace M2 with its lagged value (L.broadmoney_GDP) 
we find that the coefficient is not significant (Column 1).  Then, when we replace M2 over GDP with 
bank credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP (bc_gdp) (column 2) or with private saving as a 
fraction of GDP (sav_gdp) (column 3) the relation turns to be mostly not significant with exception of 
                                                     
 
18 The process which links money supply, government debt and the Central Bank is known as monetization, and it consists in 
a procedure where the government issues debt to finance its deficit and the Central Bank purchases it by printing money. 
This leave the economy with an increased supply of money.  
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bank credit which takes a negative sign when we use FE estimator. Differently from the case of EMs, 
the lack of a positive and unambiguous relation between domestic debt and financial development in 
LICs is not a novelty (Abbas and Christensen, 2010; Mu et al., 2013). Also, as argued by De Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995) broad money and bank credit to the private sector, even if often used as proxies 
of financial deepening might capture two different dimensions of the financial markets and might be 
not necessarily related. According to the authors, M2 is mainly related to the ability of the financial 
system to provide liquidity or a medium of exchange, while the bank credit to the private sector is 
mainly related to the ability of the financial sector to allocate credit efficiently. Against this 
background and taking into consideration the lack of significance of the lag of M2, we interpret the 
positive relation between M2 and domestic debt as a signal of  increased liquidity due to  the purchase 
of government instruments by the Central Bank. Also, we doubt that the sole negative relation 
between bank credit to the private sector and the ratio of domestic debt over total debt suffices to 
infer that domestic debt crowds out private investment. In fact, when we look at the ratio of domestic 
debt over GDP, the relation turns not significant.  
 
Turning to economic openness, our baseline specification (Table 3 and 4) shows that trade openness 
(trade) is negatively correlated with both domestic debt as a share of the total and as a share of GDP. 
However, the coefficient is very small and not always significant. These results are in line with Mu et 
al. (2013) and support the hypothesis that countries more outward oriented issue more debt 
externally.   
 
In term of monetary policy, we find that inflation (inf_ma) is negatively correlated with domestic debt 
as a share of total debt, supporting the hypothesis that when monetary credibility is higher, countries 
tend to switch public debt portfolio composition toward domestic debt. As highlighted by the 
literature on public debt composition in EMs, the rationale behind this may be manifold. For a lender 
point of view, price stability may alleviate creditor fears that domestic debt would be inflated away. 
For a borrower point of view, unpredictable monetary policy increases the real ex post interest rate on 
domestic debt and the interest rate differential
19
 fostering sovereign debt dollarization (Jeanne, 2003). 
Another interpretation of this result is suggested by Claessens et al. (2007) which suggest that 
governments with high inflation cover their financing needs through the inflation tax, reducing the 
need to issue large amounts of debt. The relation between these two variables should be interpret with 
caution  given the potential endogeneity of inflation. In fact, as suggested by Jeanne (2003), and more 
recently by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the causality may run the other way with larger shares of 
domestic-currency debt incentivizing inflation and leading to  hyperinflation episodes. Furthermore, 
the relation could also be driven by common factors and being attenuated when a measure for the rule 
of law is added to the regressors (Burger and Warnock, 2003). This said, in Table 5-11, we run a 
number of robustness tests. Following Jeanne (2003), we start by testing the hypothesis that inflation 
volatility impacts domestic debt through interest rate differentials. To accomplish this, we substitute 
our proxy of monetary policy with the spread between the interest rates on domestic and external debt 
(diff_int) (Column 4). The sign of the coefficient remains negative and not significant, confirming the 
previous results. Second, we try to understand whether using five-year moving average of GDP 
deflator may blur the results, given that it does not distinguish between moderate and hyper-inflation. 
To this end, we replace our proxy with GDP deflator (gdp_def) and a dummy variable that captures 
hyperinflation episodes (hyperinf_d) 
20
. As shown in column 5, the coefficient of the GDP deflator 
confirms the negative relation between variables. Interestingly, the coefficient of hyperinflation is 
positively and significantly correlated with domestic debt. Third, we analyze in greater details the 
possibility of endogeneity of inflation. We deal with this using the lagged value of the variable 
(column 6) and, as for all the other variables, using the BB estimator, which should account for the 
endogeneity problem (Table 3). The first option confirms a negative and not significant relation, 
however, when we control for the potential endogeneity using the BB estimator, the coefficient turns 
to the wrong sign. Overall these regressions highlight one interesting and robust result: once we 
                                                     
 
19 Interest rate differential is defined as the difference between interest rate on domestic and external debt. 
20 The dummy variable takes value 1 is GDP deflator is above 50 and 0 otherwise.  
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control for hyperinflation episodes, inflation and hyperinflation episodes are significantly and 
consistently correlated with domestic debt. On the one hand, the negative sign of inflation suggests 
that when monetary credibility is higher, countries tend to switch toward domestic debt. On the other 
hand the positive sign of hyperinflation episodes may capture the incentive of the government to 
reduce the real value of its local currency debt through printing money
21
. This hypothesis is 
confirmed in Table 10 and 11 where we exclude the Central Bank from our definition of domestic 
debt and we find that inflation and hyperinflation turn not significant. Finally, following Burger and 
Warnock (2003), we try to understand whether the inclusion of variables that capture institutional and 
political quality –potentially highly correlated with monetary stability- blur the results. Indeed, when 
we exclude CPIA from our FE regression, the coefficient of inflation turns significant (Column 11, 12 
and 13).  Results are not robust to the use of BB.   
 
We then turn to the impact of monetary policy on the size of domestic debt in the economy and we 
repeat the same exercise that we performed in the previous paragraph. We first proxy monetary 
credibility with the inflation rate (Table 4), second we substitute it with the spread between the 
interest rates on domestic and external debt (Table 7 and 8, column 4), third we replace the 5 years-
moving average with the GDP deflator and a dummy variable that captures hyperinflation episodes, 
fourth we add lagged values of inflation (Table 7 and 8, column 5 and 6), and finally we exclude 
CPIA (Table 7 and 8, column 11, 12, and 13). The results confirm previous finding and show a 
significant relation amongst domestic debt, inflation and hyperinflation when we control for the latter.   
 
These results coupled with those on the impact of monetary policy on public debt composition 
suggest that in presence of monetary stability countries tend to switch toward domestic debt 
(Hausman and Panizza, 2003; Burger and Warnock, 2003; Claessens et al, 2007; Mehl and Reynaud, 
2005; Guscina, 2008). Also an interesting finding is the positive relation between domestic debt and 
hyperinflation which suggests that governments may have incentives to print money above the 
signorage-maximizing level in order to reduce the real value of their debt. As  we will see in the next 
chapter,  when we exclude the Central Bank from the definition of domestic debt, hyperinflation turns 
not significant, somehow suggesting that debt hold by the Central Bank may be inflationary.  
 
Before turning to the analysis of political and institutional variables, we inspect the interaction 
between capital control and monetary policy and their impact on domestic debt. To this end, we 
augment each regression with a proxy of financial openness (kaopen)
22
  and its interaction with 
monetary stability. In Table 5-8, we first, interact capital controls with the inflation rate (int_kaoinf),  
second we interact the capital control variable with the GDP deflator (int_kaogdpdef) and we add a 
dummy variable for hyperinflation episodes (Column 8), third we add a dummy variable for 
HIPC/MDRI countries which reach the completion point (d_completions_point) and finally we 
substitute the inflation rate with the spread between the interest rates on domestic and external debt 
(int_kaodiff). On the one hand, we expect capital control to be positively correlated with domestic 
debt  as smaller capital inflows should make it easier for governments to control inflation  and yet to 
guarantee monetary stability. On the other hand we expect that in countries more financially open bad 
                                                     
 
21 As previously discussed monetization leaves the economy with an increased supply of money. If the money printed 
exceeds the demand for it, prices will raise up and so will do inflation (Fisher and Easterly, 1990). The literature on 
government budget has long focused on the real resources that the government can buy with the money printed (seignorage 
revenues) and also on the limits of this practice. It has been demonstrated  that as  inflation raises,  the demand for money 
declines and eventually the government’s revenue from seignorage reaches a maximum. Recently, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) has pointed  toward the failure of this literature to explain why governments seem to inflate above the seignorage-
maximizing rate and have suggested that this choice may be explained by domestic debt and the gain of the government from 
inflating down its real value. 
22 Data comes from Chinn and Ito (2008). The authors use the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions and 
Regulations to construct a measure of capital controls. We use their data as a de jure measure of financial integration. The 
Chinn-Ito index is based on dummy variables which codify restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. The minimum 
number is -1.82 (financially closed), the maximum number is 2.46 (financially open). Hence, financial openness measures 
are both scaled such that a higher number indicates a more open financial system. 
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monetary policies will have an higher impact on domestic debt than in countries with capital control. 
The rationale being that in countries more open, government will easily turn to external lenders to 
satisfy their financial needs (the coefficient of the interaction term will be bigger in countries more 
financially open). Table 5 and 6 present the results for the share of domestic in total public debt using 
FE and GMM respectively. The most robust result is the lack of significance of capital control in all 
regressions. This may suggest that financial integration does not impact public debt composition. 
Turning to the interaction terms, we start by looking at column 7 in which we multiply capital control 
with the inflation rate. Using FE we do not find any significant result, while using GMM the 
coefficient turns significant and to the wrong sign. The Wald test on the interaction term even 
worsens the result and suggests that the positive relation between inflation and domestic debt is even 
higher in countries more financially integrated. To understand this result in the two following 
columns we first add a dummy for hyperinflation (Column 8) and then we add dummy for debt relief 
23
 (Column 9). In both cases the sign of inflation turns not significant, suggesting that the positive 
relation between domestic debt and inflation may have simply captured hyperinflation episodes.  
Finally, in Column 10 we interact capital controls with the spread between the interest rates on 
domestic and external debt. Interestingly the Wald test on the interaction term reveals that in 
countries more financially open the interest rate differential tent to have a higher (negative) impact on 
domestic debt, suggesting that when the cost of domestic debt is high  countries will borrow more 
externally if capital controls are loose. In Table 7 and 8 we perform the same exercise on the size of 
domestic debt in the economy and we find similar results.  
 
All in all, the most robust result in the battery of regressions on monetary stability, is  the positive 
correlation between domestic debt and hyperinflation when we include the Central Bank in the 
definition of domestic debt (the coefficient turns not significant when we exclude it).  
 
Last, we control for political and institutional quality and we find that the CPIA Index is positively 
and significantly correlated with domestic debt as a share of the total (Table 3). The result, however, 
is not robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. In particular, when we add total debt and 
debt forgiveness, the coefficient turns not significant, suggesting that higher CPIA’s scores may 
simply reflect an improved evaluation for countries benefitting from debt relief (yet reducing their 
reliance on external debt). Also, CPIA may simply capture sound monetary policies and, thus 
describing the positive relation between monetary stability and domestic debt. To address these 
concerns we run a number of robustness tests (Table 5-8, Column 11, 12 and 13). First, we try to 
substitute CPIA with the quality of bureaucracy (bureaucracyquality) and the stability of government 
(governmentstability) taken from the ICRG database . Unfortunately the variables reduce 
considerably the panel data dimension and  we do not find any significant result. Second, in line with 
Hausmann and Panizza (2003) we try to proxy policy and institution with the level of development as 
measured by the log of per capita GDP (lngdp_pc) and the coefficient is again not significant. The  
BB estimator confirms the result.  Turning to the size of domestic debt in the economy, CPIA is again 
not significant. Results hold across all different specifications. One possible interpretation of the lack 
of significance of CPIA is suggested by Presbitero (2012) who shows that countries with low CPIA 
have benefitted from HIPC/MDRI Initiatives and yet have increased substantially domestic debt on 
the onset of debt relief.  
  
 
                                                     
 
23 The rationale for including debt relief is that, in our sample,  hyperinflation episodes occur mainly at the same time as drop 
in external debt granted by debt relief.  
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6. Alternative specifications.  
In the previous section, we have presented the results of our baseline model and the robustness to 
alternative specifications. To further verify the validity of our findings, in this section we undertake a 
numbers of additional robustness exercises. First, we estimate the model dropping influential 
observations. Second, we run the regressions on a larger sample of countries. Third, we exclude 
holdings of the Central Bank from the definition of domestic debt in order to ensure that our original 
dependent variable is a reasonable approximation of  the depth of domestic markets. Since we 
estimated a very large number of alternative specifications, we do not report all of them in the paper. 
Results are available upon request.  
 
In the first case, we simply drop Eritrea and we find that results on portfolios composition remain 
almost unchanged, except for CPIA which turns not significant. When we look at the size of domestic 
debt in the economy, we find that inflation turns not significant and the magnitude of the coefficient 
on broadmoney diminishes, remaining in any case positive and significant.  
 
Secondly, we do the same analysis on a larger sample of countries. The original dataset, in fact, 
allows for a definition of a balanced panel data of 32 countries over the period 2002–2011. 
Unfortunately, given the lack of data for other covariates included in the regressions, the analysis is 
run on 25 countries
24
. Results remain almost unchanged, except for trade-openness and broadmoney, 
which become not significant. Also, as in the previous section, we obtain inconsistent results both on 
the sign and on the significance of inflation.  
 
Finally, we substitute our proxy of the depth of domestic markets with domestic debt as a share of 
GDP excluding the holdings of the Central Bank. We find that the results of the baseline 
specifications remain almost unchanged, except for hyperinflation which turn not significant, and the 
coefficients of broadmoney and the flow of external resources which slightly diminish. As already 
discussed in the previous chapter the most interesting result is the lack of significance of  
hyperinflation when we exclude the Central Bank.  This points, amongst other interpretations already 
discussed,  towards the importance of excluding the Central Bank’s holdings in the analysis of 
domestic debt market.  
 
Overall these tests confirm the findings of the previous section, stressing the fragility of some results. 
 
  
                                                     
 
24 Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Union de Comoros, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia.  
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the rationale for the increase in domestic debt using a newly developed 
database covering 21 LICs over the period 1996-2011. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that studies the determinants of public debt composition in LICs and the size of domestic debt 
in the economy.  
 
Relying on GMM and FE estimators, the key findings of the paper are that only a small number of 
factors explain the ability of countries to issue domestic debt. Also, the fragility of some results 
highlights that the rationale for the increase of domestic debt in LICs is not as clear as in EMs. 
 
Starting from demand-side factors, we find that the fiscal space granted by debt relief has naturally 
favored the substitution of public debt portfolios toward domestic debt but it probably did not suffice 
on its own to foster domestic debt development. We also find that  financial needs in LICs are 
probably still satisfied mainly through external financing.  We draw our conclusions from two set of 
results. First we see that an increase in net transfers –and hence in financial needs– determines and 
increase in domestic debt to GDP but a decrease in its ratio over total debt, suggesting that  LICs still 
finance their debt mainly through foreign borrowing. Second we find that total debt or the reduction 
of external debt granted by debt relief foster the substitution in public debt portfolio but they do not 
seem to determine the size of domestic market, suggesting that the reduction of the burden granted by 
debt relief did not suffice on its own to develop domestic debt. 
 
Looking at supply side constrains, we find that internal financing is positively correlated with the 
share of liquidity in the economy  and with hyperinflation episodes and it is negatively correlated 
with trade openness and moderate inflation. Also we do not find evidence that financial development 
and quality of policy and institutions  are correlated with domestic debt.  
 
We interpret the significant correlation between domestic debt, liquidity in circulation and 
hyperinflation  has a warning signal of  the tendency of governments to inflate the debt away. As 
recently suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the domestic debt and the gain of the government 
from inflating down its real value may explain why governments seem to print money above the 
seignorage-maximizing rate.  The negative correlation with moderate inflation and trade confirms 
previous finding and suggests that in presence of monetary stability countries tend to switch toward 
domestic debt  (Hausman and Panizza, 2003; Burger and Warnock, 2003; Claessens et al, 2007; Mehl 
and Reynaud, 2005; Guscina, 2008), while countries more outward oriented issue more debt 
externally (Adelegan et al. 2009; Mu et al. , 2013). The lack of significance of financial development 
is in line with the results of Mu et al. (2013) and Abbas and Christensen (2010) who find either a 
negative or a lack of correlation between the two variables. One possible interpretation of these 
results is that domestic debt in LICs is still mainly dominated by central banks - which hold primarily  
non-marketable instruments-  and by commercial banks - which may be induced by moral suasion to 
absorb excessive public debt -Panizza (2008).  Being this true, financial development  would not play 
an important role in spurring domestic debt. The absence of a positive relation between domestic debt 
and the quality of policies and institutions confirms the results of Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and 
Mehl and Reynaud (2005) who both downplay the role of institutional factors in determining 
domestic debt in EMs.  
 
These results seem to suggest that domestic debt development in LICs is still at an early stage and the 
rational for its increase is not as clear as in EMs.  From a policy perspective,  the significant 
correlation between domestic debt, hyperinflation and liquidity in circulation raises the specter of 
domestic default and may suggest the need for governments to develop specific domestic debt 
management policies.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: List of countries 
 
 
  
Country name
Income 
Group
Region 
(i)
Lending 
category
Debt 
Relief
Main data 
source
Debt Stock 
Sample
Debt 
Structure 
Sample
Burundi LIC AFR IDA HIPC Website x x
Benin LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Burkina Faso LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED
Bangladesh LIC SA IDA IMF
CAR LIC AFR IDA HIPC IFS (v)
Comoros LIC AFR IDA HIPC IFS (vi) x
Eritrea LIC AFR IDA HIPC IFS (vii) x
Ethiopia LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED x x
Ghana LMIC AFR IDA HIPC Website x x
Guinea LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF x x
The Gambia LIC AFR IDA HIPC Website
Guinea Bissau LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF x x
Haiti LIC LAC IDA HIPC PRMED x x
Kenya LIC AFR IDA Website x x
Kyrgyz LIC ECA IDA IMF x x
Cambodia LIC EAP IDA IFS x
Lao PDR LMIC EAP IDA IMF
Liberia LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED
Madagascar LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Mali LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Myanmar LIC EAP IDA IFS x
Mozambique LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED
Mauritania LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED
Malawi LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED x x
Niger LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED
Nepal LIC SA IDA Website x x
Rwanda LIC AFR IDA HIPC Website x x
Senegal LMIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Solomon Islands LMIC EAP IDA Website x x
Sierra Leone LIC AFR IDA HIPC Website x x
Chad LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Togo LIC AFR IDA HIPC IFS x
Tajikistan LIC ECA IDA IMF
Tanzania LIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED x x
Uganda LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF x
Vietnam LMIC EAP Blend IMF
Yemen LMIC MNA IDA IMF x x
Congo, Dem. LIC AFR IDA HIPC IMF
Zambia LMIC AFR IDA HIPC PRMED      
Zimbabwe LIC AFR Blend Web-IMF
(vii)  Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
(i) Africa Region (AFR), East Asia & Pacific Region (EAP), Europe & Central Africa Region (ECA), 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC),  Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA), South Asia 
(i i) Domestic debt corresponds to Central Government, with the exception of Lao PDR 
(General Government), Niger (Public Sector), and Congo DCR (General Government).
(i i i) Domestic debt  includes all  financial l iabil ities defined by the GFSM (IMF, 2001), with 
the exception of Benin, Kenya, Kyrgyz, and Mauritania, whose definition includes only 
securities. For Benin and Mauritania, there are no data available for other l iabilities. For 
(iv) Domestic debt is defined on a residency basis, with exception of  Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Solomon Islands, and Yemen, where the currency basis is used because of their debt 
recording practices and data constrains.(v) Banking system is the only holder of domestic debt.
(vi) There is no domestic market. Central Bank is the only holder of domestic debt.
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Figure 1: Domestic and External Debt (percentage, weighted average) 
  
 
 
Source: Bua, et al. (2014)  
 
Figure 2: Cost of Domestic and External Borrowing (percentage, weighted average) 
  
Source: Bua, et al. (2014) 
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Figure 3: Domestic debt by type of instruments (percentage, weighted average) 
 
 
  
Source: Bua, et al. (2014) 
 
 
Figure 4: Domestic Debt by maturity and holders (percentage, weighted average) 
  
Source: Bua, et al. (2014)  
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
 
Variable Label Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Sourcce
dd_tot Domestic Debt  ( as % total public debt) (i) 0,266 0,240 0,010 0,998 334 AC (ii)
dd_gdp Domestic Debt  ( as % GDP) (i) 0,166 0,196 0,006 1,246 334 AC (ii)
broadmoney_gdp M2 (as % of GDP) 0,319 0,238 0,090 1,628 329 WEO
inf_ma Inflation 5 years moving average GDP deflator 0,119 0,078 -0,005 0,419 313 WDI
cpia CPIA  3,117 0,489 1,825 4,100 320 World Bank
trade Trade (% of GDP) Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 0,620 0,271 0,004 1,446 315 WDI
ex_nettr Net transfers on external debt ( as % of GDP) Net flows minus interest payments during the year 0,017 0,025 -0,045 0,142 334 WDI
tot_gdp Total Debt (% of GDP) CG Domestic Debt plus CG External Debt including IMF credits (DRS) 0,814 0,597 0,156 4,253 334 AC (ii), WDI
dfor_gdp Debt forgiveness or reduction (as % of GDP) Change in debt stock due to debt forgiveness -0,025 0,093 -0,803 0,000 336 WDI
debt_limit IMF's DLP and/or IDA's NCBP Takes value 1 if the country is subject to IMF's DLP or IDA's NCBP 0,699 0,459 0,000 1,000 336 Mona 
bc_gdp Bank credit to the private sector (as % of GDP) 0,116 0,077 0,009 0,456 264 WDI
sav_gdp Private saving (as % of GDP) 0,135 0,089 -0,064 0,473 315 WDI
diff_int Interest rate differencial Difference between domestic and external interest rate 0,079 0,070 -0,017 0,398 284 AC (ii)
gdpdef GDP deflator 11,478 11,100 -8,708 80,750 311 WDI
hyperinf_d Hyperinflation Takes value 1 if GDP deflator is bigger than 50 0,012 0,109 0,000 1,000 336 AC (ii)
lngdp_pc Log GDP per capita 10,539 2,235 6,504 14,638 329 WDI
bureaucracyquality Burocracy Government's ability to govern without drastic changes in policy 1,310 0,765 0,000 3,000 192 ICRG
governmentstability Governance Government’s ability to carry out its program(s), and to stay in office 8,719 1,651 4,000 12,000 192 ICRG
(ii) Author calculation
(i) Domestic debt is defined as debt owed by Central Government to domestic residents and it covers all  financial l iabilities (i.e. marketable and non-marketable) included in the GFSM (2011) with 
the exception of arrears.
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Table 3. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of total public debt  
 Fixed effect Blundell & Bond 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2):  test for autocorrelation in first difference. Null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (see Arellano –Bond, 
1991) 
Hansen test for the validity of instruments: test the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous. In a model 
containing a very large set of excluded instrument   such a test may have very little power.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot
L.dd_tot 0.803*** 0.816*** 0.726*** 0.866*** 0.786*** 0.964*** 0.958*** 0.899*** 1.050*** 0.923***
(0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.038) (0.042) (0.087) (0.080) (0.083) (0.073) (0.083)
broadmoney_gdp 0.051 0.047 0.118 0.041 0.055 0.062 0.061 0.008 -0.001 0.049
(0.048) (0.050) (0.076) (0.066) (0.049) (0.082) (0.092) (0.106) (0.054) (0.075)
inf_ma -0.129* -0.112 -0.074 -0.046 -0.135** 0.149 0.234 0.117 0.145 0.127
(0.062) (0.067) (0.050) (0.041) (0.063) (0.145) (0.172) (0.117) (0.086) (0.121)
cpia 0.022* 0.026* 0.005 0.009 0.026** 0.030 0.029 -0.008 0.006 0.023
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
trade -0.055* -0.051* -0.046* -0.046** -0.065** -0.087 -0.077 -0.061 -0.027 -0.113*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) (0.026) (0.059) (0.057) (0.052) (0.048) (0.061)
ex_nettr -0.265* -0.079 -0.207* -0.703** -0.591 -0.700*
(0.145) (0.141) (0.113) (0.289) (0.411) (0.336)
tot_gdp -0.080*** -0.018 -0.050* -0.008
(0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026)
dfor_gdp -0.326*** -0.318***
(0.079) (0.084)
debt_limit -0.015 -0.025
(0.012) (0.019)
Constant 0.037 0.019 0.108** 0.026 0.048 -0.056 -0.062 0.127 -0.015 0.031
(0.051) (0.060) (0.049) (0.037) (0.049) (0.101) (0.071) (0.099) (0.078) (0.102)
Observations 267 265 264 264 267 267 265 264 264 267
R-squared 0.803 0.804 0.819 0.864 0.805
Number of country_id 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.165 0.0445 0.110 0.908 0.160
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP  
 Fixed effect Blundell & Bond 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2):  test for autocorrelation in first difference. Null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (see Arellano –Bond, 
1991). 
Hansen test for the validity of instruments: test the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous. In a model 
containing a very large set of excluded instrument   such a test may have very little power.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp
L.dd_gdp 0.498*** 0.563*** 0.543*** 0.542*** 0.502*** 0.538 0.561** 0.503* 0.510* 0.517
(0.118) (0.080) (0.095) (0.096) (0.117) (0.357) (0.211) (0.265) (0.257) (0.368)
broadmoney_gdp 0.380* 0.260** 0.238** 0.237** 0.383** 0.515** 0.300* 0.394** 0.385** 0.549**
(0.184) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.180) (0.188) (0.170) (0.161) (0.170) (0.202)
inf_ma -0.059 -0.062 -0.076 -0.076 -0.063 0.110 0.059 0.063 0.045 0.117
(0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.042) (0.140) (0.092) (0.129) (0.105) (0.154)
cpia -0.002 -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.048 0.038 0.025
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.044) (0.022) (0.041) (0.036) (0.035)
trade -0.047 -0.057 -0.061* -0.061* -0.053 0.066 -0.072 -0.178 -0.156 0.056
(0.037) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.087) (0.100) (0.129) (0.126) (0.096)
ex_nettr 0.287* 0.262 0.263 0.350 0.313 0.297
(0.158) (0.158) (0.160) (0.267) (0.243) (0.239)
tot_gdp 0.030* 0.031 0.070 0.054
(0.017) (0.019) (0.045) (0.045)
dfor_gdp -0.005 0.045
(0.027) (0.030)
debt_limit -0.010 0.032
(0.008) (0.032)
Constant -0.027 0.051 0.028 0.028 0.000 -0.214 -0.007 -0.151 -0.122 -0.299*
(0.039) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.184) (0.099) (0.104) (0.103) (0.165)
Observations 268 266 265 265 268 268 266 265 265 268
R-squared 0.628 0.716 0.726 0.726 0.631
Number of country_id 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.682 0.324 0.358 0.427 0.443
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of total public debt. Alternative specifications.   
Fixed effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot
L.dd_tot 0.813*** 0.812*** 0.772*** 0.793*** 0.832*** 0.814*** 0.809*** 0.827*** 0.748*** 0.790*** 0.812*** 0.661*** 0.667***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.042) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043) (0.057) (0.053) (0.126) (0.088)
broadmoney_gdp 0.039 0.053 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.061 0.045 0.035 0.122* 0.113
(0.064) (0.054) (0.053) (0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047) (0.066) (0.075)
inf_ma -0.116 -0.031 -0.104 -0.071 -0.125** -0.123* -0.124*
(0.068) (0.125) (0.073) (0.109) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065)
cpia 0.026* 0.009 0.028* 0.028** 0.021* 0.027* 0.023* 0.019 0.000 0.025*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
trade -0.054 -0.043 -0.049 -0.050 -0.035 -0.051* -0.045 -0.027 -0.009 -0.049 -0.040 -0.131** -0.133**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.054) (0.058)
ex_nettr -0.299* -0.356** -0.301* -0.372* -0.223 -0.283* -0.324** -0.262* -0.268* -0.404** -0.177 -0.441* -0.463*
(0.146) (0.129) (0.159) (0.182) (0.153) (0.144) (0.134) (0.126) (0.147) (0.145) (0.145) (0.220) (0.236)
L.broadmoney_gdp 0.074
(0.081)
bc_gdp -0.361***
(0.087)
sav_gdp 0.012
(0.044)
diff_int -0.142 -0.195*
(0.101) (0.106)
gdpdef -0.001* -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hyperinf_d 0.179** 0.157** 0.143**
(0.067) (0.065) (0.053)
L.inf_ma -0.086
(0.075)
kaopen 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)
int_kaoinf -0.017
(0.079)
int_kaodiff -0.085
(0.070)
int_kaogdpdef -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point 0.070***
(0.019)
lngdp_pc 0.001
(0.034)
bureaucracyquality 0.012
(0.071)
governmentstability -0.002
(0.003)
Constant 0.013 0.079 0.042 0.006 0.014 0.021 0.007 0.002 0.045 0.017 0.099 0.205** 0.138**
(0.061) (0.055) (0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059) (0.047) (0.042) (0.038) (0.047) (0.336) (0.086) (0.057)
Observations 262 208 250 256 265 264 247 247 247 244 271 157 157
R-squared 0.801 0.823 0.810 0.800 0.814 0.804 0.795 0.808 0.833 0.801 0.802 0.844 0.844
Number of country_id 19 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term -0,088 0 0 -0,28
Wald test (Prob > F) 0.6046 0.1879 0,2235  0.0797
 62 
 
  Table 6. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of total public debt. Alternative specifications.   
Blundell & Bond 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot dd_tot
L.dd_tot 0.985*** 0.957*** 1.051*** 0.993*** 0.972*** 0.992*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.919*** 0.800*** 0.978*** 0.961*** 1.038***
(0.095) (0.091) (0.051) (0.058) (0.059) (0.072) (0.047) (0.065) (0.069) (0.069) (0.056) (0.117) (0.122)
broadmoney_gdp 0.078 -0.021 0.042 -0.024 0.061 0.051 0.114** 0.124 0.218 0.309
(0.076) (0.073) (0.070) (0.042) (0.073) (0.046) (0.041) (0.112) (0.205) (0.288)
inf_ma 0.269 0.125 0.344 0.177 0.296*** 0.284 0.283
(0.182) (0.129) (0.198) (0.137) (0.097) (0.238) (0.211)
cpia 0.052** 0.012 0.032 0.022 0.017 0.034 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.022
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026)
trade -0.023 -0.021 -0.057 -0.115* -0.070** -0.068 -0.078 -0.041 -0.035 -0.045 -0.040 -0.054 -0.077
(0.054) (0.078) (0.053) (0.065) (0.031) (0.043) (0.055) (0.073) (0.055) (0.052) (0.070) (0.192) (0.163)
ex_nettr -0.936** -0.785** -0.882* -0.822** -0.613* -0.802** -0.697* -0.798* -0.619* -0.589** -0.803** -0.694* -1.019**
(0.393) (0.359) (0.423) (0.372) (0.305) (0.345) (0.339) (0.417) (0.353) (0.267) (0.356) (0.329) (0.446)
L.broadmoney_gdp 0.095
(0.082)
bc_gdp -0.120
(0.116)
sav_gdp 0.034
(0.100)
diff_int -0.150 0.012
(0.152) (0.146)
gdpdef 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
hyperinf_d 0.164* 0.170* 0.134
(0.081) (0.084) (0.080)
L.inf_ma 0.205
(0.122)
kaopen -0.013 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
int_kaoinf 0.130
(0.090)
int_kaodiff 0.056
(0.100)
int_kaogdpdef 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point 0.058**
(0.026)
lngdp_pc -0.012
(0.015)
bureaucracyquality 0.020
(0.032)
governmentstability -0.001
(0.007)
Constant -0.186* 0.039 -0.094 0.024 0.023 -0.077 0.198 -0.090 -0.042 -0.033 -0.057 -0.067 -0.048
(0.096) (0.123) (0.118) (0.073) (0.057) (0.069) (0.197) (0.087) (0.076) (0.050) (0.085) (0.178) (0.098)
Observations 262 208 250 256 265 264 271 247 247 247 244 157 157
Number of country_id 19 18 18 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 12 12
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)0.162 0.255 0.132 0.0587 0.0797 0.0963 0.0970 0.0706 0.0541 0.0334 0.0784 0.0599 0.0772
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term 0,426 0 0 0,068
Wald test (Prob > F)  0.0024 0.8732 0,6727  0.7186
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Table 7. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP Alternative specifications.   
Fixed effect 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp
L.dd_gdp 0.579*** 0.594*** 0.644*** 0.517*** 0.560*** 0.562*** 0.576*** 0.496*** 0.452*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.536***
(0.057) (0.081) (0.056) (0.085) (0.080) (0.083) (0.070) (0.114) (0.118) (0.113) (0.113) (0.067) (0.084)
broadmoney_gdp 0.316*** 0.286*** 0.256** 0.249*** 0.224** 0.295*** 0.196** 0.195** 0.260** 0.283**
(0.106) (0.097) (0.099) (0.087) (0.083) (0.093) (0.078) (0.078) (0.095) (0.110)
inf_ma -0.082 -0.045 -0.060 -0.049 -0.019 -0.060 -0.062
(0.089) (0.038) (0.069) (0.044) (0.064) (0.052) (0.056)
cpia 0.001 -0.016 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019* -0.014 -0.017* -0.019 -0.016 -0.016
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
trade 0.055 0.005 -0.023 -0.061 -0.052 -0.056 -0.055 -0.030 -0.032 -0.020 -0.021 -0.060 -0.034
(0.044) (0.016) (0.029) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.029)
ex_nettr 0.083 0.139 0.206 0.256 0.261 0.246* 0.195 0.096 0.205 0.207 0.074 0.095
(0.089) (0.173) (0.144) (0.148) (0.164) (0.142) (0.129) (0.104) (0.133) (0.133) (0.151) (0.167)
L.broadmoney_gdp -0.138
(0.161)
bc_gdp -0.096
(0.111)
sav_gdp -0.013
(0.029)
diff_int -0.060 -0.040 -0.156*
(0.054) (0.059) (0.075)
gdpdef -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hyperinf_d 0.059* 0.060* 0.060*
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
L.inf_ma -0.021
(0.058)
kaopen -0.010 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
int_kaoinf 0.024
(0.037)
int_kaodiff -0.085
(0.075)
int_kaogdpdef 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point -0.002
(0.009)
int_kaocpia
int_kaobroad
lngdp_pc -0.027
(0.025)
bureaucracyquality -0.048
(0.045)
governmentstability -0.003
(0.003)
Constant 0.084 0.097** 0.127** 0.059** 0.067*** 0.046 0.282 0.081* 0.078* 0.069** 0.068** 0.080 0.047
(0.052) (0.034) (0.054) (0.027) (0.021) (0.036) (0.261) (0.044) (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.085) (0.040)
Observations 264 210 250 256 255 265 272 248 244 248 248 159 159
R-squared 0.416 0.542 0.674 0.723 0.736 0.714 0.713 0.626 0.644 0.641 0.641 0.588 0.584
Number of country_id 19 18 18 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 12 12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term 0,005 -0,241 -0,001 -0,001
Wald test (Prob > F)  0.9510 0.1132 0.0087 0,006
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Table 8. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP Alternative specifications.   
Blundell & Bond 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp dd_gdp
L.dd_gdp 1.123*** 0.869*** 1.004*** 0.503** 0.586** 0.552** 0.570*** 0.683*** 0.630*** 0.757*** 0.754*** 0.760*** 0.861***
(0.139) (0.103) (0.075) (0.195) (0.242) (0.210) (0.169) (0.155) (0.176) (0.161) (0.163) (0.220) (0.224)
broadmoney_gdp 0.337* 0.343** 0.344** 0.271 0.222 0.257 0.205* 0.214* 0.369* 0.379
(0.174) (0.148) (0.147) (0.174) (0.132) (0.151) (0.116) (0.115) (0.195) (0.261)
inf_ma 0.093 0.011 0.003 -0.025 0.135** -0.023 0.075
(0.182) (0.056) (0.103) (0.092) (0.058) (0.094) (0.132)
cpia 0.027 -0.013 0.039 -0.015 0.010 0.008 0.012 -0.005 0.022 0.020
(0.034) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027)
trade 0.148 -0.000 0.073 -0.101 -0.038 -0.058 -0.070 -0.029 -0.017 0.027 0.039 -0.054 -0.056
(0.091) (0.037) (0.062) (0.075) (0.114) (0.104) (0.085) (0.077) (0.080) (0.075) (0.074) (0.052) (0.047)
ex_nettr 0.022 0.216 0.191 0.206 0.165 0.222 0.218 0.230 0.113 0.043 0.243 0.216
(0.132) (0.307) (0.187) (0.217) (0.259) (0.220) (0.211) (0.189) (0.186) (0.169) (0.224) (0.287)
L.broadmoney_gdp 0.084
(0.124)
bc_gdp -0.015
(0.072)
sav_gdp 0.046
(0.062)
diff_int -0.127 0.016
(0.087) (0.133)
gdpdef -0.000 -0.001* -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
hyperinf_d 0.021 0.072** 0.070**
(0.040) (0.029) (0.030)
L.inf_ma 0.035
(0.096)
kaopen -0.012* -0.018 -0.013 -0.012
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
int_kaoinf 0.052
(0.054)
int_kaodiff 0.130
(0.112)
int_kaogdpdef 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point 0.008
(0.015)
int_kaocpia
int_kaobroad
lngdp_pc -0.007
(0.011)
bureaucracyquality 0.045*
(0.023)
governmentstability -0.001
(0.003)
Constant -0.204* 0.069 -0.202* 0.076 -0.076 -0.058 0.085 -0.069 -0.017 -0.124 -0.134 -0.141 -0.101
(0.103) (0.078) (0.104) (0.061) (0.125) (0.117) (0.116) (0.069) (0.071) (0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.121)
Observations 264 210 250 256 266 265 272 248 244 248 248 159 159
Number of country_id 19 18 18 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 12 12
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.678 0.323 0.528 0.351 0.296 0.281 0.231 0.467 0.346 0.120 0.114 0.568 0.754
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term 0,187 0,146 -0,001 -0,001
Wald test (Prob > F)  0.0189 0.5322 0.6924 0,794
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Table 9. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP Excluding Central Bank.   
 Fixed effect Blundell & Bond 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2):  test for autocorrelation in first difference. Null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (see Arellano –Bond, 
1991). 
Hansen test for the validity of instruments: test the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous. In a model 
containing a very large set of excluded instrument   such a test may have very little power.  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb
L.dd_gdp_ncb 0.610*** 0.601*** 0.580*** 0.578*** 0.610*** 0.734*** 0.616*** 0.604* 0.603* 0.675***
(0.083) (0.084) (0.103) (0.107) (0.084) (0.145) (0.176) (0.318) (0.312) (0.17)
broadmoney_gdp 0.157* 0.149* 0.137* 0.136* 0.157* 0.205*** 0.174** 0.185* 0.187* 0.235***
(0.086) (0.079) (0.076) (0.075) (0.086) (0.054) (0.077) (0.093) (0.092) (0.064)
inf_ma -0.033 -0.043 -0.04 -0.039 -0.032 0 0.02 -0.013 -0.032 0.052
(0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045) (0.05) (0.133) (0.135) (0.117) (0.124) (0.159)
cpia 0.012 0.006 0.01 0.01 0.012 0.022 0.024 0.085 0.081 0.034
(0.009) (0.007) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.02) (0.015) (0.073) (0.066) (0.021)
trade 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.072 0.029 -0.134 -0.124 0.051
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.051) (0.032) (0.114) (0.102) (0.042)
ex_nettr 0.196* 0.184 0.185 0.132 0.074 0.083
(0.099) (0.106) (0.108) (0.169) (0.178) (0.172)
tot_gdp 0.02 0.02 0.088 0.083
(0.015) (0.016) (0.073) (0.07)
dfor_gdp -0.005 -0.004
(0.012) (0.03)
debt_limit 0.001 0.033
(0.005) (0.027)
Constant -0.063 -0.038 -0.044 -0.044 -0.056 -0.151** -0.136** -0.259 -0.249 -0.204**
(0.037) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.064) (0.048) (0.189) (0.175) (0.096)
Observations 244 242 241 241 244 244 242 241 241 244
R-squared 0.654 0.666 0.672 0.672 0.654
Number of country_id 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.406 0.907 0.885 0.9 0.46
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP Excluding Central Bank. Alternative specifications   
Fixed effect 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb
L.dd_gdp_ncb 0.532*** 0.728*** 0.629*** 0.555*** 0.564*** 0.602*** 0.595*** 0.380*** 0.341** 0.391*** 0.394*** 0.613*** 0.685***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.027) (0.091) (0.089) (0.080) (0.081) (0.130) (0.143) (0.124) (0.127) (0.096) (0.079)
broadmoney_gdp 0.193** 0.189** 0.145* 0.154* 0.143** 0.193** 0.131* 0.126* 0,076 0,103
(0.080) (0.082) (0.076) (0.075) (0.066) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) (0.046) (0.064)
inf_ma -0,051 -0,036 -0,04 -0,053 -0.054 -0,025 -0,037
(0.075) (0.048) (0.063) (0.052) (0.049) (0.063) (0.069)
cpia 0,006 -0,001 0,003 0,005 0,004 0,006 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
trade 0.059* 0.019** 0,015 -0,011 -0,011 -0,004 -0,005 0.012 0.006 0.015 0.013 -0,046 -0,005
(0.029) (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.031) (0.024)
ex_nettr 0,093 0,07 0.172** 0.188* 0,191 0.213** 0.141 0.069 0.104 0.110 0.153* 0.175**
(0.075) (0.069) (0.08) (0.09) (0.111) (0.101) (0.083) (0.097) (0.087) (0.087) (0.072) (0.075)
L.broadmoney_gdp -0,119
(0.096)
bc_gdp -0,063
(0.058)
sav_gdp 0,002
(0.03)
diff_int 0,044 0,06 -0.070
(0.058) (0.062) (0.070)
gdpdef -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0) (0.000) (0.000)
hyperinf_d -0,006 0.003 0.005
(0.01) (0.023) (0.023)
L.inf_ma -0,036
(0.067)
kaopen 0.007 0.018 0.007 0.008
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
int_kaoinf 0.031
(0.035)
int_kaodiff -0.089
(0.063)
int_kaogdpdef 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point -0.007
(0.007)
int_kaocpia
int_kaobroad
lngdp_pc 0,013
(0.015)
bureaucracyquality -0.064*
(0.029)
governmentstability -0,002
(0.002)
Constant 0,037 0,014 0,022 -0.048* -0,043 -0,037 -0,153 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.123* 0,007
(0.026) (0.016) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.151) (0.023) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) (0.057) (0.018)
Observations 241 190 227 232 231 241 248 226 222 226 226 134 134
R-squared 0,442 0,628 0,625 0,669 0,673 0,666 0,665 0.481 0.494 0.480 0.483 0,706 0,679
Number of country_id 18 17 17 18 18 18 19 18 18 18 18 11 11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term -0,023 -0,159 0 0
Wald test (Prob > F) 0,4729 0,2041 0,8232 0,8612
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Table 11. Determinants of domestic debt as percent of GDP Excluding Central Bank. Alternative specifications   
Blundell & Bond 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb dd_gdp_ncb
L.dd_gdp_ncb 0.501*** 0.904*** 0.932*** 0.530*** 0.652*** 0.609*** 0.629*** 0.718*** 0.617*** 0.744*** 0.648** 0.969*** 0.962***
(0.145) (0.108) (0.031) (0.180) (0.186) (0.145) (0.108) (0.132) (0.203) (0.158) (0.262) (0.129) (0.125)
broadmoney_gdp 0.218** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0,112 0.111 0.178 0.135* 0.209** 0,088 0,104
(0.095) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.067) (0.108) (0.064) (0.098) (0.082) (0.083)
inf_ma -0,047 0,048 -0,049 -0,026 -0.065 -0,032 0,064
(0.206) (0.074) (0.124) (0.121) (0.116) (0.099) (0.121)
cpia 0.052** 0,007 0,026 0,015 0.033* 0.028* 0.027 0.022 0.036* 0.033*
(0.019) (0.013) (0.023) (0.01) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
trade 0,077 0,003 0,022 -0,016 0,058 0,037 0,034 -0.007 -0.028 0.010 0.020 0,015 0,005
(0.058) (0.031) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.035) (0.052) (0.040) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046) (0.032) (0.038)
ex_nettr 0,097 0,154 0,009 0,009 0,05 0,132 0.214* 0.098 0.101 0.093 0,24 0.300**
(0.136) (0.163) (0.177) (0.212) (0.164) (0.119) (0.117) (0.138) (0.141) (0.153) (0.146) (0.123)
L.broadmoney_gdp 0.286***
(0.073)
bc_gdp -0,016
(0.054)
sav_gdp 0,12
(0.108)
diff_int 0,243 0.143
(0.278) (0.137)
gdpdef -0,001 -0.000 -0.000
0 (0.000) (0.000)
hyperinf_d 0,021 0.030 0.027
(0.019) (0.038) (0.027)
L.inf_ma -0,017
(0.133)
kaopen -0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
int_kaoinf -0.053
(0.072)
int_kaodiff -0.083
(0.129)
int_kaogdpdef 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
d_completion_point -0.005
(0.014)
int_kaocpia
int_kaobroad
lngdp_pc -0,011
(0.011)
bureaucracyquality 0,004
(0.01)
governmentstability -0,003
(0.002)
Constant -0.224*** -0,026 -0,095 -0.097* -0.195*** -0.141*** 0,082 -0.083* -0.097* -0.130** -0.138*** -0,034 -0,013
(0.053) (0.04) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.042) (0.11) (0.043) (0.052) (0.046) (0.047) (0.028) (0.031)
Observations 241 190 227 232 242 241 248 226 222 226 226 134 134
Number of country_id 18 17 17 18 18 18 19 18 18 18 18 11 11
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0,779 0,711 0,29 0,502 0,409 0,803 0,903 0.986 0.813 0.697 0.762 0,197 0,147
Hansen test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction term -0,118 0,06 0 0
Wald test (Prob > F) 0,431 0,6956 0,8311 0,7746
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Chapter 3 
The impact of IMF’s debt limit policy on borrowing behavior1 
Abstract 
This paper uses the propensity matching score approach to assess the impact of the IMF’s debt limits 
policy (DLP) on borrowing behavior in countries eligible to borrow from its concessional lending 
window. The paper finds that countries under the DLP borrow significantly higher amounts of 
concessional resources. However, there is no evidence that the DLP significantly impacts the level of 
non-concessional borrowing nor the terms of such borrowing. This result is confirmed by the 
heterogeneity analysis, suggesting that the level of development, rather than concessionality 
requirements, is the key driver of non-concessional borrowing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: F33, F34, F35, F53, O1   
Keywords: Concessionality; debt; debt limits policy; IMF programs; propensity score matching. 
  
                                                     
 
1 The impact of IMF’s debt limit policy on borrowing behavior”, is a previous version of the IMF Working Paper 2014/176, 
“A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior (joint with  Calixte Ahokpossi 
and Laurence Allain) 
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1. Introduction 
As always when a financial crisis occurs and policy responses are adapted, questions arise about the 
effectiveness of those strategies. The long lasting debt crisis in highly indebt poor countries and the 
arrival of debt forgiveness –mainly through the Highly Indebt Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCs) and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)
2
 - reawaken the debate over the effectiveness of debt relief 
and its efficiency compared to other forms of developmental assistance to poor and indebted 
countries.  
 
The literature has traditionally recognized two main channels under which debt relief spurs growth 
and investment. The first one is the reduction of debt service payment (Cohen, 1993) and the second 
one is the reduction of the stock of debt below the level that disincentive investment (Krugman 1988, 
Sachs 1989).  
 
Evidence from the HIPC/MDRI Initiative provides new insight into these channels and suggests 
additional benefits and challenges.  On the one hand, recent studies claim that one possible 
advantages of debt relief vis-à-vis other forms of assistance is to create market access to private 
capital market. To this regards, Bulow (2002) has highlighted as crucial test of debt relief the 
importance of successfully restoring positive net resource transfers to countries where international 
lending is profitable; along the same line Arslanalp and Henry (2004) have shown that Brady deals 
succeeded in stimulating investment and growth principally because of the new flow of lending to the 
private sector. On the other hand, some IFIs have raised concern about possible disadvantages of debt 
relief, warning against the risks that some countries will use the fiscal space guaranteed by the 
initiative to restart borrowing excessively or to borrow at non- concessional term (World Bank, 2006, 
IDA and IMF, 2006).  In this regards, countries have adopted, on their own or through various 
international commitments (IMF conditionality, regional convergence criteria, engagement with other 
multilateral institutions), some rules to guide their borrowing behavior and ultimately to avoid the 
buildup of unsustainable debt.  These two views are somehow contradictory: worries about lending, 
in fact, appear to clash with the idea that debt relief paves the way for new capital inflows producing 
rising asset prices, increased investment and faster growth (Arslanalp and Henry, 2004).  
 
It is a moot point whether constraints on borrowing behavior harm the ability of low income countries 
(LICs) to access growth enhancing lending or whether  the lack of basic infrastructure that form the 
basis for profitable economic activity would harm it regardless.   
 
Given this backdrop, in this paper, we assess effectiveness of the IMF’s debt limits policy (DLP) on 
borrowing behavior in countries eligible to its concessional lending window (Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust – or PRGT).3  
 
The IMF’s debt limits policy is a set of rules that guide borrowing policy in countries with an 
economic program supported by a Fund arrangement. A key feature of the policy is that it 
distinguishes loans based on concessionality, i.e., the level of their grant element.
4
 Under the DLP, 
while access to nonconcessional borrowing is limited, access to highly concessional borrowing is 
                                                     
 
2 Debt Relief in Highly Indebted Poor Countries started in 1988 with the Toronto term and the forgiveness of a third of 
bilateral debt.  The Initiative was followed by three consecutive actions and the forgiveness of 90 percent of bilateral debt.   
As these reductions were seen as insufficient, donors decided to include multilateral agencies. Multilateral forgiveness began 
with the HIPC Initiative in 1996 and it continued with the approval of the MDRI in 2005. The HIPC Initiative entailed 
coordinated action by multilateral organizations and governments to reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of 
the most heavily indebted poor countries. The MDRI goes further by providing full debt relief to free up additional resources 
to help these countries reach the MDGs (IMF, 2013a). 
3 PRGT is a trust fund that provides concessional resources for poor countries with limited access to international markets.  
4 The grant element is the difference between the face value of the loan and its present value relative to the face value. Up to 
October 2013, to calculate the grant element, the IMF used a variable discount rate that is linked to the commercial interest 
reference rate (CIRR). Now, it uses a discount rate linked to the level of economic activity in LICs. Concessional loans are 
those for which the grant element is higher than a certain threshold. The IMF uses a 35% threshold.  
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unconstrained. In principle, as long as concessional resources are available, countries can rapidly 
accumulate new debt. The terms of concessional borrowing are very favorable and alleviate the debt 
burden, but a high amount of concessional debt can also compromise debt sustainability (IMF 
2013b). In this regard, we intend to investigate the impact of DLP on the level on new borrowing as 
well as on the terms of borrowing in order to understand whether IMF’s conditionality harms the 
ability of LICs to access growth enhancing lending. To answer these questions, we focus on PRGT-
eligible countries because the policy uniformly applied to this group of countries.  
 
We proxy DLP with the participation in IMF program for muliple reasons. First, DLP does not apply 
to countries as a stand-alone policy, but as part of an IMF program. Second, DLP applies in all IMF 
programs with LICs (hence our focus on PRGT eligible countries). Third, even though Fund 
programs encompass a variety of other measures (fiscal, monetary, financial, etc), DLP is the only 
one that affects the terms of borrowing; it also affects, in conjunction with fiscal policy, the amount 
borrowed through limits on nonconcessional borrowing. 
 
Same preliminary evidence is depicted in Figure 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt disbursement and suggest that on 
average PRGT-eligible countries tend to supply their financial needs with concessional loans vis-à-vis 
non-concessional loans. Also the box-plot in Figure 1 suggests that LICs are quite heterogeneous with 
regard to reliance on non-concessional financing and small economies seem to receive larger amount. 
Figure 2 reveals that in countries under DLP the level of concessional borrowing (as % of GDP) is on 
average higher that in countries that are not under the policy, while the level of non-concessional 
borrowing (as % of GDP) is similar in both groups. Figure 3 shows that grant element and financial 
terms are on average higher in countries under DLP. These figures provides first insight into the 
effectiveness of DLP. On the one hand, higher level of concessional borrowing and better financial 
terms in countries under the policy suggest a positive impact of DLP on borrowing behavior; on the 
other hand, the limited reliance on non-concessional borrowing in both groups may indicate that 
macroeconomic and institutional instability in LICs discourage non-concessional type of lenders.  
 
A challenge in identifying the impact of DLP on LICs is the potential for endogeneity of IMF’s 
program participation. IMF programs are usually concluded in times of economic crises, therefore the 
conditions of countries that enter and remain under agreement are not the same as for those that 
abstain. If those conditions differ, difference in borrowing behavior might depend not only on the 
program (DLP) itself but also on these initial conditions. Failure to control for these initial conditions 
would result in a selection bias problem. The literature on the impact of IMF program has used  
various methods to deal with the selection problems, from early before–after studies (Reichmann and 
Stillson, 1978; Connors, 1979; Pastor, 1987,  Killick, 1995) to more recent works which use 
Heckman’s (1979) methodology  (i.e.  Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000), the instrumental variables 
approach (Barro and Lee, 2005; Easterly, 2005; and Nsouli, Mourmouras, Atoian, 2005), or the 
method of matching (Atoyan and Conway, 2006; Hardoy, 2003; Bal Gunduz et al., 2013).
5
 
To address the self-selection problem of being under an IMF program, we use the statistical technique 
known as “propensity score matching”6 (PSM). In addition to examining the overall effect of DLP on 
                                                     
 
5 All these approaches present pros and cons -relative to the specific context- that should be carefully ponder by the analyst. 
The matching is a consistent estimator of  casual parameters under the hypothesis of “selection on observables” (see Cerulli, 
2012; Przeworski & Limongi, 1996), hence it results in unbiased estimates only if the decision to enter IMF programs can be 
accounted by the selection procedure (Przeworski & Limongi,1996). Nonetheless, it is generally preferred to other estimators 
as it does not require the identification of any specific parametric relation between the dependent variables and the 
regressors. On the contrary, the Heckman Selection Model (1979) is suitable –other than under selection of observable- also 
under “selection on unobservable”, but it depends implicitly on auxiliary restrictions such as the distribution of the 
unobservable. Finally the challenge with the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, even if suitable for both selection of 
observable and unobservable without assuming any distributional hypothesis, is in finding variables that affect the 
probability of program participation but do not affect the outcome variables other than through their impact on participation.  
6 Propensity score matching was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and  it has been used –with increasing 
interest- in many non randomized studies (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1999;  Hong & Yu, 2008;  Ye & Kaskutas,  2009; Wyse, 
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borrowing behavior, we also investigate whether there is any heterogeneity in its impact, which is 
whether the treatment varies across members of the population.  To this end, we explore the 
following sources of heterogeneity: IDA-status, level of development, infrastructure gap, projection 
growth and total debt. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first study that uses propensity 
score matching to analyze the impact of DLP on borrowing behavior.  
 
We find that the level of concessional borrowing is significantly higher in countries under the DLP, 
suggesting that the presence of an IMF program could play a catalytic role in attracting more 
concessional resources. We do not find evidence that the DLP significantly impacts the level of non-
concessional borrowing (private or otherwise), suggesting that LICs have not been able to attract 
significant amounts of non-concessional financing, irrespective of the policy constraint. The results 
also indicate that the terms of borrowing on new loan commitments are not significantly affected by 
concessionality requirements under the DLP. Finally, the heterogeneity analysis (conducted for 
robustness check) confirms that terms of borrowing as well as the level of non-concessional 
borrowing are not affected by the DLP, but are affected by the level of development 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follow. Section 2 describes our dataset and the methodology. In 
section 3, we estimate the average treatment effect of DLP on the treated group, employing a variety 
of propensity score matching methods. In section 4, we explore the heterogeneity feature of the 
treatment effect utilizing control function regression approach. Section 5 offers our conclusion. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                
 
Keesler, and Schneider, 2008;  Staff et al. , 2008).  In the macroeconomics literature, it has been recently used,  to study the 
effects of the inflation targeting arrangement on macroeconomic performances (see Lin and Ye, 2009; Lin, 2010), the effects 
of fiscal rules on fiscal behavior in developing countries (Tapsoba, 2012), the economic impacts of foreign capital flows (see 
Chari, Chen, and Dominguez, 2012) and the impact of different strategies to respond to crisis (Forbes et al. , 2013). Amongst 
the studies on the impact of IMF Fund-supported program, Propensity score matching has been recently used by Atoyan and 
Conway (2006) Hardoy (2003),  Hutchison  (2004), and Bal Gunduz et al., (2013).  
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2. Method and data 
(a) Data 
 
Our analysis assesses the hypothesis that countries’ borrowing behavior is impacted by their 
involvement with the IMF, through its DLP. Our dataset consists of 70 countries that were PRGT-
eligible throughout the sample period 1986 – 20117 (countries are listed in Table 1 in Appendix 2). 
Most of the data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator and the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook. Following Barro and Lee (2005) and Jorra (2012), we arrange all the data 
in five-year frequencies; hence our panel covers 70 countries over the five-year periods 1986-91, 
1992-96, 1997-01, 2002-06, 2007-11. Amongst the 70 countries, 57 countries benefited from IDA-
only lending and 13 received a mix of IDA and IBRD lending
8
 Also, 39 countries in the sample 
benefitted from the HIPC initiative. The focus on PRGT-eligible countries- based on income level 
and related economic and financial vulnerabilities - helps create a homogeneous sample and yet it 
ensures that the control group provides a good counterfactual for the treatment group.  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a country is under IMF 
program for at least three years in a five years window.
9
 This variable is taken from Bal Gunduz et al.  
(2013). The qualifying programs are all IMF financial arrangements available to PRGT-eligible 
countries: primarily the ECF and its predecessors (PRGT, ESAF, SAF), but also the Stand-By-
Arrangements (SBA), the Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF), the Standby Credit Facility  (SCF), and 
the Policy Support Instruments (PSI). The focus on this specific sample helps address some of the 
concerns raised by the literature on IMF’s engagement. As pointed out by Steinwand and Stone 
(2008), the heterogeneity of IMF’s program weakens the ability of identifying a satisfactory selection 
model of participation in IMF programs.  
 
We assess borrowing behaviors in the presence of the debt limits policy by looking at external public 
debt along three different dimensions. For each dimension we use different groups of variables:  
 
i) Size of borrowing, which is proxied by the total amount of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) 
loan commitment and disbursement as a share of GDP. We also look at the sources of PPG debt 
flows by breaking them down into concessional
10
 versus non-concessional loans, official (bilateral 
and multilateral) loans versus private loans. Finally, we look at the largest source of borrowing for 
most low income countries (IDA loans)
11
; 
 
ii) Composition of borrowing, which is proxied by the share of external disbursement –breakdown 
into sources of financing- as a share of total external disbursement. As before, we look at 
concessional versus non-concessional, bilateral, multilateral and IDA;  
                                                     
 
7A country is PRGT-eligible, if: (i) its annual per capita income is below the operational IDA cut-off ; and (ii) the sovereign 
does not have capacity to access international financial markets on a durable and substantial basis (IMF, 2013c).  
8 As for 2011. 
9 Alternatively, we define the treatment as “being under DLP and/or IDA Non Concessional Borrowing Policy” (NCBP), in 
order to include the debt limits imposed by IDA since 2006. The variable is proxied by a dummy variable that takes value 
one if a country is under IMF program and/or IDA NCBP for at least three years in a five years window”. The two variables 
overlap almost perfectly, hence no difference is found in the results.  
10 The definition of concessionality in the data available differs from the debt limit policy definition. WDI defines 
concessional debt as loans with an original grant element of 25 calculated discounting future service payments at 10 percent, 
while in the current debt limit policy the concessionality ceiling is based on 35 percent grant element cut off and it is based 
on CIRRs discount rate;  hence data should be interpret with caution. 
11 In the current Debt Limit Policy the concessionality ceiling applies to PPG External Debt Commitments. Therefore, we 
would ideally use as dependent variable the breakdown of PPG External Debt Commitments. However, given the lack of 
data on concessional/non concessional dichotomy for External Debt Commitments, we use 5 year period average of External 
Debt Disbursement, which we expect being a good proxy of 5 year average of External Debt Commitments. 
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iii) Terms of borrowing, which is proxied by the average grace period, the average interest rate, the 
average maturity, and the average grant element
12
 on new external debt commitments. Data are draw 
from the World Bank’s Debt Reporting System (DRS). 
 
Summary statistics and description of the variables are provided from Table 2 to Table 5 in Appendix 
2. As depicted in Figure 2 and 3 (see Appendix 1), countries under DLP shows on average a higher 
level of disbursement on concessional PPG External Debt (as % of GDP), higher grant element and in 
general better average financial term. This seems to give a first insight on a positive impact of DLP 
on borrowing behavior. We do not observe any difference in the level of non-concessional borrowing 
(as % of GDP).  In the next section we assess more formally whether those differences hold once we 
address the self-selection problem of the IMF-engagement.  
  
                                                     
 
12 Data on average grant element available in the WB’s DRS are derived by discounting future service payments at 10 
percent. In order to provide figures closer to the IMF’ grant element calculator – based on CIRRs discount rate- we derived 
the average grant element using 5% discount rate. Our estimates are based on the average financial terms provided by WDI 
and assuming constant future repayments.  
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(b) Method 
 
The objective of our analysis is to evaluate the treatment effect of DLP in PRGT-eligible countries on 
their borrowing behavior. A simple approach would be to compare flow of external debt for countries 
under the DLP against that of countries not subject to the DLP. However, this approach would yield 
biased results, as participation in IMF program (and therefore being subject to the DLP) is 
endogenous and depends on many factors (Bal Gunduz et al. 2013). To account for this endogeneity, 
we consider the participation in an IMF program as a treatment and we refer to countries that have 
been under IMF program as treated group and to the non-program as the control group. Then, the 
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT; Imbens, 2004) 
13
 is given by  
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼1|𝐷𝐼 = 1] −  𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 1]           (1) 
 
Where D is the dummy variable that identifies a country as “being under the Debt Limits Policy”. 𝑌𝐼1 
is the value of the outcome variable when country i is “under the Debt Limits Policy” and 𝑌𝐼0 if it is 
not. [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 1] is the outcome value that would have been observed if the country i was not subject 
to the DLP, and [𝑌𝐼1|𝐷𝐼 = 1] is the outcome value actually observed for the same country (subject to 
DLP).  
 
Unfortunately, the counterfactual impact of the treatment - [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 1] – is not observed, therefore 
one has to choose a proper substitute for it in order to estimate an unbiased ATT. To this end, we use 
a statistical technique known as “propensity score matching” (PSM). It consists of finding in a large 
group of non-participants individuals who are similar to the participants in all relevant characteristics 
X and pair them. Then, differences in outcomes between the control group and the participants can be 
attributed to the treatment (DLP in our case). The key assumptions that need to be met to apply PSM 
are: i) conditional independence assumption (CIA); and ii) common support. 
 
The first condition requires the selection into treatment to be driven only by factors that the researcher 
can observe. Under this assumption equation (1) becomes:  
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼1|𝐷𝐼 = 1, |𝑋𝑖 ] −  𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 0|𝑋𝑖]         (2) 
 
Where 𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 1]   has been replaced by  𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 0|𝑋𝑖] which is observable.  
 
Since, conditioning on a high number of covariates in X might be complicated (the so called “curse of 
dimensionality”), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest matching on probability score i.e. the 
probability of participating in a program given observed characteristics X instead of matching on X. 
The second assumption requires that every subject has a non-zero probability to receive either 
treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that under those two assumptions treatment 
assignment is strongly ignorable and conditioning on propensity score can be used to obtain unbiased 
average treatment effect estimates and equation (2) can be written as follow:  
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼1|𝐷𝐼 = 1, |𝑝(𝑋𝑖)] −  𝐸 [ 𝑌𝐼0|𝐷𝐼 = 0|𝑝(𝑋𝑖)]           (3) 
 
Yet, propensity score matching entails forming matched sets of treated and untreated subjects who 
share a similar value of propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , once a matched sample has 
been formed, the treatment effect can be directly estimated by comparing outcomes between treated 
and untreated subject in the matched sample.  
                                                     
 
13 A related measure of treatment effect is the ATE at the population level (Imbens, 2004), that is the average treatment 
effect of moving an entire population from untreated to treated. Applied researchers should decide whether ATT or ATE are 
of greater interest for their research. ATT might be more appropriate when estimating the impact of a structured program 
with potentially high barriers to participate. In contrast, when testing the effect of wide spread treatment (i.e. brochures given 
to patients) ATE might be of greater interest.  
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The methodology involves two steps: the first one is the estimation of the propensity scores, i.e. the 
probability that a country would have agreed to an IMF stabilization program ex-ante, regardless of 
what they ultimately decided to do. In the second one, the propensity scores are used to match 
countries that had an IMF program with similar countries (propensity-wise) that did not have an IMF 
program. This process of “balancing” program and non-program observations by propensity scores 
controls for systematic differences between the two groups prior the decision whether to participate in 
a Fund program. 
14
 
 
The results of the propensity score matching should be interpret with care. The reliability of the PSM 
results depends on whether or not the conditions for the application of the PSM methodology are met. 
As we previously described, PSM relies on two main assumptions: i) Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA); and ii) Common support. The first one requires the selection into treatment to be 
driven only by factors that the researcher can observe; hence it implies that omitting important 
variables can seriously increase bias in resulting estimates. In order to credibly justify the CIA, it is 
important to first discuss whether the available empirical evidence casts doubts on its plausibility; and 
then to identify a selection model broadly accepted by the literature. In other words, a model – which 
properly identifies the likelihood of being under an IMF program, - is conditio sine qua non for the 
correct use of PSM.  The second assumption –the common support- ensures that countries with the 
same characteristics X have the same positive probability of being both participants and 
nonparticipants (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 1999).  
  
                                                     
 
14 The literature proposes different type of estimators to match treated and untreated observations. In this paper we present 
the result for the radius matching and the kernel matching because they guaranteed the best balancing for all relevant 
confounders (as proved by the Absolute Standardized Bias). 
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3. Estimating average treatment effect  
(a) Estimating the propensity scores 
 
We estimate the propensity score by using a probit model with the probability of being under IMF 
program/DLP as dependent variable. As independent variables, we use economic and political 
variables that capture both demand and supply factors and that have been broadly identified by the 
literature as predictors of participation in IMF programs
15
. Our estimation is broadly similar to the 
one by Bal Gunduz et al. (2013).   
 
In general, we assume that i) countries turn to the IMF when their economies are in turmoil and that 
ii)  the IMF lending policy in LICs is  responding to the degree of their external imbalance, their 
macroeconomic conditions, their size and institutional weights.  Given this backdrop, we expect Fund 
assistance to be more likely in countries with weak macroeconomic conditions, feeble structural 
characteristics and state institutions, and tighter link with the IMF.   
 
Starting from the countries’ macroeconomic conditions, in line with the major evidence in the 
literature
16
, we find that a shortage of official reserves significantly increases the likelihood of 
entering a program agreement with the Fund.  As regard bilateral aid, we do not find any significant 
correlation with the dependent variable. The expected sign is ambiguous a priori. According to 
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009), when the availability of bilateral aid is lower, the pressure to 
draw on multilateral resources is stronger. Supporting this view Bal Gunduz et al. (2013) find a 
negative significant relation between the likelihood of an IMF program and aid. On the other hands, 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) maintain that bilateral foreign assistance is widely used by donors as 
foreign policy instrument responding to their strategic interests in the recipient countries and can be 
expected to have a catalytic effect on IMF lending. Our results do not help distinguish between these 
competing theories. Finally, in line with Bal Gunduz et at. (2013) we don’t find evidence that weak 
trading partner growth impacts the likelihood of being under an IMF program. 
 
Consistently with the literature
17
 we find that the probability of being under an IMF-program is 
higher in poorer countries and is lower in countries that benefit from higher resource rents (Bal 
Gunduz et al., 2013). We also find that countries with high level of inflation were slightly less likely 
to sign an IMF-program. This result, which might be difficult to justify, is partially in line with the 
literature that find different results upon using different samples and periods. In particular, Pop-
Eleches (2008) finds a negative relation for Latin America in the period 1990-2001; Biglaiser and 
DeRouen Jr. (2010) do not find any significant result and Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010) find a 
positive and significant relation. 
 
The structural characteristics of a country also contribute to explain the likelihood that the country 
would have an IMF program. As expected, landlocked resource-scarce countries have a higher 
probability of being under an IMF program (Bal Gunduz et al., 2013). We also control for the 
possibility that the IMF rewards more globalized countries, either because of their closeness to the 
“Washington Consensus” prescription or because they are more prone to suffer from spillover effect 
of a crises. In line with Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010) and Bal Gunduz et al. (2013) we do not find 
evidence of a significant relation.  
 
Institutional characteristics are shown to increase the probability of being under an IMF program. We 
find that the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is positively and 
                                                     
 
15 E.g. Barro and Lee, 2005; Bird & Rowlands, 2007; Broz and Hawes, 2006; Brune et al., 2004; Dreher, 2006; Edward, 
2005; Bal Gunduz et al., 2013; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2010; Przeworsk & Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2003 ). A detailed 
description of our variables and the source of information can be found in Table 2 in Appendix 1. 
16 Cornelius, 1987; Knight and Santaella, 1997; Vreeland, 2003; Barro and Lee, 2005; Sturm, Berger and De Haan, 2005. 
17 Joyce, 1992; Garuda, 2000; Dreher and Vaubel, 2004; Barro and Lee, 2005; Sturm, Berger and De Haan, 2005; 
Eichengreen, et al., 2006. 
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significantly correlated with the dependent variable, while being a democracy is not significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable.  The sign of this relation is not conclusive in the literature. In 
particular democracy might impact the dependent variable either way. Autocratic governments are, in 
fact, less concerned with the popularity of their economic policy decisions and therefore may be more 
likely to ask for IMF support, but are also less interested in using IMF assistance to spur 
macroeconomic adjustment programs. Supporting the negative relation, Bird et al. (2004) find that 
countries with weak state institutions are more likely to borrow from the IMF repeatedly, while 
Jensen (2004) and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) do not find any significant relation.  
 
Finally, one of the most robust finding that emerges from the literature on the determinants of IMF 
lending is that program initiation is significantly drawn by a country’s political and economic links 
with IMF influential shareholders.  To capture the country’s relationship with the IMF, we include the 
country’s size and its IMF quota, which might increase the likelihood of the Fund to intervene (Barro 
and Lee, 2005; Bal Gunduz et al., 2013; Stone, 2008). We find a positive but not significant relation. 
This result might be explained by the peculiarity of our sample, composed by countries whose size 
does not significantly differ.  
 
Table 6 reports the probit estimates of the propensity score using DLP as dependent variables
18
. 
Column (1) displays our preferred model. In the following columns we add further controls on the 
baseline specification. Table 7 reports the probit estimates using an alternative dependent variable 
(being under a Fund program, or being under the World Bank’s Nonconcessional Borrowing Policy). 
The results remain almost identical to those of Table 6.  
  
                                                     
 
18 It is important to point out that our objective here is not to build a statistical model explaining IMF participation in the best 
possible way, but to mimic a controlled experiment in the best possible way.   To do so, -while selecting the variables- we 
give much attention to the implementation rules proposed by the literature (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2007; Persson, 2001). 
In particular, according to the CIA, the PSM produces bias estimates if variable that affect simultaneously the assignment 
process and the outcome variables are omitted. By the same token, as pointed out by Persson (2001) omitting variables that 
affect only the assignment process, but not the outcome variables, have little influence on the results. Secondly, only 
variables that are unaffected by the participation (or its anticipation) should be included in the model. To ensure this we 
include variables either calculated at the beginning of the 5-year period or fixed over time.  
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(b) Matching method and results 
 
Before applying the matching methods, we make sure that the common support assumption is met. 
To this end, we implement the minimum-maximum criterion, by excluding all observations in the 
control group whose propensity score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum in 
the treated group.  
 
We used the results of the propensity scores estimated above to match countries under the DLP with 
countries in the control group using two methodologies. First, the radius matching which matches 
each country under the DLP with control countries within a certain radius (we used R=0.05 and 
R=0.1). Second, the kernel matching, which matches each country under the DLP with all control 
countries weighted proportionally to their closeness to the DLP country
19
.  As the matching estimator 
presents no analytical variance, we compute standard errors by bootstrapping (see Dehejia and 
Wahba, 1999). We looked at three sets of debt indicators: the volume of borrowing (disbursement and 
commitment), the composition of borrowing (disbursement) and its financial terms (interest rate, 
maturity, grace period and grant element).  
 
Table 8 reports the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATTs) on all the outcome 
variables. The results are broadly consistent across matching methods. They indicate that,   on 
average, the level of concessional borrowing (disbursement and commitment) is significantly higher 
in countries under the DLP as compared to what would have happen in its absence, while the ATT on 
the level of non-concessional borrowing is not significant. We find that the higher level of 
concessional borrowing in countries under DLP is essentially driven by multilateral and bilateral 
donors, whereas the level of borrowing granted by private creditors is not statistically different in the 
two groups. Turning to the composition of external debt disbursement, we do not find any significant 
results. However, the signs of the coefficients suggest that depending on the treatment status countries 
rely on different debt portfolio composition favoring concessional lending vis-à-vis non-concessional 
lending if they are under the policy. Finally we find that the ATT on average grant element, average 
interest rate, average maturity and average grace period is not significant. However, as the 
composition of external debt disbursement is found to be not significant, no difference should be 
found in the average grant element of the two groups
20
.  
 
In sum, we do not find evidence that DLP significantly impacts the level of non-concessional 
borrowing and the terms of borrowing on new commitment, suggesting that LICs are not able to 
attract non-concessional type of lenders irrespective of the policy constraint. Also we find that the 
level of concessional borrowing is significantly higher in countries under DLP (as % of GDP) 
suggesting that, if available, PRGT-eligible countries tend to supply their financial needs through 
concessional borrowing. The higher level of concessional-type of lenders in countries under DLP 
should be interpreted with caution, as the literature is not unanimous on its rational. Bird and 
Rowlands (2007a) suggest that IMF programmes crowd in lending at favorable terms; more recently 
Kinda and Le Manchec (2012) postulate that higher level of donor assistance in countries under IMF 
programmes may be simply reflecting the fact that most of the factors that affect the likelihood of 
being under the DLP (GDP per capita, size of the country, etc) also affect donors’ allocation.  Finally, 
we find that DLP does not exert a significant effect on private creditors lending, suggesting that the 
policy does not discourage private creditors. Even if beyond the scope of this analysis, this result is in 
line with previous studies on the catalytic effect of the IMF-programmes on private lending, which 
                                                     
 
19 We retained the radius matching and the kernel matching because they guaranteed the best balancing for all relevant 
confounders (as proved by the Absolute Standardized Bias). As pointed out by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), 
asymptotically, all PSM estimators should yield the same results but in small sample the choice of the matching algorithm 
can be important. Pragmatically we should choose the matching method that guarantees the best balancing on the X variables 
-and hence the highest bias reduction-.  
20 Grant element is calculated for all public and publicly guaranteed external debt as the difference between (commitment) 
present value and the discounted present value of its contractual debt service divided by the (commitment) present value. If 
the debt composition is similar no difference should be found in the average grant element of different countries.  
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indicate that countries with weak fundamentals do not experience catalysis (Mody and Saravia, 2003; 
Bordo et al., 2004; Bird and Rowlands, 2007b).  
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4. Heterogeneity 
The Average Treatment effect estimated above could still mask some heterogeneity
21
 due to countries 
specific features. To this regards, in this section we explore five possible sources of heterogeneity: i) 
IDA status (IDA-only countries most likely have a different borrowing behavior than other 
countries); ii) level of development (richer countries have larger access to non-concessional 
financing); iii) country’s infrastructure gap (countries with large infrastructure gap tend to borrow at 
any cost to close the gap); iv) growth prospect (the better the growth prospect the more incline the 
country is to borrow at any cost); and v) total debt as % of GDP (higher level of the burden may 
discourage non-concessional type of lenders.). Following Lin and Ye (2009) and Tapsoba (2012) we 
apply control function regression approach
22
 and run a simple OLS within the common support 
previously identified. The regression is defined as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐷𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑃𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝐷𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝑋𝑖𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
Our dependent variables are the average grant element and the average non-concessional borrowing 
(as % of GDP). We focus on the average grant element vis-à-vis other terms of borrowing as it is a 
continuous variable that summarizes interest, maturity and grace period.  𝐷𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the dummy 
variable indicating whether country i was subject to the DLP at time t, 𝑃𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the propensity 
score estimated in our selection model, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are the possible sources of heterogeneity, and finally the 
interaction term. The parameter 𝜔 captures the difference of the treatment impact due to 𝑋𝑖𝑡.  
 
Table 9 presents the regression estimates using average grant element as dependent variable. The 
results confirm the finding of the previous section: after controlling for the likelihood of being under 
the DLP, there is no significant difference between the DLP countries and the control group (Table 9, 
column 1 and 2). When we control for IDA status,
23
 we observe that IDA and DLP have significant 
impact on average grant element (Table 9, column 3). This confirms the assumption put forward in 
the PSM section that the presence of IDA only countries in both the treated and the control groups 
appear to blur the impact of the DLP.     In particular, when we control for IDA, the coefficient of 
DLP suggests that in non-IDA countries the DLP positively impacts the average grant element 
(12.622), while a Wald test on the interaction term reveals that the DLP does not significantly impact 
the grant element in IDA only-countries.   
 
This result should be interpret with care. IDA status in fact is defined as GNI per capita below an 
established threshold; only few countries in our sample are above this threshold and their GNI per 
capita vary largely.   To the extent that the level of development impacts negatively the probability of 
being under an IMF program, the DLP might simply proxies the better financing terms granted to 
poorer countries.  To overcome this problem we substitute IDA-countries with GNI per capita and we 
find that the impact of DLP disappears. In addition we find that the level of development is negative 
correlated with the grant element (Table 9 column 4) suggesting that more developed countries 
receive less favorable financing terms.  
 
One of the most frequent complaints from Low Income Countries that are subject the Fund’s DLP is 
that the policy is very restrictive because given the limited amount of concessional borrowing 
                                                     
 
21 In this paper we refer to heterogeneity as “how the effect of treatment varies across members of the population”. As 
pointed out by Jann (2010), a basic paradigm of the literature on casual models is that there can be individual heterogeneity 
in treatment effects. Surprisingly, however, not much attention is usually paid to the explicit analysis of the heterogeneity of 
treatment effects in applied studies. In fact because all statistical quantities of interest can be computed only at the group 
level, the researcher necessarily “ignores” within-group individual level heterogeneity (Xie et al, 2012). 
22 Amongst other methodologies for program evaluation, Wooldrige (2002) suggests the use an OLS regression that includes 
the propensity score as control variable in the outcome regression. One of the main backdrops of this estimator is that the 
variation in the first-stage probit estimates is ignored when computing the standard error of the treatment effect. 
23 IDA is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is IDA-only at the beginning of the five- year period and 
zero otherwise.  
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available to them, they are constrained in their ability to invest in public infrastructure. We postulate 
that countries with higher infrastructure gaps would tend borrowing more on non-concessional terms, 
so as to close their infrastructure gap. We proxy infrastructure by the number of telephone line per 
100 people (av5_i_TLPPLP)
24
 and we find that the coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting 
a positive relation between infrastructure gap and average grant element
25
. This could be because 
infrastructure gap is highly correlated with GDP per capita, which is a key determinant of 
concessional resources allocation.  
 
We also explored whether improving growth prospect affect borrowing behavior (av5_PROJGR). If a 
country’s growth prospects are better than previously expected for any reason (discovery of natural 
resources or ambitious new investment plan) the debt burden may not worsen by a limited increase in 
non-concessional borrowing. As a result, one would expect improving growth prospects to result in 
worsening borrowing terms. We proxy improving growth prospect, by a variable that compared 
different vintages of WEO projections and we do not find any significant results
26
.  
 
Finally we test whether higher debt burden may discourage non-concessional type of lenders. In 
particular we explore the hypothesis that total debt as percent of GDP (av5_TDPPG_GDP) is positive 
correlated with average grant element. We do not find any evidence of such relation.  
 
Columns (8) and (9) display new results that repeat earlier regression, but using values at the 
beginning of the 5-year period for potentially endogenous variables. We find that above conclusions 
are unaltered.  
 
Table 10 presents the estimations using average non-concessional borrowing (as % of GDP) as 
dependent variable. The results reinforce those of the previous section. After controlling for the 
likelihood of being under the DLP, there is no significant difference between the DLP countries and 
the control group (column (1) and (2)).   
 
When we control for IDA status, we observe that IDA has a significant impact on non-concessional 
borrowing (Table 10, column (3)), confirming the hypothesis that, as long as available, LICs tend to 
supply their financial needs through concessional borrowing.   The coefficient of DLP and its 
interaction with IDA dummy (IDA_INT) are not significant, suggesting that DLP does not impact the 
level of non-concessional borrowing irrespective of IDA-status classification. In column (4) we 
analyze the heterogeneity of the treatment effect across different levels of development. GNI per 
capita is found to be positively and significantly correlated with non-concessional borrowing (as % of 
GDP) while DLP is not. This confirms previous evidence and may indicate that countries turn to 
larger level of non-concessional borrowing when their economies growth rather than in absence of 
borrowing constraint.  
 
Columns (5) to (7) use respectively infrastructure gap, prospect growth and total debt as source of 
heterogeneity. Column (8) and (9) repeat the same regressions, but using values at the beginning of 
the 5-year period for potentially endogenous variables. The results confirm those of the previous table 
and suggest that the impact of DLP is not significant and it does not vary across different members of 
the population.   The significance of the infrastructure gap, as proxied by the number of telephone 
line per 100 people (Column (8)), is also in line with previous findings and reinforces the hypothesis 
that higher level of development attract non-concessional type of lenders.  
 
                                                     
 
24 5-year period average. 
25 We tried a better proxy (infrastructure gap as measured by roads paved as a percent of total roads), but because of limited 
coverage of the variable, our sample size was significantly reduced, rendering the results questionable.  
26 To measure improvement in growth prospects, we calculate the growth rate of 5-years average GDP projections taken 
from WEO.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of the IMF’s debt limits policy (DLP) on borrowing 
behavior in countries eligible to IMF’s concessional lending. We aim to shed some light into the 
discussion on debt relief effectiveness on to the  ability of LICs to access growth enhancing lending 
without harming sustainability. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first paper that 
analyzes the impact of DLP on borrowing behavior using propensity score matching to address the 
self-selection problem of being under IMF program.  
 
We do not find evidence that the DLP significantly impacts either the level of non-concessional 
borrowing or the terms of such borrowing (interest rate, grace period, maturity and grant element). 
This suggests that LICs do not accumulate non-concessional loans more rapidly when not subject to 
the DLP. We also show that the DLP does not exert a significant effect on private creditors lending, 
suggesting that the policy does not discourage private creditors, perhaps because poor countries are 
not able to attract private lenders in the first place. Even if beyond the scope of this analysis, this 
result, which is in line with previous studies on the catalytic effect of the IMF programs on private 
lending, indicates that countries with weak fundamentals do not experience catalysis.  
 
Finally the heterogeneity analysis suggests that countries turn to higher levels of non-concessional 
borrowing as their economies grow richer, not because of the absence of constraints on borrowing 
under the DLP. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that the absence of the concessionality 
requirements under the Fund’s debt limits policy is unlikely to result in a major shift in financing 
toward non-concessional borrowing, especially in the poorest low-income countries. 
 
Our findings have several implications for the current discussions on debt relief and its effectiveness 
in stimulating private capital flows.  Our study suggests that, regardless borrowing constraints, least 
developed countries are not able to attract non-concessional type of lenders and, if available, they 
tend to supply their financial needs through concessional borrowing. In line with Arslanalp and Henry 
(2004), we postulate that  highly indebt poor countries may lack  the basic infrastructure that form the 
basis for profitable economic activity and hence debt relief may not be able to stimulate investment 
and growth through private foreign capital.  
 
In term of policy implication, this paper suggest that DLP does not impact borrowing behavior in 
PRGT-eligible countries. This is particularly important in the current context, where LICs face 
decreasing foreign aid relative to development financing needs and government must seeks for 
additional financing. Our study suggests that the level of development, rather than DLP, influences 
the ability to access non-concessional type of lenders.   
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Appendix 1  
 
 
Figure 1: PPG External Debt disbursement (percentage of GDP, weighted average) 
 
 
  
The panel covers 70 countries over the five-year periods 1986-91, 1992-96, 1997-01, 2002-06, 2007-11. 
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Figure 2: PPG External Debt Disbursement by DLP (percentage of GDP, weighted average) 
  
  
  
The panel covers 70 countries over the five-year periods 1986-91, 1992-96, 1997-01, 2002-06, 2007-11. 
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Figure 3: Average financial terms  
  
  
  
  
The panel covers 70 countries over the five-year periods 1986-91, 1992-96, 1997-01, 2002-06, 2007-11. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 1: List of countries  
 
  
Country Region IDA HIPC Country Region IDA HIPC
Afghanistan, I. S. of South Asia 1 1 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Armenia Europe & Central Asia 0 0 Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Bangladesh South Asia 1 0 Maldives South Asia 1 0
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Mali Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Bhutan South Asia 1 0 Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean 0 1 Moldova Europe & Central Asia 1 0
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Mongolia East Asia & Pacific 0 0
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Cambodia East Asia & Pacific 1 0 Myanmar East Asia & Pacific 1 0
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Nepal South Asia 1 0
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean 1 1
Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Niger Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Papua New Guinea East Asia & Pacific 0 0
Congo, Democratic Republic of Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Congo, Republic Of Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Samoa East Asia & Pacific 1 0
Cote d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Sao Tome & Principe Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Djibouti Middle East & North Africa 1 0 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Dominica Latin America & Caribbean 0 0 Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Solomon Islands East Asia & Pacific 1 0
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 St. Lucia Latin America & Caribbean 0 0
Georgia Europe & Central Asia 0 0 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Latin America & Caribbean 0 0
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Grenada Latin America & Caribbean 0 0 Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia 1 0
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Togo Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean 1 1 Tonga East Asia & Pacific 1 0
Haiti Latin America & Caribbean 1 1 Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean 1 1 Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia 0 0
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0 Vanuatu East Asia & Pacific 1 0
Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia 1 0 Vietnam East Asia & Pacific 0 0
Lao People Dem. Rep. East Asia & Pacific 1 0 Yemen, Republic Of Middle East & North Africa 1 0
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0 Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0
List of countries
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables Description Source
Size of borrowing
COMMEXP_GDP Commitments PPG (as % of GDP)     WDI
COMMIDA_GDP Commitments PPG IDA (as % of GDP) WDI
COMMPR_GDP Commitments PPG Private Creditors (as % of GDP) WDI
DPPG_GDP Disbursements PPG (as % of GDP)    WDI
DPPGCON_GDP Disbursements PPG concessional external debt (PPG) (as % of GDP)   WDI
DPPGNOCON_GDP Disbursements PPG non concessional external debt(PPG) (as % of GDP) WDI
DPPGIDA_GDP Disbursements PPG IDA (as % of GDP)    WDI
DPPGBIL_GDP Disbursements PPG bilateral (as % of GDP)    WDI
DPPGMUL_GDPP Disbursements PPG multilateral (as % of GDP)    WDI
DPRV_GDP Disbursements PPG Private Creditors (as % of GDP)    WDI
Composition of borrowing
DPPGIDA_DPPG Disbursements PPG IDA (as % of TOT. DISB.PPG)   WDI
DPPGBIL_DPPG Disbursements PPG bilateral (as % of TOT. DISB.)   WDI
DPPGMUL_DPPG Disbursements PPG multilateral (as % of TOT. DISB.)    WDI
DPPGCON_DPPG Disbursements PPG concessional external debt (as % of TOT. DISB.)  WDI
DPPGNOCON_DPPG Disbursements PPG non concessional external debt   (as % of TOT. DISB.) WDI
Term of borrowing
GRCPERCO Average grace period on new external debt commitments (years)  WDI
GRCELCO Average grant element on new external debt commitments (%)  WDI
GRCELCO_5 Average grant element on new external debt commitments' based on 5% discount rate WDI
GRCELC~10 Average grant element on new external debt commitments' based on 10% discount rate Author calculation
INTCOM Average interest on new external debt commitments (%)   WDI
MTR Average maturity on new external debt commitments' private (years) WDI
Outcome variables
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
 
Variables Description Source
Dependent variable
DLP Countries subjected to Debt Limit Policy : the  dummy takes value one if the country is 
under IMF program for at least three years in a five years window
Bal Gunduz et al., 
(2013)
DLPNCBP Country subjected to Debt Limit Policy and/or IDA Non Concessional Borrowing Policy 
(NCBP)”, in order to include the debt l imits imposed by IDA since 2006. The dummy takes 
value one if a country is under IMF program and/or IDA NCBP for at least three years in 
a five years window
IMF
Geographic and institutional characteristics
politicalglobalization Globalization index KOF Institute
landlocked 1 if landlocked CEPII
democracy Dummy variable takes value 1 if the regime qualifies as democratic.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi J., 
and Vreeland J.R. (2010)
cpia World Bank's CPIA Index measures the quality of
policies and institutions in the country IMF
External demand conditions
grostar Trading partner real GDP growth WEO
Country's relation with the Fund 
quota_gdp Logarithm of the IMF quota IMF 
SIZE Logarithm of GDP (constant 2005 PPP) WDI
Initial macroeconomic buffer 
AIDGDPI Initial aid/GDP (at the beginning of each five years period) WDI
RESIN Initial reserves in months of import (at the beginning of each five-years period) VE-LIC database
Country income and macroeconomic conditions
INFLCPI Infation, average consumer prices (annual percent change) WEO
GNIPC Logarithm of GNI per capita (current US$) WDI
resource_rents Resource Rent as a share of GDP WDI
CURRACC Current account deficit WDI
TDPPG_GDP Total Public Debt PPG (as % of GDP) WDI
GDPGR  Gross domestic product, constant prices (annual percent change) WDI
Variables Description Source
IDA Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the country is IDA only (time variant) BEGINNING 
OF 5 YEARS PERIOD IMF
i_TLPPLP Telephone lines per 100 people BEGINNING OF 5 YEARS PERIOD WDI
PROJGR Growth rate of GDP projection BEGINNING OF 5 YEARS PERIOD WEO
TDPPG_GDP Total Public Debt PPG (as % of GDP) BEGINNING OF 5 YEARS PERIOD WDI
av5_i_TLPPLP Telephone lines per 100 people (five years average) WDI
av5_PROJGR Growth rate of GDP projection (five years average) WEO
av5_TDPPG_GDP Total Public Debt PPG (as % of GDP) WDI
Selection model
Heterogeneity analysis
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Countries
av5_COMMEXP_GDP 5.319 3.866 0.000 25.926 319 68
av5_COMMIDA_GDP 1.584 1.504 0.000 7.195 296 68
av5_COMMPR_GDP 0.433 1.019 0.000 7.847 322 68
av5_DPPG_GDP 4.279 2.693 0.040 13.066 323 69
av5_DPPGCON_GDP 3.324 2.230 0.040 10.924 323 69
av5_DPPGNOCON_GDP 0.923 1.360 0.000 8.050 323 69
av5_DPPGIDA_GDP 1.339 1.185 0.000 5.576 327 69
av5_DPPGBIL_GDP 1.070 1.115 0.000 6.644 325 69
av5_DPPGMUL_GDP 2.791 1.871 0.005 8.881 322 69
av5_DPRV_GDP 0.320 0.623 0.000 3.521 325 69
av5_DPPGIDA_DPPG 32.670 21.454 0.000 77.774 333 70
av5_DPPGBIL_DPPG 23.457 17.514 0.000 74.983 331 70
av5_DPPGMUL_DPPG 70.004 21.993 10.831 100.000 331 70
av5_DPPGCON_DPPG 82.955 19.957 23.100 100.000 330 70
av5_DPPGNOCON_DPPG 17.054 19.953 0.000 76.900 330 70
av5_GRCPERCO 7.654 1.799 2.335 10.892 324 70
av5_GRCELCO 60.672 14.482 17.040 81.000 324 70
av5_GRCELCO_10 63.707 13.482 23.334 82.722 310 67
av5_GRCELCO_5 36.855 15.286 -9.809 60.800 310 67
av5_INTCOM 1.991 1.317 0.150 7.156 321 70
av5_MTR 29.404 7.126 10.070 42.285 325 70
All outcome variables are 5 years period average
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Countries
politicalglobalization 44.605 16.895 13.804 84.551 323 68
landlocked 0.353 0.479 0.000 1.000 340 68
democracy 0.342 0.475 0.000 1.000 342 70
grostar 4.085 1.849 -0.655 9.468 337 68
quota_gdp 4.051 2.805 0.571 15.882 309 67
AIDGDPI 12.776 9.803 0.574 50.360 306 67
RESIN 3.419 2.368 0.033 13.336 302 66
INFLCPI 11.772 18.820 -6.243 165.707 276 67
GNIPC 6.236 0.784 4.868 8.470 307 69
resource_rents 7.241 9.580 0.000 56.217 313 67
SIZE 21.411 1.282 18.978 24.597 311 66
cpia 3.094 0.715 1.000 4.630 319 70
CURRACC -7.278 8.557 -42.894 11.990 267 67
av5_CURRACC -7.595 7.725 -35.374 9.220 285 68
TDPPG_GDP 88.051 68.558 17.311 492.711 295 67
av5_TDPPG_GDP 87.624 71.699 18.042 524.142 310 67
GDPGR 3.434 5.971 -29.100 21.713 255 66
av5_GDPGR 3.488 3.516 -13.560 12.074 318 66
IDA 0.797 0.403 0.000 1.000 350 70
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Countries
IDA 0.797 0.403 0.000 1.000 350 70
GNIPC 6.236 0.784 4.868 8.470 307 69
i_TLPPLP 3.262 5.318 0.100 27.100 332 69
PROJGR 19.830 53.978 -26.976 377.568 255 70
TDPPG_GDP 88.051 68.558 17.311 492.711 295 67
av5_i_TLPPLP 3.593 5.738 0.080 28.420 334 69
av5_PROJGR 24.977 56.738 -21.550 373.687 311 70
av5_TDPPG_GDP 87.624 71.699 18.042 524.142 310 67
Outcome variables
Selection model
All indipendent variables are calculated at the beginning of 5 years period, unless otherwise indicated
Heterogeneity analysis
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Table 4: Summary statistics by DLP 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
av5_COMMEXP_GDP 5.027 4.095 0.000 25.926 186 5.779 3.518 0.194 22.248 127 4.612 3.018 1.049 9.320 6
av5_COMMIDA_GDP 1.200 1.443 0.000 7.195 189 1.987 1.479 0.000 6.214 127 1.333 2.005 0.000 5.143 6
av5_COMMPR_GDP 0.505 1.117 0.000 7.847 189 0.347 0.873 0.000 6.652 127 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.064 6
av5_DPPG_GDP 4.125 2.849 0.040 13.066 189 4.532 2.477 0.263 11.668 128 3.712 1.808 2.347 6.284 6
av5_DPPGCON_GDP 2.979 2.248 0.040 10.924 189 3.829 2.131 0.192 10.087 128 3.421 2.000 1.952 6.261 6
av5_DPPGNOCON_GDP 1.092 1.516 0.000 8.050 189 0.702 1.082 0.000 5.176 128 0.291 0.317 0.000 0.789 6
av5_DPPGIDA_GDP 1.136 1.219 0.000 5.576 193 1.660 1.049 0.000 4.657 128 0.997 1.453 0.000 3.892 6
av5_DPPGBIL_GDP 1.095 1.108 0.000 5.087 191 1.022 1.085 0.000 6.644 128 1.308 1.966 0.000 5.223 6
av5_DPPGMUL_GDP 2.527 1.906 0.005 8.881 189 3.203 1.768 0.075 8.712 127 2.383 1.526 0.490 5.098 6
av5_DPRV_GDP 0.373 0.699 0.000 3.521 191 0.256 0.495 0.000 2.653 128 0.021 0.032 0.000 0.064 6
av5_DPPGIDA_DPPG 27.984 21.190 0.000 77.160 199 40.410 19.537 0.000 77.774 127 25.447 24.016 0.000 65.126 7
av5_DPPGBIL_DPPG 25.974 18.661 0.000 74.980 196 19.777 14.234 0.000 65.194 128 20.283 27.524 0.000 74.983 7
av5_DPPGMUL_DPPG 66.096 23.460 10.831 100.000 196 75.488 17.818 20.106 100.000 128 79.145 27.535 23.960 100.000 7
av5_DPPGCON_DPPG 79.212 22.245 23.100 100.000 196 88.290 14.635 33.679 100.000 127 90.993 11.092 74.811 100.000 7
av5_DPPGNOCON_DPPG 20.805 22.236 0.000 76.900 196 11.710 14.635 0.000 66.321 127 9.007 11.092 0.000 25.189 7
av5_GRCPERCO 7.362 1.947 2.335 10.566 191 8.099 1.409 3.930 10.892 127 7.542 2.594 3.660 9.667 6
av5_GRCELCO 57.369 15.751 17.040 81.000 191 65.652 10.550 18.268 79.718 127 60.401 16.432 41.093 77.000 6
av5_GRCELCO_10 60.390 14.708 23.334 81.467 185 68.616 9.552 23.361 82.722 125 . . . . 0
av5_GRCELCO_5 33.136 16.745 -9.809 60.800 185 42.358 10.724 7.633 60.622 125 . . . . 0
av5_INTCOM 2.289 1.449 0.200 6.174 189 1.551 0.953 0.150 7.156 126 1.854 1.048 0.333 3.077 6
av5_MTR 27.850 7.425 10.070 42.285 192 31.767 5.692 15.506 41.288 127 29.106 11.547 12.137 39.233 6
Outcome variables
DLP = 0 DLP = 1 DLP = .
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Table 5: Summary statistics by DLP 
 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
politicalglobalization 41.109 16.414 13.804 84.551 197 50.072 16.231 20.955 84.121 126 . . . . 0
landlocked 0.283 0.452 0.000 1.000 212 0.469 0.501 0.000 1.000 128 . . . . 0
democracy 0.328 0.471 0.000 1.000 204 0.391 0.490 0.000 1.000 128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.000
grostar 4.062 1.890 -0.655 9.468 209 4.122 1.787 -0.135 8.140 128 . . . . 0
quota_gdp 4.004 2.826 0.571 15.595 182 4.118 2.785 0.814 15.882 127 . . . . 0
AIDGDPI 11.803 10.503 0.574 50.360 180 14.167 8.555 1.821 48.809 126 . . . . 0
RESIN 3.268 2.583 0.033 13.336 176 3.630 2.021 0.087 9.668 126 . . . . 0
INFLCPI 13.827 23.546 -4.476 165.707 154 9.305 9.747 -6.243 45.485 117 6.200 3.137 2.125 10.365 5
GNIPC 6.357 0.782 4.942 8.470 174 6.031 0.717 4.868 8.345 127 7.055 1.054 5.075 7.959 6
resource_rents 8.462 11.185 0.000 56.217 186 5.453 6.177 0.000 35.092 127 . . . . 0
SIZE 21.292 1.409 18.978 24.597 184 21.621 1.015 19.277 24.298 125 19.122 0.003 19.121 19.124 2
cpia 2.985 0.773 1.000 4.630 186 3.292 0.531 1.453 4.380 126 2.443 1.058 1.000 3.500 7
av5_CURRACC -7.487 8.292 -34.738 9.220 161 -7.650 6.974 -35.374 6.673 122 -12.938 1.742 -14.170 -11.707 2
CURRACC -7.148 9.058 -42.894 11.990 146 -7.411 8.003 -37.621 8.713 119 -8.870 3.422 -11.289 -6.450 2
av5_TDPPG_GDP 93.200 80.627 18.820 460.740 181 81.349 56.811 18.042 524.142 124 41.394 6.764 31.300 49.967 5
TDPPG_GDP 91.222 79.647 18.293 492.711 168 85.627 50.512 17.311 296.212 122 40.675 4.980 32.124 44.625 5
av5_GDPGR 2.687 4.001 -13.560 11.864 189 4.778 2.144 -0.020 12.074 124 1.786 0.819 0.720 2.688 5
GDPGR 2.688 6.666 -29.100 17.926 143 4.555 4.787 -12.674 21.713 108 -0.150 3.097 -4.138 3.416 4
IDA 0.759 0.428 0.000 1.000 212 0.844 0.365 0.000 1.000 128 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 10.000
Variable Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
IDA 0.759 0.428 0.000 1.000 212 0.844 0.365 0.000 1.000 128 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 10.000
i_TLPPLP 3.569 5.758 0.100 27.100 203 2.589 4.281 0.100 20.320 119 5.044 6.644 0.220 20.570 10.000
PROJGR 21.812 53.996 -26.716 320.722 142 18.158 55.702 -26.976 377.568 106 4.937 11.320 -10.171 26.395 7
TDPPG_GDP 91.222 79.647 18.293 492.711 168 85.627 50.512 17.311 296.212 122 40.675 4.980 32.124 44.625 5
av5_i_TLPPLP 3.793 5.926 0.130 28.420 202 3.037 5.087 0.080 27.380 122 6.353 8.498 0.230 26.766 10.000
av5_PROJGR 21.262 51.070 -21.550 331.783 188 32.305 66.088 -13.262 373.687 115 6.944 11.745 -1.930 35.005 8
av5_TDPPG_GDP 93.200 80.627 18.820 460.740 181 81.349 56.811 18.042 524.142 124 41.394 6.764 31.300 49.967 5
DLP = 0 DLP = 1 DLP = .
Selection model
DLP = 0 DLP = 1 DLP = .
Heterogeneity analysis
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Table 6: Selection model 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
landlocked 0.512** 0.502** 0.508** 0.486** 0.469** 0.531** 0.497** 0.477** 0.758***
(0.228) (0.236) (0.239) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.247) (0.235) (0.199)
politicalglobalization -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
democracy 0.134 0.096 0.045 0.155 0.118 0.167 0.064 0.090 0.068
(0.218) (0.234) (0.237) (0.221) (0.219) (0.221) (0.233) (0.228) (0.221)
grostar 0.033 0.015 0.015 0.036 0.006 0.041 0.058 0.034 0.011
(0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.062) (0.058)
quota_gdp 0.037 0.059 0.059 0.038 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.042 0.021
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.049)
AIDGDPI 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.046***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
RESIN -0.113** -0.122** -0.101* -0.120** -0.091* -0.110** -0.072
(0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.047)
INFLCPI -0.018** -0.015 -0.011 -0.017** -0.016* -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.016**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
GNIPC -0.510*** -0.527*** -0.475** -0.564*** -0.526*** -0.514** -0.434** -0.575***
(0.197) (0.204) (0.204) (0.203) (0.201) (0.203) (0.215) (0.222)
resource_rents -0.037** -0.046** -0.044** -0.038** -0.035** -0.038** -0.040** -0.039** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
SIZE 0.149 0.244* 0.187 0.124 0.083 0.147 0.208 0.138 0.276**
(0.129) (0.134) (0.134) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.148) (0.131) (0.113)
cpia 0.538*** 0.405** 0.470** 0.554*** 0.495** 0.550*** 0.523** 0.519***
(0.194) (0.197) (0.200) (0.197) (0.199) (0.198) (0.245) (0.196)
av5_CURRACC -0.030
(0.020)
CURRACC -0.016
(0.015)
av5_TDPPG_GDP 0.000
(0.003)
av5_GDPGR 0.091**
(0.042)
TDPPG_GDP 0.001
(0.002)
GDPGR -0.024
(0.026)
IDA -0.226 0.056
(0.357) (0.283)
Constant -2.279 -4.175 -3.478 -1.399 -0.891 -2.225 -4.229 -1.421 -6.932***
-3,438 -3,6 -3,586 -3,555 -3,502 -3,563 -3,876 -3,702 -2,408
Observations 226 212 205 223 223 221 195 226 232
Pseudo R-squared 0,248 0,251 0,244 0,246 0,267 0,244 0,238 0,249 0,202
N 226 212 205 223 223 221 195 226 232
Dependent variable : Debt Limit Policy
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Selection model  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
landlocked 0.430* 0.483** 0.492** 0.403* 0.394* 0.443* 0.411 0.401* 0.702***
(0.231) (0.235) (0.239) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.251) (0.238) (0.201)
politicalglobalization -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
democracy 0.148 0.085 0.033 0.161 0.121 0.176 0.069 0.112 0.079
(0.222) (0.234) (0.237) (0.225) (0.223) (0.226) (0.239) (0.233) (0.224)
grostar 0.026 0.005 0.006 0.029 0.002 0.035 0.055 0.027 0.004
(0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.063) (0.058)
quota_gdp 0.045 0.061 0.061 0.047 0.050 0.050 0.057 0.049 0.027
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.057) (0.052) (0.049)
AIDGDPI 0.028* 0.022 0.021 0.026 0.023 0.029 0.031* 0.027* 0.051***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
RESIN -0.135** -0.143*** -0.125** -0.140*** -0.116** -0.132** -0.089*
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048)
INFLCPI -0.020** -0.015 -0.012 -0.019** -0.019* -0.020** -0.021** -0.020** -0.018**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
GNIPC -0.555*** -0.500** -0.452** -0.604*** -0.569*** -0.554*** -0.480** -0.608***
(0.202) (0.203) (0.204) (0.207) (0.205) (0.207) (0.221) (0.227)
resource_rents -0.037** -0.047*** -0.044** -0.036** -0.034** -0.037** -0.040** -0.038** -0.038**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
SIZE 0.175 0.265** 0.211 0.150 0.113 0.175 0.245 0.165 0.310***
(0.131) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.151) (0.133) (0.114)
cpia 0.560*** 0.361* 0.419** 0.572*** 0.524*** 0.566*** 0.570** 0.544***
(0.197) (0.196) (0.198) (0.200) (0.202) (0.201) (0.253) (0.199)
av5_CURRACC -0.025
(0.020)
CURRACC -0.014
(0.015)
av5_TDPPG_GDP -0.000
(0.003)
av5_GDPGR 0.082*
(0.042)
TDPPG_GDP 0.000
(0.002)
GDPGR -0.033
(0.027)
IDA -0.185 0.114
(0.361) (0.285)
Constant -2.529 -4.521 -3.874 -1.677 -1.233 -2.546 -4.794 -1.822 -7.654***
-3.486 -3.601 -3.588 -3.601 -3.545 -3.611 -3.955 -3.756 -2.437
Observations 226 212 205 223 223 221 195 226 232
Pseudo R-squared 0.271 0.247 0.240 0.268 0.288 0.266 0.265 0.272 0.220
N 226 212 205 223 223 221 195 226 232
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable : Debt Limit Policy and IDA-Non Concessional Borrowing Policy
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Table 8: Propensity score matching 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description
ATT BSSE z P> |z| ATT BSSE z P> |z| ATT BSSE z P> |z|
DPPG_GDP Disbursements PPG (as % of GDP)    0.7728728 0.3865643 2 0.046 0.5967261 0.3859173 1.55 0.122 0.7848913 0.389036 2.02 0.044
DPPGCON_GDP Disbursements PPG concessional external debt (as % of GDP)   0.7241765 0.3302592 2.19 0.028 0.5936713 0.3382845 1.75 0.079 0.7133179 0.329694 2.16 0.03
DPPGNOCON_GDP Disbursements PPG non concessional external debt (as % of GDP) 0.0488692 0.1606924 0.3 0.761 0.0032322 0.1614627 0.02 0.984 0.0717271 0.159068 0.45 0.652
DPPGIDA_GDP Disbursements PPG IDA (as % of GDP)    0.3228747 0.1889911 1.71 0.088 0.3114287 0.1810039 1.72 0.085 0.3115159 0.180228 1.73 0.084
DPPGBIL_GDP Disbursements PPG  bilateral (as % of GDP)    0.2123053 0.1275779 1.66 0.096 0.1695951 0.1190846 1.42 0.154 0.2255069 0.125289 1.8 0.072
DPPGMUL_GDP Disbursements PPG multilateral (as % of GDP)    0.6000248 0.3208987 1.87 0.062 0.4769695 0.3321076 1.44 0.151 0.5876777 0.304546 1.93 0.054
DPRV_GDP Disbursements PPG Private Creditors (as % of GDP)    -0.0392666 0.0931214 -0.42 0.673 -0.0574947 0.0879635 -0.65 0.513 -0.0280096 0.102481 -0.27 0.785
DPPGIDA_DPPG Disbursements PPG IDA (as % of TOT. DISB.)   3.518317 3.409974 1.03 0.302 4.491444 3.461008 1.3 0.194 3.086319 3.576274 0.86 0.388
DPPGBIL_DPPG Disbursements PPG bilateral(as % of TOT. DISB.)   -1.172665 2.781734 -0.42 0.673 -1.051942 2.575596 -0.41 0.683 -0.8694812 2.522231 -0.34 0.73
DPPGMUL_DPPG Disbursements PPG multilateral(as % of TOT. DISB.)    1.558769 3.091106 0.5 0.614 1.709736 2.969438 0.58 0.565 1.058155 3.170461 0.33 0.739
DPPGCON_DPPG Disbursements PPG concessional external debt (as % of TOT. DISB.)  0.8580167 2.346067 0.37 0.715 1.115517 2.263488 0.49 0.622 0.4616413 2.471818 0.19 0.852
DPPGNOCON_DPPG Disbursements PPG non concessional external debt (as % of TOT. DISB.PPG) -1.057798 2.17438 -0.49 0.627 -1.212577 2.293875 -0.53 0.597 -0.6718606 2.397672 -0.28 0.779
COMMEXPPG_GDP Commitments PPG (as % of GDP)     1.564012 0.5355725 2.92 0.003 1.389821 0.5496944 2.53 0.011 1.599904 0.531238 3.01 0.003
COMMIDA_GDP Commitments PPG IDA (as % of GDP)     0.5156829 0.256106 2.01 0.044 0.4701947 0.2622312 1.79 0.073 0.5115893 0.252089 2.03 0.042
COMMPR_GDP Commitments PPG Private Creditors (as % of GDP) 0.0807619 0.1223185 0.66 0.509 0.066098 0.1301578 0.51 0.612 0.0887437 0.963739 0.09 0.927
GRCPERCO Average grace period on new external debt commitments (years)  0.2472801 0.2585576 0.96 0.339 0.1467935 0.2422197 0.61 0.544 0.220743 0.268367 0.82 0.411
GRCELCO Average grant element on new external debt commitments (%)  0.767176 1.725642 0.44 0.657 0.921721 1.585463 0.58 0.561 0.4830635 1.660823 0.29 0.771
GRCELCO_10 Average grant element on new external debt commitments (%)  _10% discount rate  0.5803368 1.723532 0.34 0.736 1.084716 1.376388 0.79 0.431 0.2431072 1.614115 0.15 0.88
GRCELCO_5 Average grant element on new external debt commitments (%)  _5% discount rate 0.677487 2.01422 0.34 0.737 1.536049 1.904662 0.81 0.42 0.2425376 2.129002 0.11 0.909
INTCOM Average interest on new external debt commitments (%)   -0.1141979 0.2840498 -0.4 0.688 -0.176609 0.1381793 -1.28 0.201 -0.1205812 0.148988 -0.81 0.418
MTR Average maturity on new external debt commitments' (years) 0.7311327 0.9677089 0.76 0.45 0.9699715 0.9108252 1.06 0.287 0.5437776 0.932593 0.58 0.56
Notes:  An Epanechnikov kernel is used for  kernel regression matching. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are based on 500 replications of the data.
Radius matching Kernel matching
r=0.05 r=0.1
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Table 9: Heterogeneity analysis  
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ps 21.665***15.529***10.291** 18.986***20.948***23.283***19.199***22.483***
-4.704 -3.975 -4.191 -4.72 -4.771 -4.934 -4.775 -4.873
DLP 7.643*** 2.87 12.622** -8.121 3.077 2.116 2.827 2.332 2.716
-2.404 -1.843 -5.384 -12.879 -2.106 -2.041 -3.417 -2.089 -3.321
IDA 18.791***
-4.737
IDA_INT -11.026*
-5.525
GNIPC -8.387***
-1.844
GNIPC_INT 1.718
-2.112
av5_i_TLPPLP -0.488*
-0.265
av5_i_TLPPLP_INT -0.06
-0.338
av5_PROJGR 0.004
-0.023
av5_PROJGR_INT 0.044*
-0.026
av5_TDPPG_GDP 0.045
-0.037
av5_TDPPG_GDP_INT -0.003
-0.042
i_TLPPLP -0.748***
-0.228
i_TLPPLP_INT 0.211
-0.323
TDPPG_GDP 0.034
-0.036
TDPPG_GDP_INT -0.003
-0.037
Constant 35.849***27.040***14.587***85.514***30.590***26.960***22.987***30.941***24.147***
-2.283 -3.658 -4.42 -12.045 -3.876 -3.697 -4.474 -3.903 -4.662
Observations 190 190 190 190 180 176 187 180 186
R-squared 0.07 0.171 0.311 0.314 0.198 0.199 0.191 0.236 0.182
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable : Average grant element (5% discount rate)
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Table 10: Heterogeneity analysis 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ps -1.975*** -1.425*** -1.240** -1.510*** -1.779*** -2.052*** -1.555*** -2.101***
-0.519 -0.473 -0.511 -0.52 -0.487 -0.543 -0.525 -0.545
DLP -0.407* 0.028 -0.889 1.262 -0.019 -0.057 0.431 0.069 0.519
-0.221 -0.207 -0.553 -1.678 -0.223 -0.209 -0.363 -0.219 -0.384
IDA -1.695***
-0.449
IDA_INT 1.040*
-0.555
GNIPC 0.578**
-0.249
GNIPC_INT -0.195
-0.279
av5_i_TLPPLP 0.035
-0.027
av5_i_TLPPLP_INT 0.025
-0.041
av5_PROJGR -0.002
-0.001
av5_PROJGR_INT 0
-0.002
av5_TDPPG_GDP 0.004
-0.004
av5_TDPPG_GDP_INT -0.005
-0.004
i_TLPPLP 0.067**
-0.026
i_TLPPLP_INT -0.005
-0.044
TDPPG_GDP 0.004
-0.004
TDPPG_GDP_INT -0.006
-0.004
Constant 1.042*** 1.845*** 2.971*** -2.166 1.409*** 1.804*** 1.566*** 1.366*** 1.642***
-0.203 -0.368 -0.455 -1.586 -0.371 -0.368 -0.444 -0.378 -0.446
Observations 190 190 190 190 180 176 187 180 186
R-squared 0.025 0.134 0.277 0.211 0.147 0.15 0.142 0.196 0.144
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable : Average non concessional borrowing (as % of GDP)
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Chapter 4  
 
 
US monetary policy and gross capital flows in Emerging 
Markets 
Giovanna Bua 
Università Statale di Milano 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Using  a two-countries recursive vector autoregressions (VAR), we study the dynamic relations 
between the US monetary policy, market volatility, gross capital flows and credit. We focus on six 
Emerging Markets that have recently experienced an upsurge in capital inflows (South Africa, Peru, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil) and we look, first, at the impact of the Federal Fund Rate 
(FFR) on total gross capital inflows; second, we look at  whether shocks in U.S. monetary policy 
have a different impact on different type of flows; and finally we study the  impact on US long 
interest rate on the breakdown of gross capital flows and credit to the private sector. The results bring 
evidence that restrictive monetary policy increases market risk aversion and decreases gross capital 
flows and credit. Also the analysis on gross flows breakdown suggests that the results are mainly 
driven by portfolio investments, suggesting that debt and equity flows may act as transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy in EMs. Finally, we show that shocks in the long term interest rate 
– that we interpret as shocks to the term premium  - do not impact portfolio investments, suggesting 
the investment decisions are mainly affected by the policy rate imposed by the FED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: F32, F33, F34 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, risk-taking channel, gross capital flows, Emerging Markets 
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1. Introduction  
The ﬁnancial crisis and the boom that preceded it have renewed attention on the global factors that 
drive ﬁnancial conditions worldwide. Low interest rates maintained by central banks in Advanced 
Economies (AEs) have led to an animate discussion on cross-border monetary policy spillovers and 
the possible transmission channels. 
 
Borio and Zhu (2012) forged the term “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy to identify the impact 
of monetary policy on the willingness of market participants to take on risk exposures
1
. Bekaert et al. (2013) first provided empirical evidence of this relation and proved that lax monetary 
policy lowers risk aversion and uncertainty in the financial market, bearing potential risks for the real 
economy.   
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, most of the studies aimed at gauge the impact of U.S. monetary 
policy on financial conditions,  have focused on Advanced Economies (AEs) and the dynamic 
relation between policy rate chosen by the Federal Reserve, risk aversion of the financial market and 
some measure of the financial cycle  (Altunbas et al., 2012; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Bruno and 
Shin, 2014, 2014b; Rey, 2013).  They  have brought attention to the role of U.S. Federal Fund Rate 
(FFR) in determining bank’s decisions on how much exposure to take on and have concluded that 
monetary policy affects the economy through greater risk taking by the banking sector.  
 
The recent increase in international debt securities in Emerging Markets (EMs), however, has cast 
doubt on models that point only to the banking sector as transmission channel of global liquidity and 
have suggested that future spillovers may involve alternative mechanisms such market or debt 
securities (Bruno and Shin, 2014). In this regards, McCauley et al., (2014) and Turner, (2013) have 
noted that portfolio investments –as compared to banking flows- may not react to FFR, but they may 
react to long term interest rate irrespective of the policy rate imposed by the FED. If this was true, 
global flows could not be directly attribute to U.S. monetary policy (McCauley et al., 2014; Turner, 
2013;  Bruno and Shin, 2014).  
 
In this paper we inspect this transmission channel in EMs. In particular we try to understand whether 
different type of flows (foreign direct investment, portfolio investments, other inflows) react 
differently to short term interest rate shocks. We also try to identify whether portfolio investments 
react to long term rate shocks irrespective of the policy rate imposed by the FED. In line with the 
literature we include an additional measure of global liquidity in receiving country in order to identify 
potential co-movements in the financial cycle.  
 
We move from the  hypothesis that cross bank lending are closely tied to the policy rate chosen by the 
central bank, while portfolio investments movements may be not attributable to it. The first 
mechanism hinges on the model developed by Bruno and Shin (2014) in which global banks finance 
cross-border lending in the US dollar money market funds and therefore a fall in the US dollar risk-
free rate accelerates their flows to local banks and credit in recipient economies
2
. The second 
hypothesis,  which has been resumed by McCauley et al. (2014) and Turner (2013) in the post-crisis 
                                                     
 
1 Before them other studies already pointed to the potential link between loose monetary policy and  excessive risk-taking in 
financial markets (Rajan, 2006; Adrian and Shin, 2008). In particular, Rajan (2006) suggested that in time of lax monetary 
policy, investment managers have a tendency to engage in risky and illiquid securities in order to earn excess return in a low 
interest rate environment.  Also, he mainteined that their behavior may result from the  particular structure of  managerial 
compensation contracts. Managers are evaluated vis-à-vis their peers and by  pursuing strategies similar to others they can 
ensure that they do not under perform. Adrian and Shin (2008) suggested that monetary policy induces excess leverage. 
2 In the model developed by Bruno and Shin (2014b) local banks borrow in US dollars from global banks. In turn, global 
banks finance cross-border lending to regional banks by tapping US dollar money market funds in financial centers. In this 
setting, when the US dollar risk-free rate interest rate falls, the spread between the local lending rate and the U.S. dollar 
funding rate increases. The resulting lower dollar funding costs leads to an acceleration of bank capital flows and more 
permissive credit conditions in recipient economies.  
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period, stressed the importance of long-term dollar rate vis-à-vis short term rate as a driver of 
portfolio investments
3
.  
 
There is of course a voluminous literature on monetary policy transmission channels, on the 
determinants of capital inflows and on credit boom  in EMs,  however few main considerations 
motivate us to revisit this topic.  
 
First, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, most of the studies aimed at gauge the transmission 
channel of loose financial conditions across borders have been dedicated to the banking sector of 
Advanced Economies and to the co-movement of the financial cycle across border. They have 
highlighted the highly synchronized nature of financial cycle amongst different counties  and the tight 
co-movements of debt flows and credit grow that accompany it (Rey, 2013); also,  they have stressed 
the primary role of the banking leverage in explaining co-movements in financial conditions  
(Altunbas et al., 2012; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Bruno and Shin, 2014, 2014b; Rey, 2013). The 
attention dedicated to the banking system has been justified by the important role played by European 
banks in channeling US dollar liquidity worldwide before the crisis (Shin, 2013).   
 
Following the sharp increase of international debt securities in EMs in the first half of 2009,  few 
authors (IMF, 2011; Bruno and Shin, 2014; Shin, 2013; Turner, 2013;  McCauley, Upper and Villar, 
2013) have  shifted their attention from bank lending to portfolio investments, suggesting that 
indicators of vulnerability that are based only on international bank credit expansion may not fully 
capture financial system risks.    They have argued that the increase in bond portfolio may have been 
stimulated by long term interest rate in center economies irrespective of the policy rate imposed by 
the FED, suggesting that global flows would not be directly attributable to U.S. monetary policy 
(McCauley et al., 2014; Turner, 2013). 
 
In an economic environment where shocks in financial centers are rapidly transmitted worldwide
4
, we 
believe it is crucial for policymakers to identify future drivers of  global liquidity in order to inform 
the debate about the appropriate policy response to promote global financial stability.  
 
Second,  the recent crisis has demonstrated that increasing financial integration and sharp market 
driven movements may have reduced the control of the Central Bank on long term interest rate 
raising the need to understand its impact on financial vulnerabilities. According to theory, other 
things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are accompanied by a rise in longer-term 
yields to the extent that further rises in short-term rates are expected. This simple relationship has 
long been supported by data and a rise in the Federal Funds rate would have increased the yield on 
ten-year U.S. Treasury notes. However, the correlation between short and long term rates is by no 
means perfect; the central bank can influence but cannot precisely determine the long-term rate.  This 
has become more evident starting from June 2004, when long-term interest rates have trended lower 
even if Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate
5
 (Greenspan, 2005). Figure 
A1 in the Appendix 1 shows how this  relationship has drastically changed over time
6
.  
                                                     
 
3 The rationale behind this is that portfolio investors are more likely to  substitute out at the long end of the yield curve. 
Turner  (2013) provides evidence that movements in the real long-term interest rate in major AEs have been recently 
mirrored in similar movements in the EMs. He shows that flattering of the yield curve in the most EMs can encourage firms, 
government and households to lengthen the maturity of their local currency debt. Yet a reduction of long term rate in center 
economies may translate in an increase in EMs corporates and public bonds through a drop in the financing cost. 
4 This mechanism is amplified in countries with less flexible exchange rate where, as recently demonstrated by Magud et al. 
(2012) the impact of capital flows on credit grows  is higher.  
5 Alan Greenspan (2005) famously  characterized this period of rising short-term rates and unchanged long-term rates as a  
“conundrum.” 
6 Weise and Hardisty H. (2006) provide a detailed description of how changes in the federal funds rate have been associated 
with strong movements in the ten-year  bond rate till 2003. They report that  the 372 basis point increase in the federal funds 
rate from  1987:1-1989:1 was associated with a 211 basis point increase in the ten-year rate; the 300 point  increase from 
1993:4-1995:1 was associated with a 143 basis point increase in the ten-year rate,  and the 185 point increase from 1998:4-
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Third, the financial crisis and  the recent literature on global liquidity have raised attention on the 
potential risks of gross financial flows, challenging  the  early literature on capital flows determinants 
which  focused on net inflows. Their choice was  justified by the situation in the mid-1990s in  EMs 
in which net capital inflows roughly mirrored gross inflows so that capital outflows of domestic 
investors could often be ignored (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Most recently, however, gross capital 
flows and its volatility have increased, surpassing the size and in most case the volatility of net capital 
flows (Broner et al., 2013), making the distinction between gross inflows and gross outflows more 
relevant
7
.  Few recent studies argued that, despite both type of flows can lead to macroeconomic and 
financial vulnerabilities, gross flows may be more relevant for financial stability (Johnson, 2009; BIS, 
2011; IMF, 2011; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Obsfeld, 2012). In this regards, the literature on credit 
boom have recently found that while shifting the focus from net to gross flows, the latter become 
good predictor of credit boom gone bust and that its probability is higher when surges are driven by 
large increase in Other Inflows and, to a lesser extent, by portfolio investments. FDI are found to 
mitigate the probability of credit boom followed by banking crisis Calderon and Kubota (2012)
 8
 . 
   
Because of the reasons indicated above, we believe that it is important to revisit the link between U.S. 
short and long interest rates, capital flows and credit to the private sector, shifting the attention from 
net flows to gross flows. 
 
We build on the recent works by Bruno and Shin (2014) and Rey (2013) in which they use a Vector 
Autoregressive model (VARs) to  study the cross border spillovers of monetary policy on global 
financial conditions  (they focus on BIS reporting countries and, AEs and EMs respectively). They 
find that an expansionary shock to US monetary policy decreases the VIX Index
9
 - which measures  
risk aversion in the financial market -  and increases bank leverage (Bruno and Shin, 2014; Rey, 
2013) , gross credit flows and global domestic credit (Rey, 2013). Their interpretation of the result 
suggests that funding cost affects bank’s decisions on how much exposure to take on, therefore 
monetary policy affects the economy through greater risk taking by the banking sector. 
 
Like them, we study the dynamic links between the US monetary policy shocks, capital flows and 
credit creation.  In addition, we look at  whether shocks on long and short interest rates have different 
impacts on gross flows composition and credit to the private sector.  Differently from them , we focus 
on EMs
10
 and we look at a single country rather than on total flows in the economy.  
 
In order to examine this dynamic relationship we conduct a two-countries recursive vector 
autoregressions (VAR) for six Middle Income Countries (South Africa, Peru, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Turkey, Brazil) from 1990q1 to 2012q4.  The choice of the sample is guided by the concern about the 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
2000:2 was associated with a 145 point increase in the  ten-year rate. By contrast, from 2003:4 to 2005:4 the federal funds 
rate increased by 316 basis points,  while the ten-year rate rose a mere 20 basis points. 
7 Broner et al. (2013) provide evidence that starting in the 2000s, gross capital flows and their volatility have increased, while 
net capital flows have remained relatively stable. The BIS report on global liquidity (2011) shows that during booms, the 
cross-border components supporting credit expansion grow faster than the credit granted by banks located in the country, 
suggesting that international credit can amplify booms in recipient economies (BIS, 2011). In the same vein, Bruno and Shin 
(2014) show that international banking system was a very substantial proportion of total cross-border debt flows  and it 
played a major role in the expansion of domestic lending. Also, Rey (2013) documents the rapid increase in credit flows 
relative to FDI and portfolio equity flows. 
8 They focus on 22 industrial economies and 48 emerging market for the period 1975 to 2010. 
9 The VIX  index measures the “risk neutral” expected stock market variance for the US S&P 500 Index. It entails a measure 
of uncertainty and one of risk aversion. 
10 There is no single agreed-upon definition of emerging markets  and the list of countries classified as emerging economies 
differs according to the institutions . Emerging market economies are generally identified as those economies in the low- to 
middle-income category that are advancing rapidly and are integrating with global capital and product markets. In our 
sample we followed the definition provided by the IMF and we considered emerging markets those  “developing countries 
that have liberalized their financial systems to promote capital flows with nonresidents and are broadly accessible to foreign 
investors.” 
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recent upsurge in portfolio capital inflows in EMs and yet the need to identify policy response to 
promote global financial stability (IMF, 2011; Bruno and Shin, 2014; Shin, 2013; Turner, 2013;  
McCauley, Upper and Villar, 2013). Their selection was based on different considerations including: 
i) countries receiving big capital inflows ; ii) geographic diversity ; iii) relatively large size.; iv) 
similar exchange rate regime.  
 
The main findings of our paper are as follows. We find that a restrictive monetary policy raises risk 
aversion in the stock market  and lowers gross capital flows and credit to the private sector. Also we 
find that a shock in the VXO leads to a decline in gross flows and credit, with the effect on credit 
lasting longer than the one on gross flows.  The analysis of the breakdown of gross flows suggests 
that for most of the countries in our sample the negative impact of the FFR and the VXO to gross 
flows is driven by portfolio investments. Finally we find that shocks in the long term interest rate – 
that we interpret as shocks to the term premium  - do not have a significant impact on the VXO Index 
and gross flows dynamics. 
 
These findings confirm  our initial hypothesis that market and debt security can play a role as 
transmission channel  of global liquidity in EMs; with regards to our initial conjecture, however,  we 
do not find that portfolio investments react to long term interest rate, suggesting that portfolio 
investment decisions are mainly affected by the policy rate imposed by the FED. 
 
Also our investigation suggests to revisit the  interpretation of the risk-taking channel.   Our findings 
are in line with most of the literature of global liquidity and capital flows determinants.  Consistently  
with the studies of Bekaert et al. (2014),  Rey (2013) and Bruno and Shin (2014), we show that FFR 
impacts the VXO (Bekaert et al., 2014; Rey, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2014) , gross flows (Rey, 2013) 
and credit to the private sector. Also we find that VXO impacts gross flows and credit (Rey, 2013). 
However, given the structure of our VAR -in which VXO is ordered after FFR and hence its 
orthogonal to its shocks-  we cannot interpret the impact of the VXO to gross flows and credit as the 
transmission channel of the monetary policy,  for that shocks in the VXO are purged from those in the 
FFR.   
 
The rest of the study is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature. In section 3 we provides 
some stylized facts on gross capital inflows in EMs. In section 4, we describe the data and the 
methodology we use.  Section 5 discusses the robustness checks and alternative specifications. 
Section 6 offers our conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis many observers have  single out the role of balance of 
payments imbalances as a key factors contributing to the global turmoil. Part of the  discussion have 
focused on current account and saving-investment imbalances (global saving glut thesis)
11
, while 
another part has pointed to the role of the financial account and the potential risks of gross capital 
flows (excess elasticity thesis). Our paper moves from this second strand of the literature and adds to 
the studies on the international transmission channel of U.S. monetary policy.   
 
The key hypothesis of the excess elasticity theory  is that the roots of the financial crisis can be traced 
to a global credit and asset price boom on the back of aggressive risk. It conjectures that the main 
macroeconomic cause of the financial crisis is not the excess saving but the excess elasticity of the 
monetary and financial regimes in place (Taylor 2007, 2009; Borio and White 2003; Goodhart et al.  
2010; Borio, 2008; Borio and Disyatat, 2010; Christiano et al. 2010).
12  
 
Scholars and policy makers supporting this view, points to the importance of the Federal Reserve’s 
pattern of providing liquidity for the global financial cycle (BIS, 2011).  In this vein,  Borio and Zhu 
(2012) coined the term “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy to denote the impact of monetary 
policy on the willingness of market participants to take on risk exposures, thereby influencing 
financial conditions and ultimately influencing real economic decisions. Digging into this hypothesis,  
Bekaert  et al. (2013) finds that a loose monetary policy reduces risk aversion in the financial market.   
  
Most of the studies aimed at gauge the transmission channel of loose financial conditions across 
border, focus mainly on banking sector and advanced economies. Along this lines, Bruno and Shin 
(2014b) develop a theoretical model which identifies the bank leverage as the prime determinant of 
the international transmission channel through banking sector capital ﬂows  and highlights the role of 
currency appreciation in spurring higher leverage in the banking system. Empirically , they study the 
role of the  cross border lending in the banking sector as potential operator of the risk-taking channel 
(Bruno and Shin, 2014). They find that  expansionary shock to US monetary policy, lowers risk 
aversion and increases cross-border banking flows through higher leverage of international banks. 
Similarly,  Rey (2013)  finds that when Federal Funds rate goes down, measured risk falls  and 
European banks’ leverage, gross credit flows and global domestic credit rise.  
 
Many of the core elements of these analysis are by no means new. They stand at the cross-road 
between studies on monetary policy transmission channel, capital flows determinants and 
international spillovers of credit flows (credit boom)
13
. 
 
The literature on capital inflows developed in the early 1990s with the resurgence of international 
financing to developing countries and have traditionally focused on net capital flows and EMs. 
Seminal papers by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996)  and Fernandez Ariaz et al. (1995) 
distinguished the global “push” factors from the country-speciﬁc “pull” factors, and emphasized the 
                                                     
 
11 This view points at the surge of net capital inflows as a key determinants of credit boom in deficit countries. According to 
this theory an excess of saving over investment in several EMs have fueled the credit booms and risk-taking in the biggest 
advanced deficit countries by putting significant downward pressure on world interest rates and/or by simply financing the 
booms in deficit countries. Perhaps the best known of these explanations is Bernanke’s (2005) global saving glut thesis. In 
his thesis he argued that the excess of ex-ante global savings over investment centered in Asia and oil-exporting economies 
led to both downward pressure on global real interest rates and the widening of global imbalances. A variant of the savings 
glut story is that of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) in which the coexistence of global imbalances and low interest 
rates stems not from a savings glut so much as from a shortage of financial assets. According to this theory, following the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, these economies’ capacity to generate financial assets had diminished, with the 
consequence that Asian central banks stepped in to provide a financial intermediary role whereby domestic savings were 
exported. It is further argued that the US is uniquely placed to supply these financial assets given its large and mature capital 
markets and the reserve currency status of the dollar. 
12 For a similar conclusion, which plays down the role of global imbalances, see Truman (2009) and Shin (2009). 
13 For a recent survey of monetary policy transmission channel see Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010).  
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importance of external push factors in explaining capital ﬂows to EMs. Taylor and Sarno (1997) 
found that global and country-specific factors to be equally important.  Recently, the dramatic 
increase in gross capital ﬂows have posed a challenge to this traditional approach where ﬁnancial 
ﬂows are seen only as the counterpart to the current account14 and has paved the way for new studies 
on the determinants of gross capital inflows. 
 
In this regards, Byrne et al. (2011) have found that  U.S. long term rates is  a crucial determinant of 
gross capital flows in developing countries
15
. Along the same line, the IMF (2011) has identified that 
loose monetary policy in AEs, global risks and EMs’ growth are also key determinants of gross 
inflows. Forbes (2010), focusing exclusively on inflows in the US,  have found that  the  financial 
development of the investing countries is the most significant drivers of foreign investments
16
.  
Finally, Forbes and Warnock (2012) looking at a large sample of countries that includes both 
advanced and emerging economies, have stressed the prominent association of global risks  and 
capital flows. This correlation disappears when they look at net flows. Interestingly, their results do 
not support the widespread presumption that changes in global liquidity or interest rates in a major 
economy, such as the United States, drive surges in capital flows.  
 
The volume of studies on the spillovers effect of international capital flows is also huge. They have 
traditionally focused on macroeconomic vulnerabilities stemming from net capital inflows
17
. 
Recently, however,  most studies have shifted their attention to the impact of gross flows (Johnson, 
2009; BIS, 2011; IMF, 2011; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Obsfeld, 2012; Turner, 2013) and have 
underlined that rising gross inflows can exacerbate credit expansions, create distortion in asset prices 
– i.e. bubbles in stock and housing prices, volatility of long-term rate– and increase vulnerabilities 
associated to currency and maturity mismatches.  
 
In this paper we are particularly interested in the impact of capital flows on credit expansion. As it is 
well known credit booms can be driven by many factors, however  in EMs they seem to be associated 
mostly with large capital inflows. Evidences that net inflows of private capital may help generate 
credit booms are obtained by Mendoza and Terrones (2008), the IMF (2011b) and Ostry et al.,(2011)
 
18
. More recently Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli (2011) and Calderon and Kubota (2012) have 
found that also gross capital inflows and credit growth are positively and significantly correlated.  
They have also showed that this positive effect is larger if the shocks can be attributed to debt inflows 
vis-à-vis equity flows.   
  
                                                     
 
14 The BIS report on global liquidity (2011), Borio and Disyatat (2011), and Forbes and Wornock (2012) provide a detail 
reasoning for this shift. More in general Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and Obstfeld  (2010) discuss the importance of focusing on 
the whole balance sheet. 
15 Defined as Equity issuance, Bond issuance and Syndicated Banks.  
16 Counties with less developed financial market invest a larger share of their portfolio in the US.  
17 See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996)  and Fernandez Ariaz et al. (1995) for early studies on current account 
imbalances.  
18 See Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012) for a recent analysis of the impact of exchange rate flexibility on credit 
markets during period of large capital inflows.  
  
109 
 
3. Stylized facts on capital inflows in middle income countries 
Our study is driven by the concern about the recent upsurge in portfolio capital inflows in EMs. This 
section briefly summarizes episodes of capital inflows boom  in Middle Income Countries from the 
Nineties and provides some stylized facts on gross capital flows composition. We highlight the 
significant change  before and after the financial crisis.  
  
Figure 1 (left panel) shows the evolution of Gross and Net Capital Inflows in a sample of 40 Middle 
Income Countries (MIC)
19
 in 1990q1-2012q4 and it identifies (right panel) the number of countries 
that experience a surge in capital inflows in each period
20
.  
 
The figure summarily  captures  the history of capital inflows over the past 15 years in Emerging 
Markets and it highlights three main upsurge episodes.  The Nineties were characterized by  a wave 
of financial liberalization, low interest rate  and positive growth performance, which led to a strong 
increase in external indebtedness in developing countries. This incredible upsurge in capital inflows 
meant the end of the external credit rationing for Latin America
21
, however it led to a long sequence 
of regional crises. It started with the tequila crisis in 1993 and it was then followed by South-East 
Asia in 1997-1998 , Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Pakistan, Ukraine, Argentina 2002, Uruguay, Turkey, 
and Ecuador.   
 
Between 2004 and 2008 the international financial market increased appetite for risk and hit 
developing countries with a new wave of capital inflows. The policy reaction in receiving countries 
was to intervene in the FX market
22
  in order  to either reduce nominal exchange rate volatility 
(Aizenman and Lee, 2007) or to preserve an undervalued real exchange rate (Dooley et al., 2009). 
Whatever the reasons, developing countries proved resilient to the global crisis  and after a sharp 
slowdown in the late 2008, capital inflows rebounded again in the first half of 2009 reaching- in net 
term-  new high, in only two quarters. Gross capital flows have  yet to hit they pre-crisis volume, but 
its amount has been on the raised reaching  at the end of 2012 US$ 720 billion.  
 
Figure 1 also brings evidence of the growing importance of gross inflows vis-à-vis net inflows.  As 
suggested by Forbes and Warnock (2012) until the mid-1990s net capital inflows roughly mirrored 
gross inflows, however starting from mid-2000s gross capital flows have increased, surpassing the 
size and in most case the volatility of net capital flows (Broner et al., 2013), making the distinction 
between gross inflows and gross outflows more relevant. 
  
                                                     
 
19 The data availability is quite heterogeneous across countries and over time. Hence, in order to conduct meaningful 
descriptive analysis and comparisons across periods, we keep only countries with quarterly data on capital flows  for at least 
15 years. We exclude China given  its large dimension. In Appendix 1 we show the evolution of Gross and Net flows pulling 
all information available (all MICs, excluding China. Figure A2) and the relative size of our sample respect to it (Figure A3). 
20 Following the IMF (2011), a surge is defined as an event in which inflows  exceed its long run trend  by one standard 
deviation  and it is big in magnitude (larger of 1.5 percent of annual GDP). The country specific trend is calculated by 
applying an H-P filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly gross inflows data.  
21 Mexico, Argentina Brazil and Chile became the main recipients of foreign capital, but Colombia, Peru and other countries 
also received significant volumes. 
22 The process of reserve accumulation, however, was not homogenous across countries. Between 2004 and 2008, Brazil 
quadrupled its stock of FX reserves, Peru more than tripled it. 
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The composition of inflows also changed over time. During the second half of the Nineties capital 
inflows were mainly in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment (PI), 
while other inflows (OI) accounted only for a small portion of the total. During the pre-crisis period 
the situation almost reversed, with OI more than doubled from about 16 percent in the previous wave 
to around 33 percent.   Probably, the most striking change in the aftermath of the financial crisis is the 
sharp increase in PI.  Figure 2 highlights the composition of gross capital inflows before and after the 
crisis
23
  in all EMs and some selected geographic area (which change seems noteworthy). 
  
                                                     
 
23 The two graphs capture periods in which a large number of countries experience a surge in capital inflows. The pre-crisis 
refers to the time span 2005q4-2008q4 and the after-crisis to 2009q3-2012q4.  
Figure 1  
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Figure 2: Gross Capital Inflows, by type of flows  
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4. Method and data 
(a) Data 
 
To accomplish our exercise, we gathered quarterly
24
 data for 6 countries (South Africa, Peru, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil) from 1990q1 to 2012q4.  Their selection was based on 
different considerations including: i) countries receiving big capital inflows ; ii) geographic diversity ; 
iii) relatively large size.; iv) similar exchange rate regime.  
 
As for the first point,  we selected only countries that have had capital upsurges in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. According to the definition of capital upsurge given in the previous paragraph, 
South Africa experienced  a surge in capital inflows for 5 quarters after the financial crisis, Turkey 
and Indonesia for 3 and Brazil, Peru and the Philippines for 2. In terms of geographic location, 1 
country is in Sub-Sahara Africa, 2 in East Asia and Pacific, 1 in Europe and Central Asia, 2 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Countries are those with largest real GDP amongst MICs. All countries 
have had a floating exchange rate during the period considered
25
.  
 
Gross flows  directed to these countries accounted for almost 40 percent of total inflows directed to 
MICs after the financial crisis. The volume of gross flows in absolute term overtook pre-crisis levels 
in most of the countries (Peru, Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil) and it reached new high as % of 
GDP in Indonesia. Figure 3 shows the evolution of gross and net capital inflows in millions of US$. 
The composition of gross flows has been skewed toward portfolio investments. As highlighted by the 
IMF (2011) in Indonesia, Peru and Turkey the trend has been  driven mainly by foreign investors’ 
holdings of government securities;  while flows to the corporate sector may have been limited in Peru 
and Indonesia due to the underdeveloped corporate bond market. South Africa and Brazil also 
experienced a sizable flows in local currency bond market, even if in Brazil the most virtuous trend is 
to be attributed to equity investments. Brazil and Peru also received a sizable flows of FDI which may 
have been attracted by the stronger outlook for commodity prices. 
  
                                                     
 
24 Following Rothenberg and Warnock (2011), Forbes and Warnock (2012), and Calderon and Kubota (2012), we argue that 
they dynamics of surges and stops in capital flows as well as expansions and contractions of credit along the business cycle 
are better captured with quarterly data.  
25  They range from 3 to 4 in the coarse classifications developed by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
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Figure 3: Gross and Net Capital Inflows (in millions of US$) 
 
Sample: 6 countries (South Africa, Peru, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil) 
 
Time series were obtained from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics  and 
Balance of Payment Statistics, Haver Analytics databases, World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Federal Reserve Board and Chicago Board Option  Exchange and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and Reinhart and Rogoff coarse classification (2004). These series are  
domestic credit to the private sector, gross capital inflows, consumer price index, real GDP growth , 
short and long term U.S. interest rate, VXO Index, exchange rate regime, US GDP and US GDP 
deflator.   
 
Our measure of credit is defined as domestic bank and other financial institutions credit to the 
domestic private sector (LNCRQR). We collect data on gross capital inflows (ICAPFL) and its 
breakdown  -foreign direct investment (IFDI), portfolio investments (IPF)  and other investment 
liability flows (IOTHF)- from the IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics26. Economic performance in 
an economy is measured by the growth rate of real GDP. Quarterly data of real GDP in local currency 
(GDPGRSM) is obtained from Haver Analytic. For the international interest rates, we use 
respectively the Effective Federal Fund Rates (FFR) -at the end of the period- taken from the Federal 
Reserve Board  and the 10 years U.S. Government Bond Interest rate taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (USBOND). The exchange rate regime is taken from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) de-facto exchange rate regime classification updated by Ilzetzky, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). This index goes from 1 to 6, and higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate 
arrangement. Global risk aversion is proxied by the VXO index —a measure of implied volatility 
computed using 30-day S&P 100 index at-the-money options. Higher values of the VXO indicate 
rising global risk aversion. Finally US GDP (USGDPGR) and US GDP (USGDPDEFGR) deflator 
are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 
  
                                                     
 
26 Gross capital inflows is equal to non-residents’ purchase minus sales of domestic assets.   
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(b) Method 
 
Our empirical investigation consists of two-countries recursive vector autoregressions (VAR) 
examining the dynamic relationship between US long and short interest rate, risk aversion and 
uncertainty, gross flows  and credit to the private sector in six selected MICs.  
 
We build on the recent works of Bruno and Shin (2014) and Rey (2013) in which they  study the 
cross border spillovers of monetary policy on global financial conditions. Bruno and Shin (2014) 
frame the argument by asking how monetary policy influences cross border banking flows. They 
perform a VAR analysis in which they include Fed Funds target rate, U.S. banking leverage, BIS 
banking flows
27
, VIX and US dollar exchange rate. They find that a monetary policy shock rises the 
VIX and lowers banking leverage and cross banking flows. Their interpretation suggests that funding 
cost affects decisions on how much exposure to take on, therefore monetary policy affects the 
economy through greater risk taking by the banking sector. Rey (2013) conducts a similar analysis for 
a sample of AEs and EMs and looks at the impact of monetary policy shocks on the VIX, credit 
creation, leverage and credit flows. She performs a recursive VAR analysis in which she includes: US 
GDP, US GDP deflator, global credit, global credit inflows, European banks leverage, Fed Funds 
target rate and the VIX. She finds that when Federal Funds rate goes down, the VIX falls (mirroring a 
lower measured risk), and European banks’ leverage, gross credit flows and global domestic credit 
rise.  
 
Like them, we study the dynamic links between the US monetary policy shocks, risk aversion and 
uncertainty , capital flows and credit creation.  In addition, we split the total gross flows into its main 
components (FDI, PI , OI) and we look at  the impact of short U.S. interest rate on each of them. Also 
we augment our VAR with US long term interest rate, in order to detect whether shocks on long and 
short interest rates have different impacts on gross flows composition and credit. Differently from the 
literature on global liquidity, we focus on financial variables in single countries. 
 
To avoid that omitted variables may overestimate the effect of US interest rate on capital inflows and 
of capital inflows on the  credit to the private sector,  we enrich the VAR model proposed by Rey 
(2013) with country specific characteristics. Following recent studies on gross capital inflows and 
credit growth
28
, we augment the list of VAR variables by adding real GDP growth and by selecting 
countries that have had a similar exchange rate regime during the entire period considered.  To avoid 
that past values of country specific variables impact the FFR, we also impose some restrictions on the 
parameter and we set the coefficients of GDPGRSM, LNCRQR and ICAPFL (or its breakdown) 
equal to zero in the FFR equation
29
.  
                                                     
 
27 As measured by the growth (log difference) in cross-border loans of BIS reporting banks on banking sector counterparties 
28 Most of the literature on capital inflows has traditionally focused on net flows and has emphasized the  importance of both 
push and pull factors in determining capital flows. Most recently, some authors have  shifted their attention to gross flows 
and have stressed the importance of push factors vis-à-vis pull factors while moving the focus from net to gross flows 
(Forbes and Warnock, 2012). In particular a recent study by the IMF (2011) have identified as main determinants of gross 
capital inflows in LICs and MICs the VIX and the U.S. interest rate – as push factors- and real GDP growth - as country 
specific pull factor.  By the same token the literature on the determinants of credit boom has been mainly focused on net 
flows. Mangud et al. (2012) have stressed the importance of net capital inflows and the exchange rate regime in determining 
the level of credit to GDP (bank credit grows more rapidly in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes). More 
recently, Calderon and Kubota (2012) looking at the relation between gross flows and credit boom have remarked their 
relevance and have stressed the importance of accounting for other likely determinants of credit boom to avoid 
overestimating the relation. Such variables are real GDP growth  and overvalued assets prices and build-up of leverage. Their 
results reinforce our choice to include real GDP growth in our model. Also, to account for possible differences stemming 
from exchange rate regime,  we select countries that have had a floating exchange rate during the entire period considered.  
29 In the presence of parameter restrictions on a VAR, OLS is no longer efficient. Therefore we use a SUR - Seemly 
Unrelated Regression – to estimate the model.  
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In order to identify monetary policy shocks we impose a triangular Cholesky decomposition
30
. 
Following Rey (2013) we include US GDP and the GDP deflator as set of information to which the 
monetary policy reacts and,  the Federal Fund rate as the main instrument of US monetary policy. 
Differently from her, we base our VAR on the assumption that each country is a small open 
economy, therefore we impose exogeneity of US GDP and GDP deflator, meaning that each 
correlation between US and the country analyzed is assumed to be unidirectional, going from the US 
to the small country.  
 
For each country we run three VARs.  First, we look at the impact of FFR on total gross capital 
inflows, in order to make sure our results are in line with the literature. Second,  we slit gross flows 
into their main components (FDI, PI and OI) and we look at  whether shocks in U.S. monetary policy 
have a different impact on different type of flows. Then we augment the VAR with US long term 
interest rate and we look at its impact first on gross flows composition and credit.  
  
                                                     
 
30 This restrictions imply  that  the first variable cannot respond to contemporaneous shocks (within the quarter) of any other 
variables, while the second variable is affected by the contemporaneous shock to the first one, but not any others, etc. Thus, 
slower moving variables are better candidates to be ordered before fast moving variables.  
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(Var 1) 
 
In the first VAR we include 5 endogenous variables and 2 exogenous variables (in this order): Fed 
Funds target rate (FFR), VXO (VXO), real GDP growth (GDPGRSM) credit to the private sector 
(LNCRQR) , gross capital inflows (ICAPFL).  LNCRQR and VXO are in log.  ICAPFL is in millions 
of US$. US GDP growth (USGDPGR) and US GDP deflator growth (USGDPDEFGR) are included 
as exogenous variables. 
 
The order we impose implies that  Fed Funds target rate  does not react to contemporaneous shocks of 
any other variables
31
, while Gross flows can respond within the same quarter to any variables (and it 
is therefore ordered last). VXO is order second and it can react only to contemporaneous shocks of 
FFR.  Real GDP growth is ordered after VXO. Credit is our “penultimate” variable, implying that if 
there were a shock in gross flows, credit would take a quarter to react.  As previously discussed,  we 
also set the coefficients of GDPGRSM, LNCRQR and ICAPFL equal to zero in the FFR equation.  
 
Some of the variables display a possibility of non-stationary behavior. Nevertheless, we estimate the 
system with 3 lags and all variables in level.  In the choice of the appropriate number of lags we opted 
for a parsimonious VAR specification, but at the same time characterized by estimated residuals with 
good white-noise properties
32
.  
 
Appendix 2 Figures 1 to 6 present the impulse response functions for the five variables recursive 
VAR with 95 percent confidence bands for each country. Intervals are bootstrapped and based on 500 
replications.  Figures are organized so that the columns of the matrix indicate the variable whose 
shock we are following and the rows of the matrix indicate the variable whose response we are 
tracking. Each cell of the tables graphs the impulse responses over 20 quarters  to a one-standard-
deviation variable shock. Figure 4, in the main text,  groups the key panels for the narrative. For each 
country we present in the first column the response of gross capital flows and credit to the private 
sector to a shock in the FFR. In the third and fourth column we show how the two variables react to a 
shock in the VXO.  At the top of the graph we present the response of the VXO to a shock in the FFR 
only for Brazil. For expositional proposes we do not present the same figure for the entire sample for 
its variation differs only modestly from one country to another (see Appendix 2 for detailed results).  
 
In the first place, we are interested in the impact of Federal Fund rate  on  gross capital inflows 
(ICAPFL) and on credit to the private sector (LNCRQR). We expect that when the Federal Fund rate 
goes up, gross flows and domestic credit fall.  As shown in Figure 4, we find that a restrictive 
monetary policy shock has a negative impact on the two variables  from about the 12
th
  quarter 
(results are not significant for South Africa and Turkey, and partially for Peru; although they  turn 
significant using 68% confidence interval)
33
.  This is in line with most of the literature on global 
liquidity and capital flows determinants and it confirms the negative relation identified for by Rey 
(2013),  also for Emerging Markets.  
 
Following the recent literature on risk-taking channel we then look at the impact of FFR on the VXO 
and at the impact of the VXO on gross flows and credit. We expect that a shocks in the Federal Fund 
rises the VXO (spreads are large and measured risk is high) and a shocks in the VXO lowers gross 
flows and credit to the private sector. Figure 4 confirms our expectations and shows that a tighter 
monetary policy raises the VXO Index from around the 5
th
 quarter. Also we find that  an increase in 
the VXO leads to a decline in gross flows lasting for about 3 quarters and to a decline of credit lasting 
                                                     
 
31 The Fed Funds target rate reflects the periodic decision making process at the Federal Reserve and the slowly evolving 
implementation of monetary policy. 
32 LM test shows that the multivariate version of Lagrange multiplier test suggests that for most of the countries just a lag 
order of one is sufficient to get uncorrelated VAR residuals. Nevertheless, we opted for a specification with three lags, which 
guarantees residuals with better white-noise properties.  
33 Note that such interval bounds are common in VAR analysis literature. See for example Bekaert et al. (2013) and 
Christiano et al. (1996b).Results are available upon request.  
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for about 13 quarters (except for South Africa and Turkey were the impact lasts for a shorter period).  
The first set of results  corroborates the findings in Bekaert et al. (2013), Rey (2013) and Bruno and 
Shin (2014) who show that FFR shock has a positive effect on the VIX Index starting between  the 4
th
 
and 9
th
  period and has a negative effect on gross flows after 12 quarters (Rey, 2013). The second set 
of results are consistent with Rey (2013) and Bruno and Shin (2014) who find a negative impact of 
the VIX on  cross-border lending (Rey, 2013; and Bruno and Shin, 2014) and global domestic credit 
(Rey, 2013). Their interpretation of the results suggest that monetary policy affects economic 
variables through greater risk taking by the banking sector, as denoted by the increase in the VIX and 
a decrease in the bank leverage. 
 
In line with their analysis, our results suggest that FFR impacts the VXO, gross flows and credit to 
the private sector. We also find that VXO impacts gross flows and credit. Given the structure of our 
VAR (in which VXO is ordered after FFR, hence it is orthogonal to its shocks), however, we caution 
against interpreting these results as risk-taking channel mechanism, because that   the impact of 
shocks in VXO cannot be attribute to U.S. monetary policy.  
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Figure 4: Main results 
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Var (2) 
 
We now turn to our second VAR in which we study how short U.S. interest rate impacts different 
type of capital inflows and interacts with credit in the economy. 
 
We split gross flows  down into its components and  we include 7 endogenous variables and 2 
exogenous variables (in this order): Fed Funds target rate (FFR), VXO (VXO), real GDP growth 
(GDPGRSM) credit to the private sector (LNCRQR) , foreign direct investment (IFDI), other inflows 
(IOTHF) and portfolio investments (IPF).  LNCRQR and VXO are in log.  IFDI, IOTHF and IPF are 
in millions of US$. US GDP growth (USGDPGR) and US GDP deflator growth (USGDPDEFGR) 
are included as exogenous variables.  
 
As before,  the order we impose implies that  Fed Funds target rate  does not react to 
contemporaneous shocks of any other variables, while Gross flows’ breakdown can respond within 
the same quarter to any variables (and it is therefore ordered last). The other variables are ordered as 
before. Since we are first and foremost interested in the impact of the shocks on the three type of 
flows but we are not interested in interrelation amongst them, we do not assume any specific direction 
of their relations
34
. However in order to make sure the ordering does not influence our results we test 
different identification restrictions and the loglikelihood remains unchanged. As before, we also set 
the coefficients of GDPGRSM, LNCRQR and IFDI, IOTHF and IPF equal to zero in the FFR 
equation.  
 
Figure 5 groups the key panels for the narrative. In the first row, for each country, we present the 
impact of a shock in the FFR to foreign direct investment, other inflows, portfolio investments and 
Credit. In the second row we show the responses to a shock in the VXO. As before, we present at the 
top of the graph the response of the VXO to a shock in the FFR for Brazil. Figure 7 to 12 in the 
Appendix 2 present detailed results.  
 
We start by looking at the impact of  Federal Fund rate on  gross capital inflows breakdown  (IFDI, 
IOTHF, IPF) and credit to the private sector (LNCRQR).  We find that for most of the countries a 
shock in the FFR reduces portfolio investments after about 12 quarter, but it does not impact other 
inflows and foreign direct investment (with exception of Indonesia and Peru for which we find that 
FFR has a negative impact on foreign direct investments after 12 quarter)
35
.  Also we find that a 
shock in FFR reduces credit after about 12 quarter. This results suggest that for most of the countries 
in our sample the negative impact of the FFR to gross flows is driven by portfolio investments. 
Results on  foreign direct investments are in line with our expectations, however we conjecture that 
the lack of significance of the FFR in affecting other inflows, may be due to the variety of flows that 
are grouped  under this account
36
. Figure A6 in Appendix 1 shows that the official sector component, 
e.g. IMF lending, – that may not react to global factors -  is a relevant component of other inflows for 
a few countries.   
 
Then we turn to the impact of FFR to the VXO and of the VXO to gross flows and credit. As 
expected, results on the VXO remain unchanged and so do those on the credit to the private sector. A 
                                                     
 
34 The literature is not conclusive on the direction of the relations amongst capital flows.  With regards to the relation 
amongst FDI and portfolio investments, for example, some authors maintain that portfolio investments enters the economy 
before FDI and, if they maintain certain level of consistency, they can contribute to the stabilization of the host economy and 
eventually to attract FDI (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009)  . On the other hands, some authors suggest that  FDI enter the 
economy at first and contributes to the stability  of the economic environment, enhancing more suitable economic 
environment for the entry of FPI (Erzurumlu et al., 2014). 
35 Results are weaker than in the previous VAR, however they turn significant using 68% confidence interval. 
36 Other inflows includes: i)other equity; ii) currency and deposit; iii) loans (including use of IMF credit and loans from the 
IMF); non -life insurance technical reserves, life insurance and annuities entitlements, and provisions for calls under 
standardized guarantees; iv)trade credit and advances; v) other account receivable/payable; and vi) SDR allocation (SDR 
holding are included in reserve assets). 
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shock in the FFR raises the VXO and a shock in the VXO reduces credit (results are not significant 
only for Turkey and South Africa).  As for the impact of the VXO to different type of capital flows, 
we find that for most of the countries a shock in the VXO reduces portfolio investments in the first 
quarter, but it does not impact other inflows and foreign direct investments (with exception of Brazil 
and Philippines for which we find a negative impact of VXO  to other inflows).  
 
These results seem to suggest that shocks in monetary policy and in the VXO affect gross flows 
mainly through portfolio investments. Even though the weak response of  foreign direct investments 
was expected, we conjecture that the lack of significance of the FFR and the VXO in affecting other 
inflows, may be due to the variety of flows that are grouped  under this account.  
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Figure 5: Main results. Gross flows decomposition 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
    
    
 
Brazil 
    
    
 
Peru 
    
    
 
 
 
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
160
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-1,000
-750
-500
-250
0
250
500
750
1,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
  
123 
 
Philippines 
    
    
 
South Africa 
    
    
 
Turkey 
    
    
  
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.012
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
  
124 
 
(Var 3) 
 
In our third VAR we try to detect whether shocks of long and short interest rates have different 
impacts on gross flows composition and credit to the private sector.  To this end, we augment our 
VAR with U.S. long term rate. 
 
We include 8 endogenous variables and 2 exogenous variables (in this order): Fed Funds target rate 
(FFR), US long term rate (USBOND), VXO (VXO), real GDP growth (GDPGRSM) credit to the 
private sector (LNCRQR) , foreign direct investment (IFDI), other inflows (IOTHF) and portfolio 
investments (IPF). LNCRQR and VXO are in log. IFDI, IOTHF and IPF are in millions of US$.  US 
GDP growth (USGDPGR) and US GDP deflator growth (USGDPDEFGR) are included as 
exogenous variables.  
 
The structure of the VAR implies that shocks in U.S. long interest rate are  changes in the U.S. 
Treasury Bond yield orthogonal to monetary policy shocks. We interpret such changes as shocks in 
the term premium. The yield of nominal Treasury security is the sum of the compounded expected 
future short term rate over the maturity of the bond plus a term premium to compensate investors for 
the uncertainty return on holding the bond. To interpret the meaning of long term shocks in our VAR 
we refer to the study by Favero and Giavazzi (2008) in which they look at the determinants of long 
term rate in the Euro Area.  They suggest that long term rate reacts both to financial and 
macroeconomic shocks. They classify financial shocks as: i) deviation from the systematic response 
of the Central Bank from macro variables (monetary shocks)  and ii) shocks  in term premia (non-
monetary shocks). Macroeconomic shocks are identified with inflation and output gap. Given this 
taxonomy,   shocks in the long term rate in our VAR are shocks in the term premium.  
 
Figure 6 groups the key panels for the narrative. In the first row, for each country, we present the 
impact of a shock in the USBOND to foreign direct investment, other inflows, portfolio investments 
and credit to the private sector. In the second row we show the responses to a shock in the VXO. As 
before at the top of the graph we show the impact of the VXO to a shock in the FFR. Figure 13 to 18 
in the Appendix 2 present detailed results.  
 
As before we first check the impact of shocks in monetary policy to gross flows and credit to the 
private sector and we find that results  are similar to those in our second VAR (although mostly not 
significant). This confirms that including the long term interest rate in a VAR model designed to 
estimate the transmission mechanism, diminishes the impact of monetary shocks on the variables of 
interest (Bagliano and Favero, 1998). Results are reported in Appendix 2.  
 
Then, we turn to the analysis of long term rate shock,. As expected, foreign direct investments do not 
react to it. Other inflows decrease in South Africa and Brazil, while portfolio investments is not 
significant in any country but Brazil, where a shock in the long rate causes an increase in portfolio 
investments in the first quarter.  Results are not cross cut, however they might suggest that in most of 
the cases portfolio investments do not react to unexpected variations in the term premium. If they do 
– as in the case of Brazil – the impact is positive.  
 
Finally, once again, we inspect the relation between U.S. interest rates, market volatility, gross flows 
and credit. We first check the response of the VXO to a shock in the FFR and in the long-term rate 
and we find that the VXO reacts to the FFR, but it does not respond to the long term interest rate. 
This results provide further strength to the hypothesis that monetary policy shocks impact market risk 
perception, and also that the inclusion of long term rate in a model designed to inspect the 
transmission mechanism weakens the results (Figure 6).  
 
Secondly,  we turn to the impact of VXO to different type of capital flows and credit. It is worth 
noting that the interpretation of the shocks now is slightly different. In fact, given the order of our 
variables (FFR, USBOND, VXO) we have purged shocks of the VXO from monetary policy shocks 
and long term interest rate shocks. Results remain almost unchanged, even if their magnitude 
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increases for most of the countries . We still find that the VXO has negative impact on portfolio 
investments in all countries and it has a negative impact on other inflows in Brazil, Philippines and 
Turkey (which was not significant in the previous model) . Finally we find that a shock in the VXO 
lowers credit to the private sector for at least 10 quarters (with exception of South Africa and Turkey 
in which the impact dies out around the 6
th
  and 2
nd
  quarter respectively). 
 
All in all, these results seem to suggest that gross capital flows - and in particular portfolio 
investments –respond to shocks in the FFR and in the VXO.  Contrarily to our initial conjecture, 
however,  we do not find that portfolio investments react to long term interest rate, maybe suggesting 
that portfolio investment decisions are mainly affected by the policy rate imposed by the FED. 
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Figure 6: Main results. Gross flows decomposition 
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5. Robustness check 
Our exercise suggests that shocks in the FFR and in the VXO are important for gross flows dynamics 
and credit to the private sector. To validate our results, we conduct  a series of robustness checks.  
 
First, we run our models taking gross inflows (ICPLF) in differences and our findings remain 
unchanged.    
 
Second, we test for structural breaks. As suggested by different authors, the crisis period presents 
special challenges in the VAR estimation, especially because the post-crisis period is associated with 
the Fed Funds rate pressed against the zero lower bound. In such a situation the impact of uncertainty 
shocks (measured by the VXO) might be substantially more pronounced Caggiano et al. (2014) and  
Federal Reserve may increasingly use unconventional instruments and communication to manipulate 
market interest rates, reducing the ability of Federal Fund rates to capture monetary policy shocks 
(Gertler and Karadi ,2013) As shown by  Bruno and Shin (2014)  and Bekaert et al. (2013) using a 
sample that encompasses the zero lower bound period shows weaker VAR impulse responses and 
many of the impulse response function associated with shifts in the Federal Funds target rate fail to 
show significant effects. We run our VARs on the sample 1990q1–2007q4, however excluding the 
crisis period does not strength our results. On the contrary we find that for most of the countries the 
impact of FFR on the VXO turn not significant at 95% confidence interval. We also test whether our 
model is affected by a structural break at the beginning of the so called conundrum period. The log 
likelihood ratio test reject this hypothesis that parameters differ before and after 2004.  
 
Third, we test the sensitivity of our VAR to alternative orderings of the variables. The order we 
impose implies that  the VXO  does not react to contemporaneous shocks of any variables but the 
FFR and, Gross flows can respond within the same quarter to any variables.  To check the extent to 
which these assumptions may affect our results, we order uncertainty last in our vector, i.e FFR, 
GDPGRSM, LNCRQR, ICAPLF and VXO. This alternative replicates more closely the ordering 
proposed by Rey (2013) and it implies that VXO reacts to contemporaneous shocks of any other 
variables.  Results remain almost unchanged but the response of gross flows to the VXO becomes 
weaker.  
 
Fourth, we check whether  our model may return spurious results due to the  lack of relevant 
information for modeling the interactions among the variables. We check the robustness of our results 
by including the nominal exchange rate taken in log (exrt)37 . Despite we choose countries with a 
floating exchange rate most of them have not had a passive role in the determination of the nominal 
exchange rate. Intervention in the FX market has been common practice (Frankel et al., 2010).  As it 
is well known, in the absence of intervention, capital inflows should lead to a nominal appreciation 
dampening and possibly reversing the impact of the foreign interest rate shock. This outcome is 
desiderable if domestic macroeconomic conditions are such that policy makers seek to avoid 
stimulating aggregate demand (Fernandez-Arias et al., 1995).  Including the exchange rate in our 
VAR does not change our main results. However it is interesting to note that the exchange rate reacts 
positively (nominal depreciation) to a  shock in the VXO and negatively (nominal appreciation) to a 
shocks in gross capital inflows and credit. Results are significant for all countries.  
  
                                                     
 
37 Exchange rate refers to local currency unit relative to the U.S. dollar, thus an increase of the variable corresponds to local 
currency depreciation.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we study the dynamic links between U.S. monetary policy shocks, risk aversion and 
uncertainty , capital flows and credit creation in EMs. In particular we try to understand whether 
different type of flows (foreign direct investment, portfolio investments and other inflows) react 
differently to short term interest rate shocks. We also try to identify whether portfolio investments 
react to long term rate shocks irrespective of the policy rate imposed by the FED. 
 
To this end we focus on six Middle Income Countries (South Africa, Peru, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Turkey, Brazil) that have recently experienced an upsurge in capital inflows.    For each country we 
run three VARs and we look, first, at the impact of FFR on total gross capital inflows; second,  we 
look at  whether shocks in U.S. monetary policy have a different impact on different type of flows; 
and finally we augment the VAR with US long term interest rate and we look at its impact on gross 
capital flows breakdown and credit to the private sector.  
 
We find that a restrictive monetary policy lowers gross capital flows and credit to the private sector 
after about 12 quarters and that it raises risk aversion in the stock market after about 5 quarters. Also 
we find that a shocks in the VXO leads to a decline in gross flows and credit, with the effect on credit 
lasting longer than the one on capital flows.  The analysis of the gross flows’ breakdown suggests that 
for most of the countries in our sample the negative impact of the FFR and the VXO to gross flows is 
driven by portfolio investments. Finally we find that shocks in the long term interest rate – that we 
interpret as shocks to the term premium  - do not have a significant impact either on the VXO Index 
or gross capital flows.  
 
Our main contribution to the literature is to highlight the role  of portfolio investments as transmission 
channel of monetary policy shocks.  Our results confirm  the initial  hypothesis that market and debt 
securities can play a role in transmitting  global liquidity towards EMs. Also, with regards to our 
initial conjecture, we do not find evidence that portfolio investments react to long term interest rate, 
suggesting that portfolio investment decisions are mainly affected by the policy rate imposed by the 
FED.  
 
Also our investigation suggests to revisit the  interpretation of the risk-taking channel.   Our findings 
are in line with most of the literature of global liquidity and capital flows determinants.  Consistently  
with the studies of Bekaert et al. (2014),  Rey (2013) and Bruno and Shin (2014), we show that FFR 
impacts the VXO (Bekaert et al., 2014; Rey, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2014) , gross flows (Rey, 2013) 
and credit to the private sector. Also we find that VXO impacts gross flows and credit (Rey, 2013). 
Their interpretation of the results suggest that funding cost affects bank’s decisions on how much 
exposure to take on, therefore monetary policy affects the economy through greater risk taking by the 
banking sector. Given the structure of our VAR, however,  -in which VXO is ordered after FFR and 
hence its orthogonal to its shocks-  we cannot interpret the impact of the VXO to gross flows and 
credit as the transmission channel of the monetary policy,  for that shocks in the VXO are purged 
from those in the FFR.   
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Figure A1 : U.S. short and long interest rate 
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Figure A2 : Gross and Net Capital Inflows (in millions of 
US$) 
 
Sample: 72 MICs (All MICs excluding China).  
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Figure A3: Gross Capital Inflows in different samples (in 
millions of US$) 
 
Sample: 72 MICs (All MICs excluding China) and 40 MICs.  
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Table A4: Description of the variables 
 
 
  
Variable Abbreviation Description Sources
Financial vulenrabilities
Credit to private sector (real term) LNCRQR Log of domestic bank and other financial institutions claims on the private sector IFS. Line 22d & 42D..ZF
Trasmission channel
Total inflows ICAPFL Total inflows (US$ dollar) IMF BOP. Line ICAPFL
FDI inflows IFDI FDI inflows (US$ dollar) IMF BOP. Line IFDI
Portfolio inflows IPF Cross border transactions and positions involving debt or equity securities , other than those included in the direct 
investment and reserve assets (US$ dollar)
IMF BOP. Line IPF
Other inflows IOTHF Other inflows. It includes: i)other equity; ii) currency and deposit; iii) loans (including use of IMF credit and loans 
from the IMF); non -life insurance technical reserves, life insurance and annuities entitlements, and provisions for 
calls under standardized guarantees; iv)trade credit and advances; v) other account receivable/payable; and vi) 
SDR allocation (SDR holding are included in reserve assets) (US$ dollar)
IMF BOP. Line IOTHF
Global factors
Short term interest rate FFR Effective Federal Fund Rates, End of Period (% p. a.) Federal Reserve Board; Selected Interest Rates, release 
H.15
Real long term interest rate USBOND 10 year bond yield deflated ex post by the annual US Consumer Price Index
Consumer Price inflation
IFS
VXO VXO Log of  implied volatility computed using 30-day S&P 100 index at-the-money options. Chicago Board Option  Exchange
Yield spread yldspr 10 years US bond  -  3 months US Treasury Bill Author calculation
Pull factors
Real GDP growth GDPGRSM Real GDP growth Haver Analytics
Other variables
Rate of inflation CPI Percentage change of CPI IFS
Flexibility of the exchange rate regime EXREG Coarse classification Ilzetzky, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/IRRBack.htm
Nominal exchange rate exrt National currency per US$ IFS
U.S. GDP USGDP U.S. GDP Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.
U.S. GDP deflator GDPDEF U.S. GDP deflator Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.
Growth of U.S. GDP USGDPGR Log of US GDP growth Author calculation
Growth of U.S. GDP deflator USGDPDEFGR US GDP deflator growth Author calculation
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Table A5: Correlation table 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
USGDP 1 1
552
GDPDEF 2 0.9717* 1
552 552
ffr 3 -0.6358* -0.7089* 1
552 552 552
usbond 4 -0.8977* -0.9205* 0.8262* 1
552 552 552 552
yldspr 5 -0.0645 0.0348 -0.6643* -0.1347* 1
552 552 552 552 552
vxo 6 0.2060* 0.1900* -0.1866* -0.2508* 0.0484 1
552 552 552 552 552 552
gdpgrsm 7 0.1522* 0.1588* -0.0518 -0.0648 -0.0073 -0.2646* 1
528 528 528 528 528 528 528
icapfl 8 0.3479* 0.3972* -0.2262* -0.3249* -0.0255 -0.1485* 0.1160* 1
548 548 548 548 548 548 528 548
iothf 9 0.1950* 0.2242* -0.0972* -0.1716* -0.0409 -0.1079* 0.1483* 0.6491* 1
548 548 548 548 548 548 528 548 548
ifdi 10 0.3733* 0.4084* -0.2443* -0.3634* -0.0419 0.0659 -0.0013 0.7482* 0.2736* 1
548 548 548 548 548 548 528 548 548 548
ipf 11 0.1697* 0.2069* -0.1386* -0.1557* 0.0277 -0.2418* 0.0817 0.6759* 0.0443 0.3349* 1
548 548 548 548 548 548 528 548 548 548 548
lncrqr 12 0.4306* 0.4655* -0.3059* -0.4242* -0.0208 0.0624 -0.0223 0.5566* 0.2219* 0.5765* 0.3773* 1
552 552 552 552 552 552 528 548 548 548 548 552
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Table A6: Other inflows breakdown 
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APPENDIX 2. Results 
 
Table 1. VAR(1). Indonesia 
 
  
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.025
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-4,000
-3,000
-2,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0050
-.0025
.0000
.0025
.0050
.0075
.0100
.0125
.0150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-1,200
-800
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-2,000,000
-1,000,000
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
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Table 2. VAR(1). Brazil 
 
  
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-2,000
-1,500
-1,000
-500
0
500
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.07
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
.007
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-1,200
-800
-400
0
400
800
1,200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-20,000,000
-10,000,000
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
  
  141  
 
Table 3. VAR(1). Peru 
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0025
-.0020
-.0015
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.25
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.012
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.10
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
.0000
.0002
.0004
.0006
.0008
.0010
.0012
.0014
.0016
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-200,000
-100,000
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
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Table 4. VAR(1). Philippines 
 
  
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.10
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-500,000
-250,000
0
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
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Table 5. VAR(1). South Africa 
 
  
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.32
-.28
-.24
-.20
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.050
-.025
.000
.025
.050
.075
.100
.125
.150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0015
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.10
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-1,600
-1,200
-800
-400
0
400
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-2,000,000
-1,000,000
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
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Table 6. VAR(1). Turkey 
 
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_ICAPFL
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_ICAPFL
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-4,000
-3,000
-2,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_ICAPFL
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
160
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_ICAPFL
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_FFR
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_VXO
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_GDPGRSM
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
160
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_LNCRQR
-6,000,000
-4,000,000
-2,000,000
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ICAPFL_to_ICAPFL
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Table 7. VAR(2). Indonesia 
 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-1 5 0
-1 2 5
-1 0 0
-7 5
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
.0 1 6
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
.1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
7 5
1 0 0
1 2 5
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.2 5
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-5 0 0
-2 5 0
0
2 5 0
5 0 0
7 5 0
1 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 5 0
1 ,5 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-1 ,5 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0
0
5 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 6
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
.1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
.0 1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 8. VAR(2). Brazil 
 
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
.1 6
.2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-1 ,6 0 0
-1 ,2 0 0
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,6 0 0
-1 ,2 0 0
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
.0 1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
.1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-1 .5
-1 .0
-0 .5
0 .0
0 .5
1 .0
1 .5
2 .0
2 .5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,5 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0
0
5 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-6 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
0
2 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-1 2 ,0 0 0
-8 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0
0
4 ,0 0 0
8 ,0 0 0
1 2 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 6
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.1 0
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
.0 0 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-2 5 0
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-5 0 0
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-1 ,2 0 0
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-1 ,0 0 0
-7 5 0
-5 0 0
-2 5 0
0
2 5 0
5 0 0
7 5 0
1 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 9. VAR(2). Peru 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.2 5
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 2 0
-.0 0 1 5
-.0 0 1 0
-.0 0 0 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 5
.0 0 1 0
.0 0 1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
.0 1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 1 2
-.0 0 0 8
-.0 0 0 4
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 4
.0 0 0 8
.0 0 1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-1 6
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.2 5
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-1 ,6 0 0
-1 ,2 0 0
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 2
.0 0 0 4
.0 0 0 6
.0 0 0 8
.0 0 1 0
.0 0 1 2
.0 0 1 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 0
1 2
1 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
1 6 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 5 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 5 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 5 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
1 6 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-1 2 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 10. VAR(2). Philippines 
 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-2 0
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
.0 2 0
.0 2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.1 0
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0 .8
-0 .4
0 .0
0 .4
0 .8
1 .2
1 .6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-5 0 0
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 1 2
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 0 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 5
.0 0 1 0
.0 0 1 5
.0 0 2 0
.0 0 2 5
.0 0 3 0
.0 0 3 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 5
-2 0
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-1 6
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-6 0
-5 0
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 6
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 0
2 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
  
  149  
 
Table 11. VAR(2). South Africa 
 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.2 8
-.2 4
-.2 0
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 5
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.0 5 0
-.0 2 5
.0 0 0
.0 2 5
.0 5 0
.0 7 5
.1 0 0
.1 2 5
.1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 2 0
-.0 0 1 5
-.0 0 1 0
-.0 0 0 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 5
.0 0 1 0
.0 0 1 5
.0 0 2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0 .5 0
-0 .2 5
0 .0 0
0 .2 5
0 .5 0
0 .7 5
1 .0 0
1 .2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
.0 0 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-5 0
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-1 ,0 0 0
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 0
2 4
2 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 12. VAR(2). Turkey 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 2 5
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 2
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 0 5 0
-.0 0 2 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 2 5
.0 0 5 0
.0 0 7 5
.0 1 0 0
.0 1 2 5
.0 1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
.0 0 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-5 0
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-6 ,0 0 0
-5 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
.3 0
.3 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
.0 0 8
.0 1 0
.0 1 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-7 5
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
7 5
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
1 ,6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-4 ,0 0 0
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
5 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 13. VAR(3). Indonesia 
 
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_USBOND
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_VXO
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IFDI
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0
-2 5 0
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_USBOND
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_VXO
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IFDI
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IPF
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-1 ,5 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0
0
5 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 6
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 5 0
-.0 0 2 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 2 5
.0 0 5 0
.0 0 7 5
.0 1 0 0
.0 1 2 5
.0 1 5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_FFR
-5 0
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_USBOND
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_VXO
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IFDI
-1 5 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 5 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IPF
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_FFR
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_USBOND
-3 0 0
-2 5 0
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_VXO
-1 ,0 0 0
-7 5 0
-5 0 0
-2 5 0
0
2 5 0
5 0 0
7 5 0
1 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IFDI
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 14. VAR(3). Brazil 
- . 15
-. 10
-. 05
. 00
. 05
. 10
. 15
. 20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_FFR
- . 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
. 03
. 04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_USBOND
- . 06
-. 04
-. 02
. 00
. 02
. 04
. 06
. 08
. 10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_VXO
- . 3
-. 2
-. 1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
- . 008
-. 006
-. 004
-. 002
. 000
. 002
. 004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IFDI
-2, 000
-1, 600
-1, 200
-800
-400
0
400
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IOTHF
-2, 500
-2, 000
-1, 500
-1, 000
-500
0
500
1, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FFR_to_IPF
- . 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
. 03
. 04
. 05
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_FFR
- . 015
-. 010
-. 005
. 000
. 005
. 010
. 015
. 020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_USBOND
- . 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
. 03
. 04
. 05
. 06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_VXO
- . 08
-. 04
. 00
. 04
. 08
. 12
. 16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
- . 005
-. 004
-. 003
-. 002
-. 001
. 000
. 001
. 002
. 003
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IFDI
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IOTHF
-800
-400
0
400
800
1, 200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VXO_to_IPF
- . 4
-. 3
-. 2
-. 1
. 0
. 1
. 2
. 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
- . 15
-. 10
-. 05
. 00
. 05
. 10
. 15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
- . 3
-. 2
-. 1
. 0
. 1
. 2
. 3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-1. 5
-1. 0
-0. 5
0. 0
0. 5
1. 0
1. 5
2. 0
2. 5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
- . 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
. 03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-2, 000
-1, 500
-1, 000
-500
0
500
1, 000
1, 500
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-8, 000
-6, 000
-4, 000
-2, 000
0
2, 000
4, 000
6, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-12, 000
-8, 000
-4, 000
0
4, 000
8, 000
12, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
- . 06
-. 05
-. 04
-. 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
. 03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_FFR
- . 008
-. 004
. 000
. 004
. 008
. 012
. 016
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
- . 04
-. 03
-. 02
-. 01
. 00
. 01
. 02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_VXO
- . 08
-. 06
-. 04
-. 02
. 00
. 02
. 04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
- . 001
. 000
. 001
. 002
. 003
. 004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-200
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_FFR
-200
-160
-120
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_USBOND
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_VXO
-1, 200
-800
-400
0
400
800
1, 200
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-2, 000, 000
-1, 000, 000
0
1, 000, 000
2, 000, 000
3, 000, 000
4, 000, 000
5, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IFDI
-8, 000, 000
-4, 000, 000
0
4, 000, 000
8, 000, 000
12, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-6, 000, 000
-4, 000, 000
-2, 000, 000
0
2, 000, 000
4, 000, 000
6, 000, 000
8, 000, 000
10, 000, 000
12, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IFDI_to_IPF
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_FFR
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-1, 200
-800
-400
0
400
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_VXO
-3, 000
-2, 000
-1, 000
0
1, 000
2, 000
3, 000
4, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-6, 000, 000
-4, 000, 000
-2, 000, 000
0
2, 000, 000
4, 000, 000
6, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-20, 000, 000
-10, 000, 000
0
10, 000, 000
20, 000, 000
30, 000, 000
40, 000, 000
50, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-15, 000, 000
-10, 000, 000
-5, 000, 000
0
5, 000, 000
10, 000, 000
15, 000, 000
20, 000, 000
25, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IOTHF_to_IPF
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_FFR
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_USBOND
-1, 000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_VXO
-3, 000
-2, 000
-1, 000
0
1, 000
2, 000
3, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-6, 000, 000
-5, 000, 000
-4, 000, 000
-3, 000, 000
-2, 000, 000
-1, 000, 000
0
1, 000, 000
2, 000, 000
3, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IFDI
-20, 000, 000
-10, 000, 000
0
10, 000, 000
20, 000, 000
30, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IOTHF
-20, 000, 000
-10, 000, 000
0
10, 000, 000
20, 000, 000
30, 000, 000
40, 000, 000
50, 000, 000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 15. VAR(3). Peru 
 
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_USBOND
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_VXO
-.2 0
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_ IFDI
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IOTHF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_ to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
.0 1 2
.0 1 6
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_USBOND
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_VXO
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 2 0
-.0 0 1 5
-.0 0 1 0
-.0 0 0 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 5
.0 0 1 0
.0 0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IFDI
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-7 5
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
7 5
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_ IPF
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 2 5
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-1 ,5 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0
0
5 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
-.0 2 4
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 0 4
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 0 4
.0 0 0 8
.0 0 1 2
.0 0 1 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_FFR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_USBOND
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_VXO
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 5 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IFDI
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 5 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
-5 0 ,0 0 0
0
5 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 5 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
1 6 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_ IPF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_FFR
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IPF
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_ to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_USBOND
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-1 2 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_ to_IFDI
-5 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 16. VAR(3). Philippines 
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
.1 6
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_ to_FFR
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_USBOND
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_VXO
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_ IFDI
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IOTHF
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_ to_IPF
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_USBOND
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_VXO
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IFDI
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_ IPF
-.2 0
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
.1 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
-.2 0
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0 .5 0
-0 .2 5
0 .0 0
0 .2 5
0 .5 0
0 .7 5
1 .0 0
1 .2 5
1 .5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
-.0 2 8
-.0 2 4
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 6
-.0 1 2
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 4
.0 0 0
.0 0 4
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 5
-2 0
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_FFR
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_USBOND
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_VXO
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IFDI
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_ IPF
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_FFR
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_VXO
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IPF
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_ to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_USBOND
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_VXO
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 6
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 0
2 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_ to_IFDI
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IOTHF
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IPF
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Table 17. VAR(3). South Africa 
 
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_USBOND
-.1 0
-.0 8
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_VXO
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 2 5
-.0 1 0 0
-.0 0 7 5
-.0 0 5 0
-.0 0 2 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 2 5
.0 0 5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IFDI
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IOTHF
-6 0 0
-5 0 0
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_USBOND
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_VXO
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 3
-.0 0 2
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
.0 0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IFDI
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IOTHF
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IPF
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
.1 2
.1 6
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.1 0 0
-.0 7 5
-.0 5 0
-.0 2 5
.0 0 0
.0 2 5
.0 5 0
.0 7 5
.1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
-.2 4
-.2 0
-.1 6
-.1 2
-.0 8
-.0 4
.0 0
.0 4
.0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-0 .8
-0 .4
0 .0
0 .4
0 .8
1 .2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 1 0 0
-.0 0 7 5
-.0 0 5 0
-.0 0 2 5
.0 0 0 0
.0 0 2 5
.0 0 5 0
.0 0 7 5
.0 1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.0 6
-.0 4
-.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.0 0 1
.0 0 2
.0 0 3
.0 0 4
.0 0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_FFR
-1 0 0
-7 5
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
7 5
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_USBOND
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
1 6
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IFDI
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IPF
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_FFR
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-1 6 0
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_VXO
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 2
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IPF
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_FFR
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_USBOND
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_VXO
-1 ,2 0 0
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-3 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IFDI
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IOTHF
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IPF
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-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_FFR
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_USBOND
-.0 6
-.0 5
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_VXO
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_LNCRQR
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IFDI
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IOTHF
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
FFR_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
.0 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_FFR
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_USBOND
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
.0 4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_VXO
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 8
-.0 0 6
-.0 0 4
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
.0 0 8
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_LNCRQR
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IFDI
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IOTHF
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
VXO_to_IPF
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_FFR
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_USBOND
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_VXO
-8
-4
0
4
8
1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_GDPGRSM
-.1 5
-.1 0
-.0 5
.0 0
.0 5
.1 0
.1 5
.2 0
.2 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IFDI
-6 ,0 0 0
-4 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
0
2 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IOTHF
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,5 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
-5 0 0
0
5 0 0
1 ,0 0 0
1 ,5 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
2 ,5 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
GDPGRSM_to_IPF
-.0 4
-.0 3
-.0 2
-.0 1
.0 0
.0 1
.0 2
.0 3
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_FFR
-.0 2 0
-.0 1 5
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_USBOND
-.0 1 0
-.0 0 5
.0 0 0
.0 0 5
.0 1 0
.0 1 5
.0 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_VXO
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_GDPGRSM
-.0 0 2
.0 0 0
.0 0 2
.0 0 4
.0 0 6
.0 0 8
.0 1 0
.0 1 2
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_LNCRQR
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IFDI
-2 5 0
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IOTHF
-1 0 0
-7 5
-5 0
-2 5
0
2 5
5 0
7 5
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
LNCRQR_to_IPF
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_FFR
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_USBOND
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_VXO
-8 0 0
-4 0 0
0
4 0 0
8 0 0
1 ,2 0 0
1 ,6 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_GDPGRSM
-4 0
-3 0
-2 0
-1 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_LNCRQR
-1 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IFDI
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IOTHF
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IFDI_to_IPF
-6 0 0
-4 0 0
-2 0 0
0
2 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_FFR
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_USBOND
-4 0 0
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_VXO
-4 ,0 0 0
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0
5 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 2 0
-8 0
-4 0
0
4 0
8 0
1 2 0
1 6 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_LNCRQR
-6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IFDI
-4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IOTHF
-1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IOTHF_to_IPF
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_FFR
-2 0 0
-1 5 0
-1 0 0
-5 0
0
5 0
1 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_USBOND
-3 0 0
-2 0 0
-1 0 0
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_VXO
-3 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_GDPGRSM
-1 0 0
-8 0
-6 0
-4 0
-2 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_LNCRQR
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IFDI
-3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IOTHF
-1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
-8 0 0 ,0 0 0
-4 0 0 ,0 0 0
0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
IPF_to_IPF
  
 
 
